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Abstract
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems [Gaushell and Darlington,
1987; Krutz, 2006] are responsible for controlling and monitoring Industrial Control
Systems (ICS) and Critical Infrastructure Systems (CIS) among others. Such systems
are responsible to provide services our society relies on such as gas, electricity, and
water distribution. They process our waste; manage our railways and our traffic. Nev-
ertheless to say, they are vital for our society and any disruptions on such systems may
produce from financial disasters to ultimately loss of lives.
SCADA systems have evolved over the years, from standalone, proprietary solutions
and closed networks into large-scale, highly distributed software systems operating over
open networks such as the internet. In addition, the hardware and software utilised by
SCADA systems is now, in most cases, based on COTS (Commercial Off-The-Shelf)
solutions. As they evolved they became vulnerable to malicious attacks.
Over the last few years there is a push from the computer security industry on adapting
their security tools and techniques to address the security issues of SCADA systems.
Such move is welcome however is not sufficient, otherwise successful malicious attacks
on computer systems would be non-existent.
We strongly believe that rather than trying to stop and detect every attack on SCADA
systems it is imperative to focus on providing critical services in the presence of mali-
cious attacks. Such motivation is similar with the concepts of survivability, a discipline
integrates areas of computer science such as performance, security, fault-tolerance and
reliability.
In this thesis we present a new concept of survivability; Holistic survivability is an
analysis framework suitable for a new era of data-driven networked systems. It ex-
tends the current view of survivability by incorporating service interdependencies as a
key property and aspects of machine learning. The framework uses the formalism of
probabilistic graphical models to quantify survivability and introduces new metrics and
heuristics to learn and identify essential services automatically.
Current definitions of survivability are often limited since they either apply performance
as measurement metric or use security metrics without any survivability context. Holis-
tic survivability addresses such issues by providing a flexible framework where per-
formance and security metrics can be tailored to the context of survivability. In other
words, by applying performance and security our work aims to support key survivability
properties such as recognition and resistance. The models and metrics here introduced
are applied to SCADA systems as such systems insecurity is one of the motivations of
this work. We believe that the proposed work goes beyond the current status of surviv-
ability models. Holistic survivability is flexible enough to support the addition of other
metrics and can be easily used with different models, for instance a hybrid of perfor-
mance and security. Because it is based on a well-known formalism its definition and
implementation are easy to grasp and to apply. Perhaps more importantly this proposed
work is aimed to a new era where data is being produced and consumed on a large-
scale. Holistic survivability aims to be the catalyst to new models based on data that
will provide better and more accurate insights on the survivability of systems.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This chapter introduces our motivation to pursue this research. It highlights the current
issues affecting SCADA systems and also gives an overview of the main ideas devel-
oped in this thesis. It goes further presenting the research questions this thesis aims to
address and how the introduced concepts provide a better solution for evaluating the
survivability of SCADA systems.
1.1 Motivation
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems [Gaushell and Darlington,
1987; Krutz, 2006] are responsible for controlling and monitoring Industrial Control
Systems (ICS) and Critical Infrastructure Systems (CIS) among others. Such systems
are responsible to provide services our society relies on such as gas, electricity, and
water distribution. They process our waste, manage our railways and our traffic. Nev-
ertheless to say, they are vital for our society and any disruptions on such systems may
produce from financial disasters to ultimately loss of lives.
In the past, SCADA and consequently the systems monitored and controlled by them
were somehow protected because they relied on proprietary technologies, and with a
very close industry nearly no information spread beyond the community. However
SCADA systems have evolved over the years, from standalone, proprietary solutions
and closed networks into large-scale, highly distributed computing systems operating
over open networks such as the internet. In addition the hardware and software utilised
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by SCADA systems are now, in most cases, based on COTS (Commercial Off-The-
Shelf) solutions.
Although such changes increased the efficiency and sophistication of the services pro-
vided, it also increased their vulnerability to malicious attacks. The once closed, propri-
etary software and hardware infrastructure is now vulnerable to attacks originating from
external (internet) and internal corporate networks. The attacks plaguing such systems
are the same ones that have been affecting ordinary systems over the years (e.g. Virus,
Trojans, Worms). Additionally, the network protocols used by SCADA systems were
not designed with security requirements in mind. For instance, the majority of protocols
does not support any type of cryptography. The industry however, shows signs that it is
changing.
Over the last few years there is a push from the computer security industry on adapt-
ing their security tools and techniques to address the security issues of SCADA sys-
tems [Coutinho et al., 2008; Gula, 2007; Kolesnikov and Lee, 2006]. DigitalBond [dig,
2012] initiatives such as QuickDraw SCADA IDS, which extends the existing Intrusion
Detection Systems (IDS) by adding signatures to SCADA-based protocols, devices and
vulnerabilities and project Basecamp, which aims to assess the security of SCADA field
devices by hacking them and making the exploits publicly available, show that the ICS
industry is not ignoring the problem. In addition to such initiatives, the U.S. government
together with the ICS industry has put in place a set of standards and regulations that
provide recommendations on how to protect SCADA systems [Knapp, 2011]. Those
initiatives are on the right track to probably reach the level of security currently de-
ployed on enterprise and personal computer systems. However as we all known this
is not sufficient, otherwise successful malicious attacks on computer systems would be
non-existent.
The fight against malicious attacks seems to be endless. Security experts appear to agree
that the best approaches against such attacks are [Anderson, 2010]:
• Management - keep systems up-to-date and configured to minimise the attack
surface. In other words, keep an endless scanning mechanism looking for vulner-
abilities in applications running in the network.
• Filtering - use firewalls to stop trojans and network exploits, and to detect signs
of attack and compromise, in case anything gets through.
16
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• Intrusion detection - have programs monitoring your networks and machines for
signs of malicious behaviours.
• Encryption - use protocols such as TLS and SSH that enable the protection of
specific parts of the network against some type of attacks.
Such approaches might be effective to minimise the number of attacks, but they do not
avoid them. For SCADA systems, some of these concepts cannot even be applied. For
instance, we do not know how sensors and actuators will behave when using encrypted
channels for communicating with each other. SCADA systems cannot afford be off-line
even for a short periods of time, therefore, upgrades that demands restarts are not an
option in many cases. Current firewalls and intrusion detection systems still need to
improve their support to the protocols used in SCADA systems, a significant part of
these protocols utilised by SCADA systems are not recognised by current firewalls and
IDS tools [East et al., 2009; Huitsing et al., 2008; Zhu and Sastry, 2010].
In the case of SCADA systems, the possibility of attacks are numerous. Most exploits
currently used to attack corporate networks may also be applied to SCADA networks.
For instance, virus, worms, and trojans used to infect and gain control of Windows
machines on corporate networks can also infect SCADA networks. Many SCADA
applications such as MTUs and protocol gateways run on Windows. Below we describe
some possible attack scenarios on SCADA networks.
• Denial of Services (DoS) attacks - Zombie computers that are part of a botnet
are programmed to send requests to SCADA machines exposed to the internet.
(e.g. gateways, firewalls). The attacks will degrade the network and as a direct
consequence the SCADA controllers will receive late or not data from the devices
deployed in the field (e.g RTUs, PLCs). As a consequence, system operators
would not rely on any information acquired in the field, making any decision
possibly erroneous.
• Virus infection - A corporate computer is infected by a virus because a user
clicked on a bogus link and downloaded a contaminated file, a user plugged to
the computer a USB dongle contaminated with a virus. Those are examples of
initial virus infections. Once a computer in the network is infected the virus
infection would spread quickly. For instance, for the case where the SCADA
machine used to control and monitor field devices is in the same network of the
17
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infected computer it is not hard to image this machine would also be infected, as
the virus could easily copy itself to the SCADA machine. Another case is when
the initial infected machine is the one used by the system operator to deploy
applications to the SCADA system. The virus could reprogram the application
to give new instructions. In fact such attack vectors were used by Stuxnet, a
virus that targeted exclusively SCADA systems [Farwell and Rohozinski, 2011].
Stuxnet changed the original instructions to increase the operating frequencies of
the centrifuges in a nuclear plant.
• Internal attack - SCADA operators have unrestricted access to the SCADA sys-
tem they are supervising. An unhappy employee could perform an internal attack
without being even noticed. In 2001 an employee caused 800,000 litres of raw
sewage to spill out into local parks and rivers in Australia [Stephanou, 2001].
• Exploitation through software vulnerability - New vulnerabilities are discov-
ered every day. A well-informed attacker may write exploits [Foster, 2006] to
target new vulnerabilities that are not patched by the critical infrastructure com-
pany. Even for the cases there are patches available critical systems have a slower
than the normal policy to apply patches. By exploiting the vulnerability the at-
tacker can gain access to the machine, and consequently perform any operation
desired. Figure 1.1 shows the number of vulnerabilities affecting SCADA sys-
tems over the last ten years. The numbers are only increasing.
• Social engineering - Attacks through social engineering are common. In [Mit-
nick, 2011], the author describes how he fouled employees of telecommunica-
tion companies to get access to user credentials he could use to penetrate their
systems. In the case of SCADA systems, companies that provide critical in-
frastructure services such as power grid distributors, have multiple remote sites
(substations) whose employees need to visit from time to time. A smart attacker
could try to foul the company employees to have access to the remote network
by calling the central office saying she or he is an employee and needs to connect
to the field network but forgot the network access credentials. The central office
could ask questions to certify that the attacker is really an employee, however as
shown in [Mitnick, 2011] this can be easily circumvented. Once connected to the
network the attacker could perform any authorised operation.
From the attacks highlighted above the most commons are the ones performed by ex-
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ploiting vulnerabilities on software components. Typical SCADA systems have two
type of software components: embedded (which runs on field devices) and COTS
(which runs on SCADA servers). Despite such systems provide different character-
istics of development and deployment, they share the same type of security problems,
they all are vulnerable to attacks.
In general, an embedded software is developed to a specific hardware that means the
software is customised to that device. Usually, the software is proprietary and the se-
curity is achieved through obscurity. Security researchers do not have access to the
software, therefore they do not know what the possible vulnerabilities are. COTS soft-
ware means the software is not customised to a certain environment or application. For
instance, the software that we use on our personal computers is the same one that runs
on SCADA systems. The Windows operating system is an example. Of course, we and
the company that runs the SCADA system have different needs for security. We can
afford to be off-line for couple hours to apply an update that patches a vulnerability.
This is not the case to a power grid company, their systems run twenty-four-by-seven.
Because they cannot apply patches immediately they remain vulnerable to attacks for a
longer period of time.
The security of critical systems is of enormous importance. Unfortunately when com-
pared with the general computer security industry they are very behind. Even though
both industries are sharing the same software and hardware, in most cases.
The computer security industry knows that security is hard [Garfinkel, 2012; Hyppo-
nen, 2012; Moitra and Konda, 2000]. As mentioned earlier, for many years the security
industry has tried to improve and fix the security on computer systems. For a mat-
ter of fact the security has improved immensely over the last decade, however we are
no where close to totally secure systems. Statements made by people from the secu-
rity industry corroborate such view. Recently, in an article to a technology magazine,
Mikko Hypponen (CTO of F-Secure, a security company) wrote about why anti-virus
companies did not catch virus such as Stuxnet and Flame [Farwell and Rohozinski,
2011; Nicolas Falliere and Chien, 2011], worms built to attack SCADA systems. The
writer clearly says that anti-virus products made for regular consumers will not protect
against well-resourced adversaries [Hypponen, 2012]. This means many things. First,
the use of COTS hardware and software in critical systems is not a good idea. Second,
anti-virus companies will never reach the level of sophistication of a well-resourced
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adversary. And Third, anti-virus products will always be behind trying to keep up to
date.
Because of the widely spread use of COTS solutions researchers and adversaries [Knapp,
2011] are more aware of the internals of SCADA systems, the once proudly used ‘se-
curity through obscurity’ mantra does not apply any more. To further corroborate our
statement we did a search for the keyword scada on the Open Source Vulnerability
DataBase (OSVDB) [OSV, 2012], an open source database initiative that catalogues
vulnerabilities on computer systems. The search returned 362 vulnerabilities. Fig-
ure 1.1 shows vulnerabilities targeting SCADA systems grouped by category. We can
see vulnerabilities such as XSS and SQL injection, which are common on web systems.
Clearly the adoption of COTS solutions by SCADA systems helped on increasing the
number of vulnerabilities targeting them. The database of vulnerabilities can be down-
loaded from [Queiroz, 2012].
A
r
b
it
r
a
r
y
F
il
e
C
o
d
e
E
x
e
c
u
t
io
n
C
S
R
F
D
O
S
In
f
o
D
is
c
lo
s
u
r
e
M
e
m
o
r
y
C
o
r
r
u
p
t
io
n
O
t
h
e
r
O
v
e
r
f
lo
w
P
r
iv
il
e
g
e
E
s
c
a
la
t
io
n
S
Q
L
In
je
c
t
io
n
X
S
S
Category
20
40
60
80
100
Vulnerabilities
SCADA Vulnerabilities by Category - OSVDB
Figure 1.1: ICS/SCADA Vulnerabilities reported since 2001 grouped by category
From the same database [OSV, 2012], Figure 1.2 illustrates the number of vulnerabili-
ties targeting SCADA systems since 2001. We can see that the number of vulnerabilities
has double from 2009 to 2010 and more than double from 2010 to 2011. The database is
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from mid-2012 and the number of vulnerabilities already reported is on the right track
to maintain the growth. It is important to say that the years that vulnerabilities were
not reported it was not because they did not exist. They just were not catalogued. The
362 vulnerabilities reported are only the point of the iceberg. There is a much higher
number of vulnerabilities not reported either because they derives from the ones already
reported or because the vendors fear for their market share and public trust.
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Figure 1.2: ICS/SCADA Vulnerabilities reported since 2001
On reporting and cataloguing attacks on SCADA systems there is the Repository of
Industrial Security Incidents (RISI) initiative [RIS, 2012], an organisation that aims to
collect and sell information about attacks on SCADA systems. Going in a opposite
direction from [OSV, 2012], RISI sells subscriptions to individuals and organisations
to have access to their database of incidents. RISI is a re-branding of the so called
Industrial Incident Database (ISID) that for many years was controlled by a group of
researchers at British Columbia Institute of Technology (BCIT). According to [Byres
and Leversage, 2007], one of the founders of the ISID database initiative, ISID had cata-
logued 105 incidents by 2006. In 2009 RISI reported that they had 175 incidents in their
database [RIS, 2012]. Recently ICS-CERT released a report that summarises malicious
activities against ICS systems [Team, 2012]. The report corroborates the trend of an in-
creasing number of attacks against ICS systems. From the attacks on SCADA systems,
Stuxnet is the most important one for few reasons. Stuxnet is a worm/virus/malware
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that was created with the specific purpose of infecting and damaging the nuclear plants
in Iran [Sanger, 2012]. Many say that it introduced the concept of cyber-weapons, soft-
ware made with the specific purpose of attacking enemies [Sanger, 2012]. Yet according
to [Sanger, 2012], Stuxnet was a jointly work between the US and Israel governments,
examples of well-resourced adversaries discussed by [Hypponen, 2012].
Also as is the case to the vulnerabilities database, the number of attacks reported by
[Team, 2012] is only a small fraction of the actual amount. Many companies fear that
by disclosing an attack they will lose the confident of their customers and shareholders.
Another problem is that network traffic datasets, widely used to simulate and identify
attacks, are not publicly available for SCADA traffic [Carlson, 2002; Lu¨ders, 2005;
Stamp et al., 2003].
From what has been discussed so far it is clear that the current state of affairs in security
systems that provide mechanisms based on prevention and interdiction [Coutinho et al.,
2008; Goseva-Popstojanova et al., 2001; Gula, 2007; Kolesnikov and Lee, 2006; Krugel
and Toth, 2001; Long et al., 2005] are not offering the desired level of security. We
believe that such security level is not enough for SCADA systems. SCADA systems
requirements are quite different from general corporate systems, they are widely spread,
they rely on multiple technologies, they have limited resources, they are a mixture of
real-time and not real-time operations and more importantly they have different needs
regarding their availability, reliability and security, among other things. We strongly
believe that rather than trying to stop and detect every attack on SCADA systems it
is imperative to focus on providing critical services in the presence of malicious attacks.
Such motivation is similar with the concepts of survivability [Ellison et al., 1997], a
discipline that aims to integrates other areas of computer science such as performance,
security, fault-tolerance and reliability.
We believe that the security of SCADA systems should be approached from a surviv-
ability perspective. Rather than trying to achieve an attack-free system, survivability
focuses on provisioning of an acceptable level of services even in the presence of ma-
licious attacks. Models have been used to analyse survivability attributes qualitatively,
focusing on the process to build survivable systems, and quantitatively, focusing on
measuring the survivability of current systems. Survivability can help on improving the
security of SCADA systems by offering a model that includes security as a key attribute
to keep the quality of service of such systems.
22
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
1.2 Existing solutions
Survivability is a concept that originated in the design of military communications net-
works where every operation should be reliable even if some communication links were
destroyed [Frank, 1974]. It can be broadly defined as the capacity of keeping essential
services of a system running in case of undesired events. It was later introduced to com-
puting systems as a framework for developing requirements and strategies to build more
effective systems [Ellison et al., 1997]. Since then, survivability has been actively stud-
ied. [Dai et al., 2007] catalogued a fair amount of work on design, architectures, and
models to analyse survivability. In this thesis we are looking at the security perspectives
that survivability offers. The undesired events in which survivability should act upon
are here defined as malicious attacks. Current survivability models implementations are
applied as a tool that provides a cost and performance analysis of the system. Their goal
is to measure the system both in terms of the degree of functionality after an undesired
event as well as the resultant cost of applying changes on the architecture and design of
the system.
The seminal work of [Ellison et al., 1997], which was the first complete document
on describing survivability to computer systems, did not get to the point of providing a
quantification of survivability as the one proposed by the ANSI T1A1.2 group [T1A1.2,
2001]. The ANSI committee defines survivability as the measure of the interest value
V that has a value V0 just before the failure happens. Then, the survivability behaviour
is represented by Va, the value of V just after the failure occurs, Vu, the maximum
difference between V and Va after the failure, Vr is the value of V when the system
is restored after time Tr, and tR is the time used to the system recovery to the original
value V .
However [Ellison et al., 1997] described (i) what is survivability, in what domains it is
valid, (ii) what are the characteristics of survivable systems, and (iii) how survivability is
related to Engineering. They put survivability together with security and fault-tolerance,
and introduced the concepts of essential and non-essential services and the design and
architecture of survivable systems. Since then, survivability has turned different paths
as we can see by comparing the definitions of survivability presented by [T1A1.2, 2001]
and [Ellison et al., 1997].
Today, the state of the practice on survivability is better illustrated by Figure 1.3. The
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research can be categorised into three groups: Design and architecture, Methodologies
for development and implementation of survivable systems, and Analysis models.
Methodologies AnalysisModels
Design
&
Architecture
Figure 1.3: Current approaches on survivability
Due to the proliferation of definitions, there is not much agreement on what survivability
is and how it should be applied. [Westmark, 2004] catalogued more than 50 definitions
of survivability. Definitions that encompass the quantification of metrics on critical
services by comparing them before and after failures, accidents or attacks to the analysis
of network services. In some cases, they do not differentiate much from concepts such
as performability, a measure that unifies performance and reliability [Meyer, 1980].
The design and architecture of survivable systems aimed to enhance the survivability of
information systems by providing mechanisms which allow the detection and treatment
of various types of undesired events. The idea is to have a blueprint that could be used
to build survivable information systems. It would allow the support of survivability
requirements such as resistance, detection, recovery and adaptation.
The methodologies would provide guidelines and an entire process on how to analyse
the survivability of organisations managed by systems through their development life-
cycle [Ellison and Woody, 2010].
We believe that current survivability definitions and models are limited. First, even
though some definitions of survivability recognised security as an important aspect [El-
lison et al., 1999] there is not much survivability models evaluating the security aspects
of systems. Usually, the analysis is limited to the performance of a specific service. Sec-
ond, services are often evaluated individually. No attention or importance is given to the
fact that services may depend on other services, and that some of these other services
may affect the behaviour and the performance of the current service under evaluation.
Third, most current research on survivability analysis is aimed at analytical analysis.
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The analytical models are used as a measurement tool to evaluate the impact of fail-
ures on networked systems [Heegaard and Trivedi, 2009; Jha and Wing, 2001; Liu and
Trivedi, 2006; Moitra and Konda, 2000].
In this thesis we are interested in analysis models, however not the analytical ones.
We believe there is already a fair amount of research on analytical models to quantify
survivability. We catalogued a reasonable amount of scientific papers focusing on the
analytical analysis of survivability. They are discussed in Chapter 2.
Therefore, this research is focused on data-driven analysis. More specifically, we are
interested on quantifying the survivability of SCADA systems based on data. A holistic
model based on a data-driven approach.
1.3 Research questions
In this thesis we shifted the focus from analytical models based on performance analysis
of individual services to a model that takes into account the entire system (holistic view),
it is based on the systems security aspects (security as key attribute) and uses empirical
data (data-driven) to quantify the survivability of SCADA systems.
More specifically, this thesis aims to tackle the following issues afflicting current sur-
vivability analysis models:
• Single service analysis. Current models used to analyse the survivability of sys-
tems often focus on the analysis of single essential services.
• Essential service identification. In general essential services are manually defined
by system experts. Such an approach is appropriate when evaluating either parts
of a system or small systems. However, it is intractable for complex systems
with hundreds of services. An automatic approach to identify essential services
is necessary.
• Lack of security aspects. A fair amount of current models are based on the perfor-
mance aspects of a system. This behaviour hides an important issue, the lack of
security-based aspects to evaluate survivability. Currently, systems are measured
in terms of processing time, throughput, and so forth.
• Analytical analysis. Current models are aimed to provide analytical analysis of
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systems’ survivability. We believe that is time to provide models that could lever-
age the data acquired from computing systems in order to provide more intelligent
analysis about these computing systems.
Based on the issues described above and on the idea of holistic survivability being
built on the concept that the entire system should be assessed and evaluated to provide
an accurate quantification of survivability, this research aims to answer the following
research questions:
• How the multiple services that are part of a SCADA system should be evalu-
ated together? What formalism should be used to represent the interdepen-
dencies of services in a holistic analysis?
• Performance analysis is a key aspect of quantifying survivability on the current
survivability models. Although we believe that performance is an important at-
tribute it is not the only one. If a model aims to quantify survivability considering
its security aspects, metrics that represent the security of the system should be
used. What metrics should be added to the model to represent security?
• We are proposing a data-driven model, where data generated by the system is an
important part of the model. We know that systems generate a variate of data
in specific formats and they are stored in different ways. How do we acquire,
transform and make the data available to be fed to the model? What parts
of the data are important to the proposed model?
1.4 Summary of the contributions
This thesis provides five main contributions to the field of survivability and SCADA
systems.
1. To address the question of analysing SCADA systems taking into account the
entirety of services, their functionalities and relationships we propose a holistic
approach. Holistic Survivability extends current view of survivability by incor-
porating both service interdependencies (as a key property) and aspects of com-
putational intelligence that uses the formalism of probabilistic graphical models
[Koller and Friedman, 2009] to represent and quantify survivability.
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2. We believe security is a key attribute of survivability and should be regarded as
such. We introduce metrics that aims at the security characteristics of SCADA
systems. Such metrics are integrated into the core of the holistic survivability
modelling process. Any survivability quantification that uses the proposed met-
rics is considering security as a survivability attribute.
3. Currently the proposed survivability models do not offer techniques to determine
the essential services of a system. Usually the essential services are determined
by system experts before the quantification takes place. Usually, the service under
evaluation is the essential service. However, we are convinced that such approach
does not work on services with multiple essential services that need to be evalu-
ated together, a key feature of holistic survivability. We propose an algorithmic
approach to find essential services that is based on graph theory, network analysis
[Landherr et al., 2010] and clustering analysis [Anderberg, 1973].
4. There are two main issues with the security analysis of SCADA systems. The first
one is the scarcity of data available for analysis. Corporations that own the data
do not disclose it fearing any security vulnerability discovered on the data could
be used to perform attacks against them. The second one is the insufficiency
of proper modelling tools to evaluate the security of SCADA systems. As it
is widely accepted in academic and industrial communities, it is impractical to
conduct security experiments on live systems. A modelling simulation tool would
enable the simulation of SCADA systems with the benefit of testing different
attack and security solutions. In this thesis we introduce a simulator aimed at
building simulations of SCADA systems. A key benefit of the simulator tool is
the ability of testing the effect of attacks on SCADA systems. In addition to that
we also can generate SCADA network traffic to perform analysis on it.
5. Even though it is possible to perform analytical analysis using the holistic surviv-
ability model, holistic survivability focuses on analysis based on data acquired
from deployed SCADA systems, or generated from simulations. Because holis-
tic survivability is built on the formalism of probabilistic graphical models we
can use it to perform two types of analysis. More specifically, we can perform
inferences such as:
• Prediction - The prediction analysis works by reasoning from causes to
effects. In other words, given the causes the tool predicts the effects. It
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analyses the services and then quantifies the probability of survivability of
the SCADA system.
• Diagnosis - The diagnostic analysis works the other way around; from
symptoms to causes. By changing the overall probability of survivability of
the system the tool shows which services are impacted more by the change.
For instance, an analyst can use this tool to identify the affected services
when the probability of survivability of the system is changed.
1.5 Organisation of the thesis
This thesis is organised in 8 chapters. We tried to map each core chapter to one of the
main contributions of the thesis. In addition to these core chapters we have an introduc-
tion, background and related work and conclusion chapters. The thesis is organised as
follows.
Chapter 2 gives an introduction about SCADA systems and their architectures. It also
presents a short introduction to probabilistic graphical models, which is the mathemati-
cal formalism utilised by holistic survivability. In addition to that, the chapter provides
a literature review on the subject divided into four main topics: Definitions, Design and
Architecture, methodologies and analysis models. However, the main focus is on the
analysis models proposed in the literature. The chapter describes the current models,
the type of formalism adopted and their shortcomings.
Chapter 3 introduces SCADASim, a simulator for creating simulation of SCADA sys-
tems. SCADASim implements some protocols used by SCADA systems and also pro-
vides SCADA devices implementations that can be used by simulations. It is used
throughout the thesis to perform the simulations used by the other chapters.
Chapter 4 introduces holistic survivability, a new concept of survivability. It provides
the definition and the concepts of holistic survivability. It introduces the attributes, the
means and the type of threats holistic survivability is aimed for. A formal definition is
provided together with the formalism necessary to quantify holistic survivability.
Chapter 5 introduces an algorithmic based technique to find essential services in SCADA
systems. Further the algorithm is compared with other existing techniques and finally
an evaluation using a simulated SCADA system is performed.
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Chapter 6 introduces holistic survivability in terms of performance modelling. In other
words, it introduces a quantification of holistic survivability based on performance. It
also defines performance metrics used to analyse survivability and how these metrics
are applied to holistic survivability. It further shows an evaluation of the performance
model using a simulated SCADA system.
Chapter 7 introduces the security metrics used to measure SCADA systems. It fur-
ther shows how the metrics are applied to holistic survivability and finally provides an
evaluation of the security model using a simulation of a SCADA system.
Chapters 6 and 7 show how holistic survivability can be applied using monitoring data
acquired from the SCADA systems using historical and real-time data. They also show
how machine learning techniques can be used to assess the state of the services of the
system and how they can be used to generate the probabilistic model that represents the
SCADA system under evaluation.
And finally, Chapter 8 concludes by summarising the work presented in the thesis and
discussing some aspects for future research in the field.
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Background and related work
This chapter introduces SCADA systems, their properties and entities. Such introduc-
tion is important as it will further be used in the analyse of such systems. As also part of
background concepts, the chapter gives an overview of the formalism of Probabilistic
Graphical Models (PGM). Two types of models are presented: Bayesian networks and
Markov Random Fields. They will be used to analyse the survivability of SCADA sys-
tems in chapters 6 and 7. In addition, a thoroughly literature review on survivability and
security on SCADA systems is presented in this chapter. Survivability is discussed in
different aspects: definitions, design and architecture, analysis modelling, development
methodologies and a view of survivability and security as a research domain.
2.1 Background
This section introduces SCADA systems. It gives a brief overview on what constitutes a
SCADA system. Describes the properties that make SCADA systems ‘different’ when
compared with conventional IT systems, how they are organised, what are the common
existing services. It also gives a example of a common network topology utilised by a
variety of SCADA system deployments.
2.1.1 SCADA systems
SCADA systems are used to monitor and control critical infrastructures. They are com-
posed by computers, networks, and sensors, which are used to control the processes
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running in the critical infrastructure sites. They sense, collect and analyse information
produced by those processes. However, most of analysis and decision making processes
are made by the so called system operators. Such operators are usually engineers with
deep understanding on the processes monitored by the system. In this thesis we use
the terms SCADA, Distributed Control Systems (DCS) and Industrial Control Systems
(ICS) interchangeably, even though DCS systems may present different characteristics.
For instance, usually SCADA systems are geographically disperse, which it is not al-
ways the case for DCS. However, those systems interact with each other, and often are
seen by practitioners as only one system.
SCADA systems have special application demands and configurations; they may com-
municate using different protocols and diverse transmission medium. For example, pro-
tocols that are popular on systems used by power plants may not be used by the oil and
gas industry. The SCADA infrastructure (software, hardware, and network) is different
from regular IT infrastructure in terms of its network topology, its protocols diversity
(hundreds of different SCADA protocols have been catalogued [Igure et al., 2006]),
diverse communication medium (Serial, Ethernet, WiFi), the type of information ex-
changed, and its security priorities. To the regular IT industry the priorities are based
on Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability (CIA). On SCADA systems the priorities
are different, Availability is the most important aspect for SCADA [Weiss, 2010].
Figure 2.1 shows the three main components of a SCADA system deployment: system
operators that controls and monitors the process, the SCADA system that provide soft-
ware and hardware for data acquisition and intervention, and the critical infrastructure
system that is monitored by these tools and system operators. In the example illustrates
in Figure 2.1, the systems being under monitoring and control are critical infrastructure
systems. However, it is not always the case. Some SCADA systems are deployed at fac-
tories and industries that are not as critical. Even for such deployments it is important
to protect the system from malicious attacks. The main and only difference between
these type of deployments is the scope of damage that a malicious attack can produce.
SCADA systems consist of some properties that may make them quite unusual when
compared with conventional networked and IT systems. Below we describe some prop-
erties that together make SCADA systems unconventional.
• Determinism - SCADA systems interact with Distributed Control Systems (DCS)
deployed in the field. Such systems are developed to run in real-time supported
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Figure 2.1: SCADA and Critical Infrastructure system
by Real-Time Operating Systems (RTOS). Such features make determinism and
real-time characteristics of SCADA systems.
• Heterogeneity - It is presented in many parts of the system. SCADA systems
integrate different operating systems, RTOS and GPOS (General Purpose Oper-
ating Systems) such as Windows and Linux and different hardware and software.
A common deployment has embedded devices deployed at the field (usually at re-
mote sites) and PC servers at the corporation site. Operators use CTOS computers
to configure, program, monitor and control the systems. Different protocols are
used by different applications. For instance, a deployment may have a PC with a
HTTP server installed, where clients do requests using the HTTP protocol. Then,
it may have embedded devices using MODBUS [Swales, 1999], a common proto-
col utilised by SCADA systems, to communicate with SCADA servers within the
corporation. At the first glance, this configuration it is not much different from
regular IT systems with Web and database servers installations, as they also use
different protocols. However, these systems are underlined by the same protocol
and characteristics: TCP/IP protocol and non-deterministic interactions. In the
other hand, SCADA systems mix together deterministic and non-deterministic
interactions. In addition to that, the hardware utilised by SCADA systems is
comprehensive. It includes from sensors to PC servers, with each one requiring
different types of support.
• Distributed - SCADA systems are geographically disperse. Control centres are
often located far away from the field devices, usually located at remote sites. The
communication between them are usually made by different medium; satellite,
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cellular, and so forth.
• Criticality - As mentioned earlier, in general SCADA systems are responsible
for controlling critical infrastructures that our society relies on. For instance,
power grids, water treatment plants, nuclear plants, traffic signalling, among oth-
ers. Such critically may have dramatic impact. For instance, the accident at
Chernobyl nuclear power plant [Ginzburg and Reis, 1991; Hatch et al., 2005]
caused the direct deaths of 250 people and more than 800,000 people suffered
radiation exposure which may result in cancer deaths over those exposed [Hatch
et al., 2005]. Nevertheless to say, failures on SCADA systems that control crit-
ical processes may cause serious catastrophes. Besides, there is no shortage of
incidents intentionally caused by humans (malicious attacks), which is one of the
points this thesis addresses.
• Availability - SCADA systems need to be available at all times. Availability is its
most important attribute. System managers normally trade off security for avail-
ability. They leave the system without applying patches for months, sometimes
years, because they cannot afford any downtime to the system.
• Reliability - Field devices operate for long period of time without any human
intervention. They are designed to be fault-tolerant and to run and in adverse
environmental conditions. In addition, a common practice is to provide redundant
communication links between the sites, in order to provide better fault-tolerance.
We categorise SCADA systems in layers based on their components; communication
links, hardware, protocols and services. The network layer handles the communication
infrastructure such type of connections, network topology and so forth. The hardware
layer handles the system devices. Field devices, PC servers and clients, network hard-
ware and so forth. The protocols layer consists of the protocols utilised by SCADA
systems. And finally the services layer, which is the layer where the applications lives.
We understand a SCADA system as a group of services working together in order to
accomplish their functionalities in a service-oriented approach. Figure 2.2 illustrates
the layers of a SCADA system and its relationship with a SCADA entity.
Communication links It can be categorised into two different types of networks that
generally use different protocols. The corporate network that is inside corporate offices
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Figure 2.2: On the left, a SCADA system in layers. On the right, a deployed SCADA
entity.
(local network), which is usually built over Ethernet and TCP/IP protocols running on
standard computer hardware (PC servers and clients). The remote network, which runs
on remote sites and is typically connected to the corporate network via Satellite, Radio,
Leased-lines and more recently, the internet.
Hardware Most of the hardware used in the field (remote sites) is dedicated. It is
designed for operating under extreme environmental conditions in order to require less
maintenance and be more durable. A field device such as a RTU (Remote Terminal
Unit) generally consists of a real-time clock and operating system (RTOS), input and
output interfaces (I/O), electrical spike protectors, restart timer to reboot the device in
cased it become unresponsive, power supply with extra batteries, communication ports
such as Ethernet, radio and serial (RS-232 and RS-485), RAM and flash memory. On
the other hand, the hardware used by the corporate networks is the common COTS
(Commercial off-the-shelf), PCs with Ethernet cards running TCP/IP and generic op-
erating systems such as Windows and Linux. A typical MTU (Master Terminal Unit)
runs on a PC with Windows or Linux as operating system. It uses a common Ethernet
card which runs TCP/IP as communication protocol. HMI (Human Machine Interface)
servers and Historian databases usually run on powerful PC servers with more memory,
faster CPU, more disk space and faster communication cards. Generally speaking there
are two types of hardware: PC servers based on COTS hardware and embedded devices,
custom made for specific tasks.
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Protocols According to [Igure et al., 2006] there are over 150 protocols utilised by
SCADA systems catalogued, mostly proprietary. However, only a small group is widely
used. Protocols such as MODBUS [Swales, 1999], DNP3 [Majdalawieh et al., 2006],
and OPC [Knapp, 2011] are very popular and broadly deployed. Recently MODBUS
and DNP3 have been integrated with TCP/IP. The MODBUS protocol offers a variant
version called MODBUS/TCP [Knapp, 2011] that uses the TCP/IP as transport and net-
work protocols. The DNP3 protocol can also run over TCP and UDP [Knapp, 2011].
Frames at the link layer are encapsulated into TCP/IP packets, so that DNP3 can take
full advantage of the internet technology. Such integration and adaptation make possi-
ble to use COTS hardware to support DNP3 and MODBUS protocols. The majority of
protocols utilised by SCADA systems were not created with security in mind. Most pro-
tocols are vulnerable to simple man-in-the-middle attacks as they exchange messages
in plain text.
Services The service layer is where our research is concentrated. A SCADA system
consists of services interconnected through network links. A typical SCADA deploy-
ment may consist of hundreds of services running together. Figure 2.3 illustrates a typ-
ical SCADA deployment with four networks. The corporate network used by system
experts to upload new software releases, monitor and control the critical systems. Re-
mote networks that deploys field devices that are required to acquire data and perform
local actions to the local system under monitoring. And a remote corporate network,
whose users (system operators) use to work from remote locations.
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Figure 2.3: Typical SCADA Deployment. The monitored critical system is not illus-
trated.
A typical SCADA deployment contains four type of services:
• HMI (Human Machine Interface) - HMI the service that system operators (ex-
perts) use to control and monitor SCADA systems. More recently, such services
became web-based. Users interact with the service through web browsers. The
HMI service is often deployed with redundancy to avoid downtimes.
• MTU (Master Terminal Unit) - MTUs are the bridge between the corporate net-
work and its users (system experts) and the field networks, where critical systems
are located. They are responsible for gathering and aggregating data acquired
from the field services. In addition, they also provide interfaces for performing
actions on the field services. For instance, lets say a system expert wants to stop a
motor that is functioning on a remote site. The request is made through the HMI
service that communicates with the MTU that controls the remote service, which
then sends the request action to the intent service. A normal deployment consists
of multiple MTUs.
• Field services - They are the services that interact with the critical systems. They
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are responsible for gathering information from sensors, usually connected to the
critical devices, to perform actions through commands sent by MTUs. These
services are deployed on field devices such as PLCs (Programmable Logic Con-
troller), RTUs (Remote Terminal Unit) or IEDs (Intelligent Electronic Device).
It depends of the functionality of the service. It is a common deployment to have
a field device running more that one service. Figure 2.2 shows a PLC that has
one service (water tank level monitoring) running. This functionality is provided
through a sensor that is attached to the water tank. However, this same PLC could
also be responsible for another service. For instance, it could control an motor
(actuator) attached to the water tank that pumps water in and out. Normally,
PLC, RTU and IED have different functionalities in the field. RTUs usually mon-
itor field parameters and send them back to MTUs. PLCs are used for controlling
real-time processes, therefore they are designed for efficiency. IEDs are con-
trolled remotely via PLCs or RTUs, they usually are part of control systems such
as transformers, circuit breakers, and so forth.
• Historian - It is a database that stores all data gathered from the system. The data
is further used for historical and insightful purposes. Usually the data is stored
as tags. A tag can be the frequency of a motor or the boiling water temperature
of a tank. Human generated information could be also stored. For instance, the
targets for some process in production.
Most SCADA services uses the client and server model of computation. MTUs perform
requests to field devices (RTUs, PLCs, IEDs), HMI servers receive requests from HMI
clients. Historians receive requests from HMI servers and MTUs and so forth. There
is a strong interdependency between these services. A service failure may cascade
into the failure of other services and sometimes incapacitate the entire system, making
the services-oriented assessment of SCADA services an important aspect of system
evaluation.
2.1.2 Probabilistic graphical models
Probabilistic Graphical Models (PGM) [Koller and Friedman, 2009] are a framework
that combines uncertainty and independence constraints to represent very complex prob-
lems compactly. They represent a full joint distribution over a set of variables com-
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pactly. Given a model with m variables where each can take n values it would take
mn parameters to represent such model, making it computationally intractable. How-
ever, PGMs take advantage that a given variable in a model is only dependent on a
small group of variables, and this groups make it independent from the others. Such as-
sumption makes PGM models to remove the redundancy by modelling the conditional
independences between the variables and consequently providing a much compact rep-
resentation of the original model.
PGMs use graph theory to represent a complex probabilistic distribution in a compact
way. Variables are represented as nodes, the edges represent the dependencies between
the variables in the graph and the variable values are represented by distributions.
The two most common types of PGMs are Bayesian networks [Perl, 1988] and Markov
Random Fields [Kinderman and Snell, 1980]. Both representations have the same basic
notion of conditional independence, a key aspect of PGMs. Conditional independence
is defined as follows.
Definition 1 Given three random variablesA, B and C. We say thatA is conditionally
independent from B given C in a probability distribution p If p(A = a,B = b|Z =
z) = p(A = a|Z = z)× p(B = b|Z = z) for all values a ∈ A, b ∈ B and c ∈ C. This
can also be written as A ⊥ B|C
Another theorem that is used by PGM models and highly relevant to the work pro-
posed in this thesis is the Bayes’ rule. The theorem can be shown by applying two
other probability theorems: Conditional probability and the the total probability theo-
rem (see Definition 2). Then, by applying both definitions the Bayes’ theorem is de-
rived, P (Y |X) = P (X|Y )P (Y )P (X) .
Definition 2 Given X1, X2, ..., Xn is a partition of the sample space Ω, that is Xi
(i ∈ n) are pairwise disjoints and⋃i∈n xi = Ω, then P (Y ) = ∑ni=1 P (Y |Xi)P (Xi).
PGMs represent a complete model for the variables and their relationships, therefore
they can be used to answer probabilistic queries about the variables. For instance, a
graphical model can be used to find out about the state of a group of variables when other
variables are observed (evidence). This is called probabilistic inference, the process
of computing the posterior distribution of variables given evidence. We will used it
throughout this thesis to compute the survivability of SCADA systems.
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2.1.2.1 Bayesian networks
Bayesian networks are Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAG) that consist of a network struc-
tureG that encodes a set of conditional independence assertions about the variables and
a set P of local probability distributions associated with each variable. The variables are
connected through direct links that represent the dependencies between the variables.
For instance, if there is an arrow linking A to B (A → B), A is said to be the parent
of B and that B is dependent on A. P (B|A) represents the Conditional Probability
Distribution (CPD) that quantifies the effect of A on B. More generally, For each Xi,
P (Xi|Pa(Xi)) quantifies the effects of Xi parents in the network.
Figure 2.4 (a) illustrates an example of a Bayesian network with four variables (nodes)
{A,B,C,X} and three states {S1, S2, S3}. It shows the CPD of all variables repre-
sented as Conditional Probability Tables (CPT), another form of representing discrete
variable states. Each row in the CPTs represent the conditional probability of each node
for conditioning situation.
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A
B
C
X
S1         S2          S3    
 0.4        0.35    0.25
S1         S2          S3    
 0.7        0.2         0.1
S1         S2          S3        
 0.61      0.24    0.15
S1         S2          S3        
 0.63      0.23    0.14
A
B
C
X
S1         S2          S3        
 0.0        0.0        1.0
 S1         S2          S3   
 0.7        0.2         0.1
S1         S2          S3    
 0.36      0.34    0.30
S1         S2          S3    
 0.48      0.31    0.21
(b) (c)
A
B
C
X
 S1         S2         S3          A        C 
0.9         0.05       0.05       N        N  
0.7         0.2         0.1         N        D  
0.6         0.3         0.1         N        U  
0.7         0.2         0.1         D        N  
0.2         0.6         0.2         D        D  
0.1         0.5         0.4         D        U  
0.4         0.4         0.2         U        N  
0.4         0.3         0.3         U        D  
0.0         0.0         1.0         U        U  
S1         S2          S3         B      C 
0.9         0.05       0.05       N     N     
0.7         0.2         0.1         N     D     
0.6         0.3         0.1         N     U     
0.4         0.4         0.2         D     N     
0.2         0.6         0.2         D     D     
0.3         0.4         0.3         D     U     
0.3         0.5         0.2         U     N     
0.1         0.7         0.2         U     D     
0.0         0.2         0.8         U     U     
 S1         S2       S3         
 0.4        0.35    0.25
 S1         S2         S3       
 0.7        0.2         0.1
(a)
Figure 2.4: Example of a Bayesian network
Figure 2.4 (b) shows the marginals of all variables. And Figure 2.4 (c) show the type of
inferences are looking for by using Bayesian networks. In this case we set the variable
A as the evidence of being in the S3 state and then we recompute the marginals of the
other variables. We can see the that probability of variableX being in state S1 decreased
to 48% from 63%, even though they are not directly connected.
As mentioned earlier, Bayesian networks and graphical models in general represent the
joint probability distribution over all variables in the graph. A Bayesian network can be
more formally defined as:
Definition 3 Given a set of variables {x1, x2, ....xn}, a graph G and a set of probabil-
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ities P , the Bayesian network that represents the joint probability distribution is
P (x1, x2, ....xn) =
n∏
i=1
P (xi|Pa(xi))
.
By applying the definition above to the Bayesian network example illustrated in Fig-
ure 2.4 we have the factorisation defined in Equation 2.1.1. We can clearly see that
Equation 2.1.1 represents a much compact representation of the network.
P (A,B,C,X) = P (A)× P (C)× P (B|A,C)× P (X|B,C) (2.1.1)
2.1.2.2 Markov networks
Markov networks are built on undirected graphs. As in Bayesian networks, the graph
nodes are defined as random variables and the edges as the relationship between nodes.
Markov networks differ from Bayesian networks in terms of inference and indepen-
dence structure.
As illustrated in Figure 2.4 and also mentioned earlier, the parameters of a Bayesian
network are represented as CPDs, where distributions over nodes given other nodes
are defined. On Markov networks there is no directional interaction defined by the
graph structure. Rather than define CPDs for representing nodes distributions, Markov
networks use the concept of potentials. Given x as a random variable, a potential is a
function from V al(x) to R+.
Potentials are used to parametrise the distribution represented by the network. The over-
all joint distribution considers all potentials defined in the graph structure. A Markov
network is defined as a product of potentials. More formally,
Definition 4 Given a set of random variables X = {x1, ..., xn}, a Markov network is
defined as the product of maximal cliques, which are defined as potentials, on subsets
of Xc ∈ X , p(x1, ..., xn) = 1Z ×
∏C
c=1 φc(Xc).
Z is a constant known as partition function. It ensures that the distribution p is nor-
malised [Barber, 2012]. Therefore, in Markov networks the CPDs are attached to the
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potentials.
2.2 Related work
This section presents an overview of the field of survivability. It starts by describing the
multiple definitions of survivability and how they are related with each other. Then it
provides a literature review on survivability segmented by three categories: Design and
Architecture, Performance models and Security models. To conclude the section
describes some relevant work on the field of security on SCADA systems.
The research on survivability is divided into two sub-fields; Network communication
and Information systems. Network communication addresses the aspects of the net-
work survival, links, speed, routes, and so forth. Information systems address software.
It is related to performance, reliability and security aspects of applications and their ser-
vices. This thesis is interested on how one can analysis and measure the survivability
of networked systems (information systems survivability). Therefore, when it refers to
survivability it is talking about information systems survivability.
2.2.1 Survivability definitions
There is no agreement on a common definition of survivability. [Westmark, 2004] cat-
alogued more than 50 definitions about survivability. [Avizienis et al., 2001, 2004b] ar-
gue further that survivability and dependability are equivalent. Clearly, such confusion
on survivability concepts makes difficult to have a general definition, one that could be
applied across domains and with a common set of attributes. Many [Al-Kuwaiti et al.,
2009; Westmark, 2004] assign such issues to the cross-domain use of survivability itself.
There are other issues with the definition and use of survivability as well, we approach
them later on this thesis. In fact, one main contribution of this thesis is the proposal of a
new concept of survivability, which fixes issues such as interdependencies of services,
recognition of essential services and predictability.
From the definitions described in [Westmark, 2004], and other ones found in the litera-
ture, we classified the definitions of survivability in three groups:
• Group 1 - The definitions in this group can be summed up as: the capacity of the
system to continue to fulfil its mission despite intrusions, failures and accidents.
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Implicitly, the essential services are responsible for the mission, and the type of
threats (intrusions, failures and accidents) may be malicious and non-malicious.
• Group 2 - In this group the definitions are related to network survivability [Gokhale,
2006]. the network is still able to perform part of its functionality after a failure
by restoring from a degraded condition. Note that the type of failure is not de-
fined, and also they assume that the network recoveries are part of its functional-
ity.
• Group 3 - This group clusters definitions that are not part of groups 1 and 2, and
are restricted to a particular issue. For instance, ‘Service stream over time’ [Sul-
livan et al., 1999], or ‘Where the integrity is not compromised at the occurrence
of unexpected disasters’ [Liew and Lu, 1992].
We are interested in Group 1 definitions, as they are related to the concept of surviv-
ability presented in our research. From all definitions surveyed two deserve more at-
tention; [Knight and Sullivan, 2000] was the first formal definition on survivability and
[T1A1.2, 2001], which is widely used by survivability practitioners. They are part of a
small group of definitions that aim to quantify survivability, closely related to our goal
in this thesis that is to measure survivability.
[Knight and Sullivan, 2000] definition states that A system is survivable if it com-
plies with its survivability specification. The specification is based on a four-tuple
(E,R, P,M), where: E, environment, is a definition of the environment in which the
system has to operate. R, specification set, is the set of specifications of tolerable forms
of service for the system. P , probability distribution, is associated with each member
of the set R with the sum of these probabilities being one. M , a finite state machine, is
denoted by four-tuple (S, S0, V, T ), where S is a finite set of state, S0 is the initial state
of the machine, V is the finite set of customer values and T is the state transition matrix.
Yet according to [Knight and Sullivan, 2000] a probability is assumed with each state
and the system survivability is defined by the sum of the probabilities that the system
is in one of the preferable states. There are some issues with this definition. First, it
was intended to be used during the development of a survivable system, as it defines a
specification in which developers need to agree upon. Second, it is labour intense, de-
manding a huge amount of time to define all attributes required by the definition. And
finally, it does not take into account service (inter)dependencies.
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[T1A1.2, 2001] was introduced by the working group on network survivability perfor-
mance of the American National Standards Institute (ANSI). This definition is more
related with group 2 however due to its wide usage, we present some discussion about
it. The definition states that survivability can be quantified as the measure of the inter-
est value V that has a value V0 just before the failure happens. Then, the survivability
behaviour is represented by Va, the value of V just after the failure occurs, Vu, the
maximum difference between V and Va after the failure, Vr is the value of V when
the system is restored after time Tr, and tR is the time used to the system recovery to
the original value V . In other words, survivability is measured before and after some
undesired event happen, the difference will quantify the survivability of the system or
network. The main drawback with this definition is it is completely tighten with per-
formance and also does not provide any insight on how it is measured, it is measured
in the service itself, in the system, if so how the services are related. In the literature
many have adopted this definition, usually applying to a specific service entitled to be
measured. A metric is defined and measured (V ), and then the difference between be-
fore and after events is computed. The time (tR) to recovery is also important to the
definition. The shorter is the time to recovery the better is the survivability.
We can also notice that both definitions make no mention about essential services either
they assume the service being evaluated is of interest and therefore essential, or they
do not have such concept. [Knight and Sullivan, 2000] definition has the concept of
acceptable services, which is close to the idea of essential services but it is not the
same. For them acceptable services are the ones that provide the best they could under
undesired conditions.
As survivability definitions are the catalyst for proposals on new architectures, method-
ologies, and analysis models for survivable systems, over the next sections we provide
more discussion on these topics.
2.2.2 Design and architecture of survivable systems
The idea of design survivable architectures for information systems is to provide mech-
anisms which allow the detection and treatment of various types of failures, faults and
malicious attacks in design time. It then facilitates the implementation of survivable
systems as they provide a blueprint on the development of survivable systems. A sur-
vivable architecture will provide run-time support for survivability requirements, such
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as availability, reliability, resistance to failures, and so forth. [Heimbigner et al., 2002;
Knight and Strunk, 2004] proposed an architecture in which survivable systems should
be built upon. The architecture is based on reactive control. It provides a set of compo-
nents for monitoring, diagnosis, synthesis, coordination, and response that are used to
adapt the system in real-time, in the case of systems components not performing as ex-
pected. [Knight et al., 1997] proposed another architecture for survivable systems. The
innovation was the introduction of wrappers or ‘shells’. The idea was to wrap services
with layers of certain functionalities in order to achieve survivability. For instance, in
order to provide localised security a ‘shell’ could be implemented on a specific service
denoted important to the system. By doing that, they argue that the localised policy
could be easily enforced, rather than on the entire system.
As one could expect there is also some research on architectures inspired by the adaptive
aspects of the human immune system. After all, adaptation is a key attribute of living
organisms. [Sheldon et al., 2004] proposed an architectural model that uses principles
such as regeneration to achieve survivability. It uses aspects of autonomic comput-
ing [Kephart and Chess, 2003] to provide the vision of an architecture that manages
and adapts by itself. Even though they only have shown ways of implementing with-
out providing any test implementation, the architecture ideas are well aligned with the
main idea of creating survivable computer systems based on adaptation and regenera-
tion. [Hiltunen et al., 1999] presented an approach to survivable architectures that is
based on the customisation of and adaptation of services. Through customisation one
could create variants of a service with different QoS, for instance. The customisation
also enables service to be changed in runtime, therefore, providing them with dynamic
adaptation, a key aspect of survivability.
[Hiltunen et al., 2001] proposed an architecture to enhance the survivability of systems
through redundancy. Such approach is widely used nowadays with most of the deployed
architectures.
[Yurcik, 2002] proposed an adaptive multi-layer framework to improve survivability
looking at the security aspects of the system. They argued that layering the system
reduces complexity and increases flexibility for adaptation, and consequently surviv-
ability. [Browne et al., 1999] proposed middleware based architecture that addresses
the mobile IP protocol for military use. The architecture proposes changes on the hand-
off mechanism of the mobile IP. More specifically, they adapted the session layer of
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the OSI model to handle the hand-off, moving this functionality from the original layer,
network layer. They argue that the session layer is more suitable to handle recovery,
replication and migration of resources.
There is some work on proposing architectures based on distributed systems technolo-
gies such as CORBA. In [Narasimhan et al., 1999], the authors proposed an architec-
tural mechanism to support survivability on CORBA applications. The immune system
mechanism replicates CORBA objects on the system to avoid undesired events. [Wells
et al., 2000] provides a survivable architecture using the loosely coupled aspects of
service-oriented architecture. They also show how a survivable system could be imple-
mented on CORBA and Java/RMI.
Rather than proposing architectures for survivable systems, [Kazman et al., 1998] pro-
posed a method to evaluate architectures looking at their quality requirements. More
specifically, they look at different architectural scenarios based on the quality attributes
and then proposes an architecture that tries to maximise all quality attributes even
though trade-off between the attributes are needed. They examine attributes such as
performance, security, availability, and so forth, all of them essential for the survivabil-
ity of a system.
Despite the fact that there is not much work in the literature on methodologies to de-
veloping survivable systems, we briefly discuss it here. [Fisher and Lipson, 1999] pro-
posed to use emergent algorithms to enhance the survivability of systems on unbounded
systems. They argue the emergent algorithms are best suitable for implementing sur-
vivable systems because their characteristics are similar with survivable systems. For
instance, emergent algorithms produce global effects through cooperative local actions
distributed throughout the system. Computer systems cannot achieve survivability at the
level of system components because the component itself represents a single point of
failure for its own survival. Therefore, distribution and implementation in a distributed
fashion, is essential to achieve survivability. As we can see survivability and emergent
algorithms are very close on their characteristics and forms of functioning.
[Ellison and Moore, 2001] proposed a process for systematically refining an enterprise
system architecture to resist, recognize, and recover from intended malicious attacks by
applying reusable design primitives that help ensure the survival of the enterprise mis-
sion. [Mead et al., 2001] discussed the changes that project management environments
aimed at development and and evolution of survivable systems brings to regular soft-
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ware development environments. How the activities are tailored to such systems impact
the current development process.
More recently, [Ellison and Woody, 2010] proposed a framework to analyse the opera-
tional aspects of distributed software development in large corporations with dynamic
environments. The framework works by analysing the complexity and integration issues
of the development life cycle. It is mostly used by project managers that want to ensure
that the development is proceeding as expected operationally. They call it Survivabil-
ity Analysis Framework (SAF). The intuition of using survivability is that the software
should survive to this distributed, and dynamic environment of people, and software
components during. More specifically, they want to assert that the development and
integration operations work under these conditions.
In [Linger and Moore, 2001] the authors created the bridge between development of sur-
vivable systems and models to analyse them. Unfortunately, they did not provide quan-
tification techniques for analysing survivability. However, their intuition for analysing
survivability where systems should be quantified ‘before’ and ‘after’ undesired events to
then compute survivability is the base for many analytical models that were devised af-
terwards [Heegaard and Trivedi, 2009; Liu and Trivedi, 2006; Moitra and Konda, 2000;
T1A1.2, 2001].
2.2.3 Performance models
The types of processes to analysing survivability can be defined into two groups: quali-
tative and quantitative. In the current literature most attempts on measuring survivability
have been qualitative, focusing more in the process of building survivable systems, the
software engineering aspects. The Survivable Network Analysis (SNA) [Mead et al.,
2000] method is such an example. SNA assumes that selected intrusion scenarios are
used to address the survivability of essential functionalities (services). Therefore, the
quality and comprehensiveness of the set of intrusion scenarios depends on the skills
of the analysts conducting the process. Possibly we can categorise the processes of
evaluating survivability qualitatively into four types:
1. Model-based approach - constructing mathematical models that abstract the sys-
tem by encapsulating key features of the system and then analysing these models.
2. Tests - Part of software development process, the components should go through
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tests to validate their functionalities.
3. Fault injection - Creation of situations (intrusion injections) that mimic possible
attacks but may be difficult to arise without a real attack.
4. Read teams - Deploys teams of attackers that try to break the system. The attack-
ers are usually consultants hired to perform this type of tasks.
In this thesis we are interested in analysis models, models used to quantify survivability.
Therefore, we refer to analysis models as models that quantify survivability.
As mentioned before, this research is interested in quantifying the survivability of
SCADA systems, therefore, we are interested in quantitative processes to measure sur-
vivability. Over the years the analysis models to quantify survivability has increased
rapidly. However, most models seem to be an adaptation from the ones used in the de-
pendability domain. Dependability [Avizienis et al., 2001] has a long and rich history
of research on techniques for quantitative and model-based evaluation of dependable
computer systems. Therefore, it seems logical to adapt these models to survivability.
However, it requires further attention. In dependable models the faults are clearly de-
fined and statistically predictable. By contrast, statistical predictability of fail rates in
systems subject to malicious attacks is arguably difficult. [Nicol et al., 2004] presented
a survey on the existing model-based techniques for evaluating computer systems de-
pendability and summarise how they are being extended to evaluate system security
and also survivability. [Qian et al., 2008] also presented a survey on the existing model-
based techniques for evaluating system dependability and summarise how they could
be extended to evaluate system security and also survivability. The work was concen-
trated on surveying model techniques and on challenges of adapting them to security
and survivability.
A fair amount of analytical models in the literature aimed at measuring survivability
[Goseva-Popstojanova et al., 2001; Heegaard and Trivedi, 2008, 2009; Liu and Trivedi,
2004, 2006; Liu et al., 2004; Trivedi et al., 2008], they describes survivability as a vari-
ation of other related domains: sometimes performability, sometimes as a composite of
performability and availability, sometimes as an attribute of dependability, and some-
times as part of resilience. In other words, they consider survivability as an attribute of
other domains that is applied to specific aspects of the system under evaluation.
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This work sees survivability differently. A key aspect that differentiates survivability
from the other domains is the provisioning of an acceptable level of service and the def-
inition of essential services. In other words, survivability is about keeping the essential
services running under any condition. A key attribute to evaluate the quality of ser-
vice is performance. Therefore is expected that survivability analysis models focus on
evaluating system performance. This practice is responsible for the confusion between
survivability definitions, and the other concepts related to it. Domains such as avail-
ability, performability, reliability, and dependability also use performance as a metric to
evaluate systems.
Indeed the use of performance measurement to quantify survivability has been applied
widely. [Moitra and Konda, 2000] defined a model to quantify the survivability of
information systems based on system performance. The model analyses system surviv-
ability based on costs of the services and their importance to the system. It quantifies
survivability as the ratio between the system performance when under attack and its
performance in normal state. The services have weights, which are defined according
to the type of the service. The higher are the weights the more essential are the services.
They also measure the worst degree of survivability that is possible to achieve without
having the system to stop working. They have used Internet based incidents to quantify
survivability of the systems such as Web and Mail servers. The two main limitations
with this model are the manual definition of essential service and the failure to account
for services interdependencies.
In [Sullivan et al., 1999] the authors have used control theory as a model to control an
information system. They address the reactive element of survivability. If performance
disruptions occur actions are taken to ensure the the system continue to meet their sur-
vivability performance requirements. The system must be adjustable when needed.
[Krings and Azadmanesh, 2005] presented a graph-based model suitable for helping the
analysis of survivability of computer systems. The model transforms the system into a
graph, and from the graph some scheduling models are applied in order to compute the
survivability of the system. However, it was not clear how survivability was represented.
Even though the examples provided are based on performance aspects of the system.
[Liu and Trivedi, 2006] proposed an analytical framework that combines performance
and availability to quantify survivability. The performance model is a homogeneous
CTMC model based on the M/M/m/m queuing model [Ross, 2007]. It assumes
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memoryless inter-arrival and service times with m servers or processors and m jobs
(requests). While the performance model handles performance measurements the avail-
ability model uses the notion of failures replacing arrival-time and service rates with
failure and repair rates, respectively. The composite model evaluates the entire system
as if the service model worked uniformly across all its services. Sadly, this assumption
does not hold for most systems (SCADA and otherwise). Since services may behave
differently based on their characteristics and roles in the system. Evaluating the system
in terms of performance and availability without considering the system’s heterogene-
ity gives an inaccurate system picture. Therefore, it is not flexible enough for use on
different types of SCADA systems with a very diverse class of services.
[Heegaard and Trivedi, 2009] proposed another performance-based model that also
takes into account dependency between services. The model uses techniques similar
to the ones presented in [Heegaard and Trivedi, 2008; Liu and Trivedi, 2006] with the
difference that it considers interdependencies between services. However, the proposed
approach has an issue with scalability, as the state space becomes intractable as the net-
work size increases. To overcome such limitation they applied a space decomposition
approximation that assumes independence between the network nodes (services).
[Gokhale, 2006] surveyed the current models and evaluations techniques used to eval-
uate survivability. One of the author’s conclusions was the lack of survivability models
targeting information systems. The majority of work was intended to network surviv-
ability. This is not a surprise as the concept of survivability on computer systems is
relatively recent [Ellison et al., 1997] when compared with the network field, which
is traced back to the 1970s [Frank, 1974; Frank and Frisch, 1970]. [Bing-Lin et al.,
2009] also presented a survey in the literature review of survivability and one of their
conclusions and the need for further research on models that analyse survivability.
2.2.4 Security models
The analysis of survivability based on security aspects is addressed in the literature from
different aspects: there are the models that use attack scenarios to compute survivability,
the ones that look at the effects of attacks on the services and finally the ones that model
attacks and attackers in order to attain survivability. In this section we discuss some
relevant work covering these different approaches.
50
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
[Zhang et al., 2007] presented a quantitative analysis model for network systems based
on attack graphs. The survivability depends of the system itself as well as the envi-
ronment it is running on. The model is defined in three steps: the preparation step
which gathers vulnerabilities information from Internet and set difficult parameters for
them; the generation of the attack graph based on the vulnerabilities gathered; and the
quantification of the network system survivability as the final assessment. For them
survivability is the minimal cost function to compromise the system with respect to all
possible intrusion scenarios via a system administrator, a human that confirms the level
that system cannot survive. [Jha and Wing, 2001] use a model to quantify survivabil-
ity which visualise the effects of attacks through scenario graphs. They aim the model
helps systems architects on the design phase of the software life-cycle. The model is
based on Constrained Markov Decision Process (CMDP) [Bolch et al., 1998], a gener-
alisation of Markov chains, where the transition probabilities are dependable of the past
history, it contains six steps: model the network, inject faults into it, specify survivabil-
ity properties (fault, service), generate scenario graphs, perform analysis on reliability
and latency and finally, perform a cost-benefit analysis.
[Bowen et al., 1999] proposed a model that rather than detect attacks after they occurred
they detect malicious attacks in real-time. They provide a real-time event monitoring
and comparison with events known to be unacceptable. They look at the system call
level to detect not permitted behaviour on the sequence of system calls in the operating
system. Then, they compare any deviation with the specified behaviour.
[Moore et al., 2001] proposed an approach for documenting attack information in a
structured way. The intuition is that by having this information catalogued in common
structure it would be easier to practitioners to identify and catalogue new attacks.
[Moitra and Konda, 2004] have devised a model to quantify survivability by evaluating
the trade-offs between the cost of defence mechanisms and the expected survivability
after a malicious attack. They have used the idea of expected survivability to measure
the survivability of a system. They suggest three metrics for computing survivability.
The first one is a ratio of the system’s performance under attack to the normal system
performance. The main issue is how to measure performance levels. A suggestion is to
consider the different functionalities and services of the system separately, then perform
an assessment comparing to what extent each functionality has survived after an attack.
The second one uses weights to define the expected survivability. It defines weights
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to services due to their importance and criticality, then a summation of the weighted
values with the degree of a service or function is compromised is computed. The third
and last one considers only the worse degree of compromise that has occurred across
all the functions and services of the system.
[Wang and Liu, 2009] proposed a new technique to evaluate survivability. They ex-
tended the definition of availability to propose a new definition of survivability. Ac-
cording to them, survivability is the capacity of the system maintain the integrity and
availability of essential data, information and services, even when under attack. This
definition is tailored to the system being evaluated, in this case a database system.
A different approach is described by [Merideth and Narasimhan, 2003]. They sub-
divided survivability taking into account how a system reacts to attacks. They argue
that proactive survivability systems differ from reactive ones as pro-actively survivable
systems may act to increase survivability, may to initiate recovery and even to adapt to
survive. They use different metrics to evaluate such systems. For reactive survivable
systems they use window of vulnerability - time period which an additional fault will
result in an epidemic, fault-detection latency, recovery latency, reactive fault-detection
accuracy - likelihood fault detections involve neither false positives nor false negatives.
For proactive survivable systems, in addition to the equivalents to the reactive systems
there is the proactive bonus metric which is the benefit of pro-actively knowing the
propagation of faults, instead of waiting for their detections. They aimed to apply these
metrics to the starfish system [Kihlstrom and Narasimhan, 2003], a proactive intrusion
detection and intrusion tolerance system. [Jajodia et al., 1999] presented a model to
analyse the recovery of database transactions compromised by malicious attacks.
[Trivedi et al., 2008] presented some stochastic techniques that took into account se-
curity and survivable systems. Security and survivability are seen as dependability at-
tributes, even though they recognised the relationship and importance of survivability
and security together.
In [Pal et al., 2009] the authors have used a more practical approach. They defined
a group of five metrics based on the system under evaluation, the Joint Battlespace
Infosphere (JBI) concept. Even though the metrics are created with the system in mind,
they might be applied for different systems. They focus on the performance attributes of
the system such as detection of 95% of large-scale attacks within ten minutes of attack
initiation. To evaluate the system against these metrics they defined two attack teams
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(read and blue) to perform the actual attacks.
[Wang et al., 2003] have proposed a model based on Fuzzy Matrix Game (FMG) [Bector
and Chandra, 2005] to analyse the survivability of network systems. They integrate
fuzzy matrix game theory with strategy selection. Attacker and attacked select different
fuzzy strategies to maximise its benefit (objective). Both sides do not have access to the
each other’s intentions.
More recently, [Chen et al., 2010] devised a model to evaluate the survivability of
Service-Oriented Architecture (SOA) based systems. The model also introduced a new
definition of survivability. The model is based on Hidden Markov Models and aims
to provide a holistic evaluation of survivability. Even though they described the steps
necessary to compute the state of each service, they did not provided a mechanism to
compute the overall survivability.
2.2.5 SCADA and industrial control systems security
The security of SCADA systems and consequently the critical infrastructure monitored
and controlled by them is paramount. Over the last few years the research community
and the computer security industry started to recognise such importance. The grow-
ing number of vulnerabilities detected over the decade (see Figure 1.2) is a good sign
that the industry is becoming aware of the challenges on the security of ICS/SCADA
systems.
[Knapp, 2011] gives a good overview of the ICS/SCADA industry providing all nec-
essary vocabulary to understand the domain. More importantly, he raises awareness
for the security issues that SCADA systems are facing currently. Actually, there is a
fair amount of research on introducing and raising awareness to the security issues of
SCADA systems, more recently.
[Barnes and Johnson, 2004; Fernandez and Fernandez, 2005] presented an overview
on SCADA systems and their vulnerabilities. In addition, they also provided some
best practices on protecting systems from malicious attacks. In the field of attack and
anomalies detection, [Mahmood et al., 2009] presents a model to analyse network traffic
of SCADA systems in order to detect suspicious behaviours and consequently possible
malicious attacks. [East et al., 2009] defined a taxonomy of attacks on DNP3 protocol,
a protocol widely used on SCADA systems [Clarke and Reynders, 2006]. [Huitsing
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et al., 2008] defined a taxonomy of attack on MODBUS [Swales, 1999], a protocol also
widely used on SCADA systems. [Fleury et al., 2009] defined a taxonomy of attacks
against energy control systems, a type of monitoring and controlling system very similar
to SCADA systems. Such taxonomies are important as they are used for creating new
rules on firewall systems.
[Kobayashi et al., 2009] presented an analysis of malicious traffic on the MODBUS/TCP
protocol. [Svendsen and Wolthusen, 2009] presented some statistical analysis tech-
niques to detect anomalies on SCADA systems. They tested their technique on lique-
fied natural gas production. [Cheung et al., 2007] described a model-based approach
for intrusion detection. The idea was to define models that represent the expected and
acceptable behaviour of services and then detect changes on the behaviour. Because a
SCADA system tends to have fix topologies and regular traffic patterns, and a limited
number of protocols deployed it seems natural to use the behavioural modelling tech-
nique as the number of false positives have a tendency to be very low. In Chapter 4,
we presented a model to detect variations on SCADA systems by monitoring services
performance in terms of service processing time. Even though this is not the main intuit
of the model, it can detect certain types of attacks that affect the performance of system
services. Also, in Chapter 5 we used the same intuition to find essential services by
considering network traffic patterns.
From a more practical aspect, as mentioned earlier there is the QuickDraw SCADA
IDS project, which extends the existing Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) by adding
signatures to SCADA-based protocols such as MODBUS and DNP3 [dig, 2012].
For security assessment, [Ten et al., 2008] proposes a vulnerability assessment frame-
work to evaluate the vulnerabilities of SCADA systems at three different levels: system,
scenarios, and access points. They also provided an assessment model based on attack
trees [Ten et al., 2007]. [El-Sharkawi, 2002; Holmgren, 2004; Parks and Rogers, 2008]
also provide vulnerability assessment of critical infrastructure systems.
[Anwar and Campbell, 2009] proposed an automated assessment of security compli-
ance of power grids monitored by a SCADA system. The security model proposed uses
predictive calculus to express the entities (e.g. devices, services) of the system (power
grid). Then, it matches the entities with the best practices (rules) that defines constraints
on the entities. [Cheminod et al., 2009] described their model of detecting vulnerabil-
ities in industrial systems (such as SCADA systems). The model aims to detect chain
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reactions in the system.
[Fovino et al.] and [Masera et al., 2008] provided a case study of security assessment
of a critical infrastructure system. They used a service-oriented approach that focuses
on the analysis and interactions between services [Masera and Fovino, 2010]. The gen-
eral idea of capturing the (inter)dependencies between services is similar to the one we
introduce in Chapter 4, however their process is manual and only works in terms of
vulnerabilities. In addition to that, they do not support any type of inference. [Fovino
and Carcano, 2009] proposed an architecture to make SCADA systems security and sur-
vivable. Essentially they proposed changes on current protocols; encryption, filtering,
checking for malformed packets, and the deployment of firewalls with SCADA-based
rules. They also presented a prototype to validate their architecture.
[Genge et al., 2011] provided a model to analyse attacks on cyber-physical systems.
They provided a framework that incorporates simulators of physical devices based on
MATLAB/Simulink and software components simulated on a network test-bed. This
work is similar to the simulator built for creating SCADA simulations presented in
Chapter 3.
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SCADASim - A simulator for
SCADA systems
SCADA systems control and monitor industrial and critical infrastructure systems. As
mentioned earlier it is important to analyse the security risk and develop appropriate
security solutions to protect such systems. However, a key problem is the lack of proper
modelling tools to evaluate the security of SCADA systems. As widely accepted in
academic and industrial communities, it is impractical to conduct security experiments
on live systems. A modelling simulation tool would enable the simulation of SCADA
systems with the benefit of testing different attack and security solutions. This chapter
introduces a simulation tool for building SCADA simulations that supports the inte-
gration of external devices and applications. A key benefit of such tool is the ability
of testing the effect of attacks on real devices and applications, even though using a
simulated environment. The chapter also describes two case studies that demonstrate
how the tool can be efficiently used to create SCADA simulations and inject malicious
attacks.
3.1 Introduction
There are few instances of active SCADA test-bed and simulation development [san,
2012; Cheung et al., 1997; Christiansson and Luiijf, 2007; Davis et al., 2006; Fovino
Part of this work appeared in IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid
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et al., 2009]. However, these tools are either proprietary, used by researchers within
the organisation, and the software is not released for external use or it is not generic
enough to support different architectures, protocols and systems. Another important
issue regarding the successful modelling of a SCADA system is how to control real
devices, such as sensors and actuators from within the simulation environment.
In this chapter we introduce SCADASim, a framework for building SCADA simula-
tions. It provides a modular SCADA modelling tool that allows real-time communi-
cation with external devices using SCADA protocols. This work builds on the basic
simulator we proposed previously [Queiroz et al., 2009]. It adds value on top of our
previous work by making SCADASim truly flexible for connecting real and simulated
devices, and also offering a plug-n-play solution that supports multiple protocols and
external applications for building SCADA simulations.
SCADASim aims to provide:
1. A modular, extensible and flexible tool to model SCADA simulations. SCADASim
provides a set of modules that represent SCADA components such as RTU, PLC,
MTU and protocols (such as Modbus/TCP and DNP3). Such modules and pro-
tocols can be easily extended, compounded into other modules and used into any
SCADASim simulation.
2. The integration of external components into the simulation simultaneously. SCADASim
introduces the concept of gates. A gate is an object that links the external envi-
ronment with the simulation environment. SCADASim simulations may have
multiple gates communicating with different external environments at the same
time.
3. The possibility of testing attack scenarios seamlessly. SCADASim supports four
main type of attacks: Denial of service, Man-in-the-middle, Eavesdropping and
Spoofing. Users can easily create attacks to run inside the simulated environment
or they can use tools such as trinno [Dittrich, 1999] to run attacks against the
external components. SCADASim also provides a library with some well-known
attacks such as worm attack and Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack.
A key benefit of SCADASim is its high scalability while integrating both real hardware
and prototype software modules. In addition to that, the integration of existing external
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components into simulations simplifies evaluation of these components since topolo-
gies, traffic patterns, and other parameters can be changed easily within the tool. This
paper evaluates SCADASim by simulating two smart grid scenarios. The first scenario
simulates a network of smart meters connected to an energy utility provider. The sec-
ond one demonstrates a wind power farm plant. The plant is monitored by a SCADA
system that controls the generation and distribution of electricity. Malicious attacks are
evaluated in both scenarios.
SCADASim aims to provide an environment to build flexible SCADA system simu-
lations efficiently. As shown in Table 3.1, it allows multi-protocol integration with
external devices and applications.
Table 3.1: SCADA simulation functionalities across different implementations
Req. 1 Req. 2 Req. 3 Req. 4
OMNET++ [Varga and Hornig, 2008]
√ − √ −
PowerCyber [Hahn et al., 2010] − √ − −
VPS [Bergman et al., 2009] − − √ −
SCADASim
√ √ √ √
SCADASim is built on top of OMNET++ [Varga and Hornig, 2008], a discrete event
simulation engine. OMNET++ consists of modules that communicate with each other
through message passing. The communication occurs either through input and output
gates or through direct messages. Modules can also be combined in a hierarchy of
levels making possible to build complex simulation components. It also provides a
set of tools for designing network topologies (NED language and editor) and supports
architecture of plugins extensions. Plugins can be used to modify the default behaviour
of the simulation engine. For example, a different message scheduler can be added to a
simulation, which changes the default behaviour of the scheduling of messages.
To choose OMNET++ as simulator engine we evaluated few other engines such as
NS2/NS3 [ns 3 maintainers, 2011]. OMNET++ was chosen because it is a generic
simulation engine and it allows plug-n-play through its NED WYSIWYG editor and
also allows integration to external applications and devices.
According to [Mayer and Gamer, 2008] there are three ways of integrating an OM-
NET++ simulation with external applications: sockets, source code, and shared li-
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braries.
• Source code - In the case of source code integration, the application source code
would have to be compiled together with the simulation, so that a final simulation
binary would be generated.
• Shared library - In this case a dynamic or static library previously compiled for
the target platform would have to be linked to the simulation code.
• Sockets - Using sockets we can create an object that acts as a server proxy to the
external world within OMNET++. The proxy would maintain a listening socket
waiting for external connections and would be responsible to delivering messages
from the simulation components to the external world and vice-versa.
From these three options a socket based integration is the only one capable of integrat-
ing external both devices and applications. The socket integration is seamless without
requiring changes to the external components, does not require shared library files or
source code that are either not practical or available for commercial and legacy SCADA
systems. However, it suffers from one major drawback, only socket-based protocols
are supported. This also means that we could not have gates communicating to devices
through serial connections, for instance.
Because of these issues we introduced a new integration option. Gates allow the inte-
gration with different type of protocols (such as socket-based, serial, or many others).
This flexibility allows users to create simulations using socket-based protocols such as
Modbus/TCP, serial ones such as Modbus Serial and so forth.
3.2 Architecture
The SCADASim architecture is based on three main components: SSScheduler, a real-
time scheduler; SSGate, a communication port that implements protocols for commu-
nication to the external environment; SSProxy, a simulation object that represents an
external component within the simulation environment.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the various components of the SCADASim architecture. Gates are
the only components able to communicate with the external environment. Proxies com-
municate to the external environment through Gates. SCADASim allows multiple gate
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instances each representing communication connections to the external environment.
For instance, one may have two gates one listening to socket connections and another
one listening to serial connections. The gates are managed by the SSScheduler. Next,
we describe the operation of each of these components in more detail.
SSSchedulerSSProxy
Simulation 
component
External 
Component
Simulation 
Environment
External 
Environment
SSGate
Figure 3.1: SCADASim component architecture
OMNET++ offers a plug-in scheduler architecture. Users can add new schedulers that
address needs not provided by OMNET++. New scheduler implementations can be
added by implementing the cScheduler abstract class. The SSScheduler extends cSched-
uler and adds new functionalities to control and synchronise messages received from the
external environment. The class diagram described in Figure 3.2 shows the relationship
between the SSScheduler and the other components in the SCADASim architecture.
The SSScheduler manages a list of SSGate instances that are responsible for sending
and receiving messages to and from the external environment. Every time the simula-
tion engine will process an event the scheduler loops through all active gates getting
their messages and adding them to the simulation queue to be processed and conse-
quently delivered to their destination. The synchronisation process guarantees that the
messages between the two environments will be synchronised.
The SSGate provides the connection to the external environment by implementing a
protocol, which is used to communicate with external SCADA components. At the
moment, SCADASim provides three gate implementations: ModbusGate, DNP3Gate,
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SSScheduler
cScheduler
cSimpleModule
SSProxy SSGate
ModbusGate
...
DNP3Gate
SSThread
Others
0..* 0..1
1..*
1..*
Figure 3.2: SCADASim class diagram
 SSScheduler  Simulation
 Engine
 SSProxy SSGate
initScheduler
initGate
initModule
proxyBinding
Figure 3.3: Sequence diagram - Gateway startup
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HTTPGate. However, programmers can add implementation of other protocols by ex-
tending the SSGate abstract class (see Figure 3.2).
Gates run as system threads so that the framework can handle multiple instances simul-
taneously. Consequently, satisfying one of the framework requirements.
A SSGate instance maintains a list of registered proxies. When a proxy is initialised,
it registers itself with the gate by calling the proxyBinding method on the gate class
(see Figure 3.3). The gate then adds the proxy to an internal table as illustrated in
Figure 3.4). So that, the gate keeps track of the external address and objects associated
with the proxy during the simulation. Row 1 in Figure 3.4 shows that a smart meter
proxy is representing an external component that has IP address 192.168.1.1.
192.168.1.1 Smart Meter
Name Proxy instance
192.168.1.10 HMI Client
1
2
Figure 3.4: Proxy binding table
For a gate instance to be used by the simulation it need to be registered with the simu-
lation engine. The attribute extgates must be added to the simulation configuration file
(omnetpp.ini) where all registered gates are separated by commas. The SSScheduler
reads this attribute when it initialises.
The SSProxy represents a real device or external application in the simulated environ-
ment. They interact with simulated objects such as simulated MTUs and with a SSGate,
which is responsible for routing their messages to external components. There is a re-
lation of one to one between a real component (hardware device or application) and a
proxy object.
Proxies are linked to external objects through their ‘names’. Every proxy must have a
name that identifies which external object it is representing. For instance, a proxy with
name 192.168.1.1 represents an external object with this IP address. It is responsibility
of the simulation creator to configure the proxies names in the omnetpp.ini configuration
file. The gate matches the source IP of an external request to the proxy name of an object
in its internal proxy table. This is how the gate knows how to route their messages to
the right proxies.
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It is easy to create proxies and simulated objects within SCADASim over OMNET++.
Objects are created by a composition of modules. Figure 3.6 illustrates a smart meter
simulation object built through module composition. The device has PPP and Ethernet
interfaces, supports IP, TCP and Modbus/TCP. The entire smart meter component is
built without writing any code thanks to the OMNET++ NED editor.
SCADASim provides built-in modules such as RTU, PLC, MTU and modules that rep-
resent type of attacks, for instance a DDoS module.
SCADASim handles protocols in two distinct ways: the ones used within SCADASim/OMNET++
environment to communicate to other simulation components in the same environment,
here called simulated protocols, and the ones used by external devices and applications
to communicate to SSGates, called original protocols. Figure 3.5 illustrates an example
of a typical SCADASim simulation. External devices communicate to SSGates using
the original version of SCADA protocols, for instance, an external PLC could use Mod-
bus/TCP to communicate to a SSGate that implements Modbus/TCP (ModbusGate). In
the simulated environment all communication among the components use the simulated
versions of the SCADA protocols. These changes are necessary because the simulation
does not provide the environment where the original protocol was designed to run.
External
Device
SSGate
SCADASim/OMNET++
SSGate
SSGate
External
Device
External
Device
SSProxy
SSProxy
SSProxy
RTU
MTU
RTU
original
protocol
simulated
protocol
simulated
protocol
Figure 3.5: Simulation architecture example
For instance, the Modbus/TCP simulated protocol uses sockets, however the socket
stack cannot be used to send messages among the components of the simulation, as
OMNET++ uses another technique. Thus the adapted version of Modbus/TCP had the
socket stack replaced by INET [INET, 2012], a OMNET++ library that simulates the
TCP/IP protocol.
SCADASim provides a library of SCADA protocols (simulated and original) to be
used in simulations. In the current version we have ported Modbus/TCP (adapted from
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[Raimbault, 2010]), DNP3/TCP (adapted from [Crain, 2011]) and HTTP protocols to
SCADASim.
Figure 3.6 shows how a protocol can be used as part of a simulation component. For
example, the Modbus/TCP protocol module is connected to the TCP module provided
by the INET [INET, 2012] library, making the smart meter capable of communicating
with other components using the Modbus/TCP protocol. All protocols available in the
protocol library can be used by any SCADA simulation without the need of writing any
code.
RTU
namTrace
notificationBoard
interfaceTable
routingTable
ModBus
tcp
pingApp
#
networkLayer
#
ppp[sizeof(pppg)]
#
eth[sizeof(ethg)]
Figure 3.6: Simulated SCADA device
It is possible to use proprietary protocol implementations (with no changes) to ex-
change messages between external devices and applications to SCADASim gates, how-
ever as mentioned earlier communication protocols need to be adapted to run within
SCADASim simulations. Proprietary protocols are no different, they would need to be
adapted in order to be used in SCADASim simulations.
Figure 3.3 illustrates the startup process of SCADASim. The SSScheduler class is ini-
tialised by the OMNET++ simulation engine and registered as the simulation scheduler.
During its initialisation the scheduler instantiates all SSGate implementations registered
to it. Then, the simulation engine initialise all proxies and simulation components. Dur-
ing the initialisation proxies register themselves to the SSGate they would like to bind
to.
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The proxy bootstrap process is initiated when a proxy starts communicating with an
external component for the first time. There are two ways for a proxy to start communi-
cation with external components: it sends a request or it receives a request. These two
processes are handled quite differently by the SSGate, as described below.
When the SSGate receives a request from an external component to route a message
to a proxy it needs to know to whom the message is addressed to. It is important to
remember that external components may only have the IP address and port (in case of
sockets) of the SSGate.
The SSGate lookups its Proxy Binding Table and finds out which proxy name matches to
the IP address of the message sender. If a match is found the SSGate creates a message
using the simulated protocol of the original version and sends the message to the proxy.
Protocols that do not rely on IP addresses have to use another technique to match proxy
names.
The SSProxy creates a message using the simulated protocol and delivery it to its SS-
Gate, the gate creates a request using the original protocol and sends the message to the
final destination.
3.3 Simulating malicious attacks
In addition to be a framework to create SCADA system simulations, SCADASim also
supports the creation of malicious attacks targeting SCADA systems.
In [Sun Microsystems, 2000], authors categorised attacks (threats) into four main types
as illustrated in Figure 3.7. Denial of services are attacks where the attacker (Bob)
denies source (Alice) access to the destination (Mary). Man-in-the-middle are attacks
where Bob impersonates Mary, consequently, receiving all requests from Alice to Mary.
Bob then, changes the requests and relays them on to Mary. Spoofing are attacks where
Bob masquerades as Alice, so that it can create and send requests to Mary. Eavesdrop-
ping are attacks where Bob receives all requests sent to Mary by Alice, even though
Mary and Alice have no knowledge of that.
SCADASim supports the all four type of attacks. However, SCADASim does not pro-
vide implementations of all type of attacks to all SCADA protocols. There are more
than 150 protocols used by SCADA systems [Igure et al., 2006]. We have decided
to initially support the most used protocols such as Modbus/TCP [Swales, 1999] and
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Figure 3.7: Attack categories
DNP3 [Group, 2011]. According to [Clarke and Reynders, 2006] DNP3 is predomi-
nant in the US energy sector with over 75% of electric utilities using it in their SCADA
applications. As mentioned earlier SCADASim users can add their own protocol im-
plementations.
As SCADASim supports the integration of external applications and devices into simu-
lations, there are three possible attack scenarios supported by SCADASim:
1. Attacks launched from within SCADASim targeting SCADASim internal com-
ponents - it is the most common one, where you have all components within
SCADASim, even though they may represent external components. An user can
launch attacks and monitor their behaviour easily from the controlled environ-
ment.
2. Attacks launched from the external environment targeting an internal SCADASim
components - the only reason to launch these type of attacks is when the user has
no access to the source code of the attack making it impossible to adapt the code
to run within SCADASim.
3. Attacks launched from the external environment targeting an external component.
There are so many sorts of attacks targeting SCADA systems with some researchers
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listing more than 50 different type of attacks targeting DNP3 [East et al., 2009] and
Modbus [Huitsing et al., 2008]. These are attacks against protocols specification, tech-
nically supported by SCADASim, even though we have not implemented all of them.
3.4 Evaluation
To evaluate SCADASim we demonstrate two common attack scenarios that show how
malicious attacks can be implemented in SCADASim. The first scenario is a denial
of service attack. Attackers launch flood attacks against a smart meter network. The
second one is a spoofing attack. An intruder connects to the local field network to send
fake messages to the PLCs as they were coming from a real MTU.
3.4.1 Denial of service attack scenario
In this scenario a “smart” house is connected to the grid distribution company. The
home updates its energy consume frequently to the company servers. With this infor-
mation the utility provider can predict consuming scenarios and consequently provide
more efficiently, and in same cases cheaper, electricity to their clients. Figure 3.8 illus-
trates the scenario. The SCADA system controls and monitors smarter meters installed
at homes. For the sake of simplicity the scenario presented only shows one home con-
nected to the grid. The scenario consists of a smart meter gathering information from
energy consume in a “smart” home. The house is equipped with a smart meter that in-
forms home spending to the utility company automatically. To simulate the smart meter
we have implemented an application that simulates the electricity consume and sends it
to the SCADASim simulation.
3.4.1.1 Simulation environment
The network topology used in in the simulation is based on a real SCADA network.
The same components are utilised; RTUs (Smart meter), MTU, HMI Server and HMI
client. The network topology consists of Local Area Networks (LAN) connected with
each other through the Internet. Different network topologies arise simply from the
differences in the number of “smart” houses being used. Figure 3.9 shows a generic
SCADA topology used in our simulation. The upper left part of the figure shows the
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Figure 3.8: SCADA system network of a smart meter deployment
“smart” house with its RTU (smart meter) and its router connected to the ISP router. The
right part of the figure shows the corporate network consisting of a MTU, an HMI server
and an HMI client. The smart grid network and the corporate network are connected to
each other via routers over the Internet.
In this environment all messages exchange between the MTU and the smart meter proxy
are implemented by Modbus/TCP protocol [Swales, 1999], a widely used SCADA pro-
tocol. The Modbus/TCP version used in the simulation is a port from the LibModbus
library [Raimbault, 2010]. The adapted version is part of the SCADASim library of
simulated protocols.
The external application communicates to the SCADASim simulation through Mod-
bus/TCP, therefore, the ModbusGate translates the request to the simulated Modbus/TCP
before to delivery it to the proxy.
3.4.1.2 Components
The simulation consists of six main components; Smart Meter, Smart Meter Proxy,
SSScheduler, MTU/HMI, HMI Client Proxy, and HMI Client.
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Figure 3.9: Smart meter network topology
3.4.1.3 Smart meter
The Smart meter is represented by the external application. It measures the power
consumption of a fictitious home. However, for the sake of simplicity, the house only
has a water heater being monitored.
3.4.1.4 HMI client
In real SCADA systems, the HMI client is used by operators to monitor and control
the system. We have developed a real but simple HMI web application that runs as
part of the HTTPGate. The operations executed on the web application are real control
actions performed by human operators. In order to communicate to the simulator the
HMI client (represented by a Web browser) sends HTTP requests to the HTTPGate,
which then translates them into simulated HTTP messages and passes them on to the
HMI Client proxy that then passes it on to the HMI Server.
3.4.1.5 Smart meter proxy
The Smart Meter Proxy represents the smart meter (implemented by the external appli-
cation) inside the SCADA simulation. It contains all the information provided by the
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smart meter, in this case the energy consumption. It reads its information by receiving
Modbus/TCP requests from the external application (smart meter).
3.4.1.6 HMI client proxy
The HMI Client Proxy represents the HMI Client application inside the simulation.
Every request coming from the HMI Client goes through the HTTPGate, and then it is
passed on to the HMI Client Proxy, which then sends it to the HMI Server. Following
the reverse route, the responses are routed from the HMI Client Proxy to the HTTPGate
then to the real HMI Client.
3.4.1.7 SSScheduler
The SSScheduler module is responsible for synchronising the clocks between both en-
vironments (SCADASim and external) and to control the active gates (SSGate) running
in the simulation.
3.4.1.8 MTU/HMI server
The MTU is responsible for controlling and monitoring the SCADA system. It performs
the same activities performed by the real MTU device. It communicates with the RTUs
to gather information about the network and to request actions to be performed on the
network. The HMI Server is responsible for providing reports on the SCADA system
for human operators. The HMI server receives requests from and provides responses to
the HMI client. In this simulation the RTU is represented by a smart meter.
3.4.1.9 Results
In this scenario a TCP SYN flooding attack is performed. The intent is to disrupt the
normal operation of the smart metering network. For instance, operators would get
delayed information about power consumption of the monitored houses. Based on such
delayed information the operator is likely to take wrong actions that could adversely
affect the operation of the SCADA system. To perform the attack we have used a
modified version of the TFN (Tribe Flood Network) tool [Dittrich, 1999].
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Figure 3.10 shows the effect of the DDoS attack on the smart meter. The attack oc-
curs within in the SCADASim environment. It starts at time = 700s in the simulation
timeline by ten attackers, each sending 1000 TCP SYN packets to the smart meter. The
time between 0 and 700 seconds (0 ≤ T ≤ 700) displays the normal behaviour of the
smart meter. As we can see in Figure 3.10 during this time the smart meter receives
a constant number of requests and process them normally. At Time = 700 (red circle)
the smart meter starts to receive an enormous amount of packets requesting new TCP
connections. From this time on the smart meter starts to show an unusual behaviour.
There is a huge drop on the number of processed requests, even though the processing
time does not change. Such behaviour indicates that many legitimate requests are not
being processed at all, they are just being dropped by the smart meter.
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Figure 3.10: Smart meter under attack
Looking at the behaviour of the MTU, Figure 3.11 shows that when the attack starts the
service perceived time spikes up dramatically. Clearly, it demonstrates that the attack is
affecting the smart meter responses to the MTU.
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Figure 3.11: MTU perceived service time
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3.4.2 Spoofing attack scenario
This scenario shows how a wind power plant simulation can be integrated to SCADASim.
We also shows how a spoofing attack can compromise the wind power plant by injecting
fake requests to the PLCs that control the power plant. The wind power plant is rep-
resented by a MATLAB/Simulink model (adapted from Simulink software demo - see
Figure 3.12). The model consists of a wind farm of six 1.5 (MW) wind turbines con-
nected to a 25 (kV) distribution system that exports power to a 120 (kV) grid through
a 25 (kV) feeder. The turbines are simulated in pairs, therefore, in total the model has
3 pairs of turbines that together generates 9 (MW) of electricity. Each wind turbine
pair has a protection system that monitors the voltage, current and speed. The reactive
power is absorbed by induction generators and the rest of the reactive power required is
provided by a 3 (Mvar) STATCOM.
PLC
Wind
Turbine 1
Wind
Turbine 3
Wind
Turbine 2
PLC
Figure 3.12: Wind farm power plant
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3.4.2.1 Simulation environment
Figure 3.13 shows the SCADA network topology used in the simulation. The network
consists of a field network connected with the utility provider corporate network through
the Internet. The down left part of the figure shows part the smart grid generation and
distribution simulation, more specifically, it shows the wind turbine pair number two,
which will be attacked by a spoofing attack. The wind turbine has more PLCs moni-
toring its functioning, however, we chose to only show the PLC that will be targeted
by the attack. The PLC is simulated by a MATLAB/Simulink s-function, a mechanism
offered by MATLAB/Simulink where external code can be executed from the MAT-
LAB/Simulink environment. In this case the function sends requests to the SCADASim
PLC proxy informing the status of its monitored component, a three-phase fault block,
and updates its status based on the response. The status value is passed along to the
fault block. The communication between SCADASim and the PLC is made by the
Modbus/TCP protocol (LibModbus library [Raimbault, 2010]).
Internet
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Router MTU/HMI Server
HMI Client Proxy
HMI Client
SSSchedulerModbusGate ModbusGate
PLC
Proxy
PLC
Wind
Turbine 2
Figure 3.13: SCADA network topology
The attack involves connecting a computer to the communication link. So that, the
attacker can read, modify and fabricate Modbus/TCP messages and/or network traffic
easily. In this case the attacker will send a message to the field PLC, which monitors and
73
CHAPTER 3. SCADASIM - A SIMULATOR FOR SCADA SYSTEMS
controls the three-fault block, to generate a fault in the circuit. The fault will make the
wind turbine pair number two unavailable, and as consequence the other turbine pairs
(number one and three) will also become unavailable. Therefore making the entire en-
ergy generation and distribution to halt. Before the fault the turbine pairs are generating
around 3 MW of power each (time < 26s). At simulation time of 26s the attacker sends
a message to the PLC that makes the fault block to provoke a fault into the circuit. The
fault cascades to the other turbines pairs as can be seen in Figure 3.14, the malicious at-
tack breaks down the entire wind power plant as the turbines stop generating any power,
even though only one pair of turbines were attacked.
0 10 20 30 40 50 60−1
0
1
2
3
4
simulation time (secs)
Wind turbines power generation (MW)
 
 
Turbine 1
Turbine 2
Turbine 3
Figure 3.14: Spoofing attack scenario
3.5 Conclusion
SCADASim is a solution to create realistic simulations of SCADA systems based on
a combination of network simulation and real devices connectivity. It solves a num-
ber of logical and implementation problems in the widely used OMNET++ simulation
environment to allow real world devices (such as smart meters, RTUs, and so forth)
to be attached to the simulator. The simulation framework, SCADASim, also allows
us to study the effects of malicious attacks on the devices and on the simulated net-
work. As security issues affecting SCADA systems become mainstream the need to
have systems where one can try and test different scenarios in order to provide better
solutions for current systems is immense. In addition to that, the lack of network traffic
datasets on SCADA systems make security research on such systems harder. Therefore,
a simulator that can provide a close to real simulations where data can be generated and
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consequently studied is very much appreciated.
75
Chapter 4
Survivability - A holistic approach
This chapter introduces a new approach for survivability. Holistic Survivability aims
to fill the gap left by current survivability models that do not consider service inter-
dependencies, are not flexible for supporting simulation based and data-driven models
and do not provide an algorithmic approach for identifying essential services. In ad-
dition to provide a holistic view of the system. Holistic survivability focuses on four
aspects: joint service analysis, identification of essential and non-essential services,
performance and security evaluation and empirical survivability analysis based on syn-
thetic or acquired data. The chapter also presents the formalism in which holistic sur-
vivability is built upon.
4.1 Introduction
Despite the fair amount of work on engineering reliability in the literature during the
1990s, researchers and practitioners realised that reliability was not sufficient for the
analysis of computing systems [Voas et al., 1997]. Survivability was proposed as a new
discipline, and in some ways as an answer for that insufficiency. In its seminal work
[Ellison et al., 1997] introduced survivability analysis for computing systems with the
idea of improving the security and fault-tolerance aspects of such systems, aspects that
were lacking on current (at that time) analysis models based on reliability.
Part of this work appeared in IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference - GLOBECOM 2010
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[Ellison et al., 1997] derived four key attributes for survivability: Recognition, Resis-
tance, Recovery and Adaptation. The notion of these attributes is that the more a system
is capable of recognising, resisting, recovering and adapting from undesired events the
more survivable is the system. We believe that in terms of analysis, recovery and adap-
tation can be seen as only one attribute. Below we discuss these attributes in more
details.
• Recognition - It is the capacity of recognising undesired events. The intuition is
that if one can recognise undesired events, one can therefore be more effective
in keeping the system survivable. In the case of malicious attacks, this is usually
done via intrusion detection systems (IDS). Until recently there was not much
tools on detecting intrusions for SCADA systems. Even though SCADA systems
are now using the same type of COTS hardware and software already used by
the IT industry, the protocols used by SCADA systems are different. Initiatives
such as QuickDraw SCADA IDS [dig, 2012], which extends the existing IDS
by adding signatures to protocols utilised by SCADA systems are changing this
scenario. It is not the purpose of holistic survivability to recognise malicious
attacks. However, it helps to find out how much damage in terms of disruption
a malicious attack is able to carry out. By inferencing future scenarios holistic
survivability can show the effects of malicious attacks on a SCADA system.
• Resistance - This relates to the capacity of resisting to undesired events. It is
about the robustness of a system. If the system does not have vulnerabilities, its
communication is secure, there are policies for authentication and authorisation in
place and so forth, then it is harder for adversaries to perform malicious attacks.
In the case of other undesired events, such as hardware and software failures,
which are not related to malicious attacks, the fields of dependability, robustness,
reliability and so forth, already provide a fair amount of research on such events
[Al-Kuwaiti et al., 2009; Bologna et al., 2003; Nicol et al., 2004; Reussner and
Firus, 2008; Sanders, 2004]. To the case of holistic survivability, it is not its goal
to provide actions that makes the system more survivable. Rather it is a model
where one can try different scenarios and consequently find out the ones that
maximise the resistance of the system by looking at the survivability score.
• Adaptation - This is a key aspect of any system. Consider the example of biol-
ogy organisms, they keep adapting to the environment they live in. Adaptation
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is the key for their survival. For intelligent creatures such as human beings, the
adaptation becomes even more interesting. We learn from our past experience
and use it to adapt to new situations and environments we are facing in a partic-
ular moment. The importance of adaptation should be no different in computing
systems, and for the matter, in SCADA systems. However, systems are not intel-
ligent beings (just yet), we cannot expect the same type of adaptation. Instead, we
should expect adaptation that is designed by humans to make a system survive.
For instance, consider a multi-core computer that is running on full speed with
all cores. If the computer starts to heat up to a certain temperature, some cores
will turn-off automatically to decrease the generation of heat and consequently
the CPU temperature. Obviously, users are comfortable with system shutting off
an overheating core as long as it can extend the operating life of their systems.
However, one aspect is to design and implement adaptation to computer systems,
another is how to measure it. There is some work on measuring adaptation of
systems. [Reinecke and Wolter, 2008] introduced an adaptation metric to Web
services, adaptivity, which is the capacity of the system to adapt itself. [Chen
et al., 2010] uses the time between transitions to unacceptable and from accept-
able states to measure the capacity of adaptation of a service. [Sheldon et al.,
2004] proposed a model that takes clues from biological organisms to improve
the survivability of systems. It is based on the ideas of autonomic computing
[Kephart and Chess, 2003] to self-adapt in order to survive. However, they did
not propose any metric to measure their models.
[Ellison et al., 1997] also introduced the concepts of essential and non-essential ser-
vices, consequently proposing a discriminatory survivability analysis of computing sys-
tems. The definition of essential services is simple. Essential services are services that
a system relies most in order to provide its functionalities. In other words, they are the
important aspects to be looked at in a system. Everything else should be considered
secondary. More importantly, and perhaps the intuition that differentiates survivability
from similar concepts such as reliability, and dependability is that system survivability
should be evaluated in terms of such services.
Since then a vast quantity of definitions and analysis models and tools for survivability
has been introduced. Such mass adoption of survivability created a problem, the amount
of different survivability definitions. [Westmark, 2004] alone catalogued more than 50
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definitions. The lack of a common definition on survivability produced the erroneous
idea that survivability was nothing new, in fact for many, after many years survivability
remains a confused mixture of multiple domain ideas. Domains such as: dependability,
availability, performability, fault-tolerance, resilience, and so forth, are constantly being
compared with survivability [Al-Kuwaiti et al., 2009; Avizienis et al., 2004a]. Chapter 2
presents a more detailed view on survivability, its concepts and analysis models.
[Al-Kuwaiti et al., 2009] did a comparative analysis of Security, Dependability, Fault-
tolerance, Reliability and Survivability, in an attempt to provide common and com-
plementary characteristics of these concepts. As result, they proposed a conceptual
framework that integrates those concepts on the basis of their definitions, attributes, re-
lationships and performance evaluation measures. However, they did not present any
mechanism to quantify survivability.
We believe that two things are necessary to evaluate the survivability of a system: a pre-
cise definition of survivability, and an accurate way of measuring survivability at any
given time. In this chapter we address these two issues by introducing a new definition
of survivability, which is then followed by a formalism that captures the problems we
aim to solve through the concept of holistic survivability. Fundamentally, holistic sur-
vivability aims to provide a measure of strength against malicious attacks in a holistic
way. We summarised the problems that holistic survivability aims to tackle into four
main topics:
• Single service analysis. Currently the analysis of survivability is frequently re-
stricted to single service analyses. This means if one wants to analyse the surviv-
ability of two services in a system, two models are applied, using two different
metrics and two analyses are performed. Another issue is that even though the
analysis is clearly related to a single service, usually it is referred as the surviv-
ability analysis of a system.
• Essential service identification. Currently essential services are often either
manually defined by system experts or not identified at all. Such manual identifi-
cation approach, when exists, is appropriate to evaluating either parts of a system
or small systems. However, it is intractable for complex systems with hundreds of
services. Therefore, we believe that an algorithmic approach to identify essential
services is necessary.
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• Lack of security analysis. Current models analyse the performance of services
in order to perform a survivability analysis. Usually, such analysis are based on
metrics such as processing time, throughput, blocking calls rates and so forth
[Heegaard and Trivedi, 2009; Jha and Wing, 2001; Moitra and Konda, 2000;
Wang and Liu, 2009]. Such metrics are adequate but they hide an essential issue,
the lack of security aspects on the evaluation. After all, if survivability definitions
identify security as an important attribute, the metrics used to evaluate survivabil-
ity should incorporate such attribute. Chapter 2 presented some related work on
survivability and security. Even though the work presented introduces security
analysis on survivability evaluation they do not provide a holistic approach that
combines service (inter)dependencies and service discriminatory aspects. In ad-
dition, they are not flexible enough to handle analytical and empirical analysis.
• Analytical analysis. As discussed in Chapter 2, most of survivability models
are aimed at providing analytical analysis of systems’ survivability. This could
have been enough in the past, however currently we are in an era where data is
being generated in a huge scale. We believe that is time to provide models that
could use the data acquired in the field to perform more intelligent survivability
analysis.
In order to highlight the intent of holistic survivability and how it fits in terms of pre-
vious taxonomies on survivability we provided a concept taxonomy that illustrates the
proposed approach on survivability. The taxonomy is shown in Figure 4.1, its focus is
on the identification and assessment of essential services and their (inter)dependencies
regarding security and performance aspects.
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Figure 4.1: Holistic Survivability Conceptual Taxonomy
The proposed taxonomy is based on the three attributes previous discussed: Recogni-
tion, Resistance, and Adaptation. Those attributes are considered as the means to attain
survivability. Translating them in terms of security, a survivable system should be able
of recognising malicious attacks, resist to attacks, recover from damages caused by ma-
licious attacks and finally, adapt itself to avoid more damage and new types of attacks.
Clearly it seems a hard task to implement such attributes in the security context. The
computer industry is trying for years to provide tools that would catch and prevent mali-
cious attacks. Some advances has been made, but as mentioned in Chapter 1 we did not
have such tools yet. On the other hand, such attributes have been widely studied on the
context of failures and faults by the dependability community [Al-Kuwaiti et al., 2009;
Avizienis et al., 2004a]. As discussed in Chapter 2, there is a fair amount of work on
designing and implementing architectures in which survivable systems could be built
upon. Such architectures provide mechanisms to the system to resist and to adapt to the
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changes in the environment. Also, there are some work on providing tools to help the
identification (recognition) of undesired events. Unfortunately, nearly all of this work is
not targeted to the recent and most challenging type of undesired events, human made
malicious attacks. Such events are controlled and deployed by humans with the only
intention of creating maximum damage as possible. Holistic survivability, in addition
to support the current analysis of survivability, aims to bring a new approach to the
fight against malicious attacks. It aims to analyse systems in terms of their security and
performance.
Attributes can be seen as non-functional requirements of any computer system, however
it is through attributes that survivability is accessed and quantified. Holistic survivabil-
ity is based on two aspects: Security and Performance. Security includes attributes such
as Availability, Confidentiality and Integrity, and performance includes Availability and
Fault-tolerance. We believe that any measurement of holistic survivability should con-
sider those attributes. The analysis models introduced in Chapters 6 and 7 use these
attributes to quantify service states and consequently holistic survivability.
Services can be affected (compromised) in many different ways. [Avizienis et al.,
2004a] described a taxonomy of threats that may affect systems during its lifetime.
They characterised threats into three types: Faults, Errors, and Failures. Faults were
classified into malicious and non-malicious. Even though all types of threats are im-
portant, we believe that the other types were exhaustively studied in previous work [Al-
Kuwaiti et al., 2009; Avizienis et al., 2004a; Neuman, 2000]. Holistic survivability is
interested in malicious faults, more specifically, malicious attacks intentionally caused.
Most of work on malicious attacks has been on detection and prevention. As mentioned
in Chapter 1 holistic survivability aims at keeping the essential services running even
when the system is under attack. Therefore, it is not the goal of holistic survivability
the prevention, identification or prediction of malicious attacks.
Holistic survivability follows the concepts devised by [Ellison et al., 1997], which de-
fines that services differ in importance for a system. Some services are more important
than others and they should be classified and handled accordingly. According to them,
there two types of services: essential and non-essential. Essential services are the ones
in which the measurement and analysis of survivability should care most. After all,
they are the essence of survivability. The clear boundaries between survivability and
dependability becomes blurry without essential services definition.
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The identification of essential services is critical for a proper analysis of survivability.
Currently, essential services are defined through a manual process. System experts
choose which services are essential based on past experience. Usually such process is
performed in preparation to survivability analysis. Chapter 5 proposes an algorithmic
approach to find the essential services in a SCADA system.
4.2 Holistic survivability - A definition
To provide a formal definition of Holistic survivability we relate the motivations in-
troduced earlier in this chapter in terms of a set of axioms that underpins the ideas of
holistic survivability. The axioms are defined as follows.
1. system as a whole - survivability is an emergent attribute. Even though we can
look at survivability of individual services to analyse survivability. To proper
identify the survivability of the system, one should aggregate the individual scores
taking into account the discriminatory factor of service importance in order to
provide the system survivability.
2. services discrimination - services differ on their functionalities, such differentia-
tion determines their criticality to the system. In the case of survivability either
services are essential or not essential.
3. dependencies - in general services are not independent entities. Most of the time
a service depends on other services to provide its functionality, therefore creating
some form of dependency between them.
4. uncertainty - this axiom comes from the intuition the there is no absolute certainty
in the evaluation process. From the data acquisition to the final score computation
uncertainty is presented. The data acquired may be noisy, data can be missed dur-
ing the collecting process, sensors may be faulty, and so forth. In addition to the
uncertainty on data acquisition, most analytical models are built on uncertainty,
they provide probabilistic results of their computations.
5. malicious attacks are inevitable - as pointed out in Chapter 1, and earlier in this
chapter, malicious attacks are only increasing, with no sign of current solutions
providing effective results. Rather than trying to stop every attack we assume that
attacks are inevitable and we focus on ways of minimising their impact.
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6. survivability is not binary - survivability is not a binary state (survivable or not
survivable). Survivability can be measured in terms of degrees. Such degrees can
be computed in terms of probabilistic quantifications with respect to the system.
For instance, a system can have a probability of 0.8 of being survivable, or 0.75
and any other positive value between [0.0, 1.0].
By considering the above axioms we provide the following definition of survivability.
Definition 5 Holistic survivability is the capacity of essential services to provide their
functionalities in cases of malicious attacks compromising parts of the system and that
such services may rely on other services of the system, which are not necessarily essen-
tials.
To quantify the capacity of essential services providing their functionalities under unde-
sired conditions, holistic survivability is represented by a five-tuple< G,S,M, Sm, P >
where:
• G - Represents the network graph that defines the computer system in question.
Depending on how the system will be analysed the graph can be either directed
or undirected. The network graph is defined in terms of services, with services
being the nodes and the communication between such services represented as
edges. Therefore, we call it service graph.
• S - Represents the services in the system. It is defined as a tuple S =< E, I >,
where E are the essential services and I = S − E, are the non-essential ones.
Usually those services are algorithmically computed. However, the definition is
flexible enough to support manual selection.
• Sm - It describes the service state model utilised by holistic survivability. The
model defines a set of possible in which services will be in during their opera-
tional time.
• M - It determines the set of metrics utilised to compute the service states. The
metrics are used to compute in which state a service is in during the evaluation.
• P - It either describes the Conditional Probability Distributions (CPD) that rep-
resent service states during their operational time or the CPDs that represent po-
tentials (see Section 2.1.2) during their runtime.
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Over the next sections we detail the above components and we also show how the pro-
posed model uses Probabilistic Graphical Models as a tool to quantify holistic surviv-
ability.
4.2.1 Service graph - G
The network structure of a computing system can be represented as a graph where com-
puter hosts can be defined as graph nodes and the connection between these hosts can be
represented by graph edges. However, in this model the graph nodes are represented by
services and the communication between them as edges. Thus, a computer host that is
hosting multiple services will have its services individually represented in the network
graph.
The network graph is different from the ones that represent network topology of com-
puter systems in general, it only includes services. Common network devices (such as
routers, switches), which are commonly represented in a network topology are not part
of the graph. In this thesis we call this network graph as service graph.
A service graph can be undirected or directed. It depends on how the interaction be-
tween the services is represented. However in both cases the graph nodes are repre-
sented by system services and and edge exists between two services if and only if there
is at least one transaction between them (see Definition 7). A transaction is defined as
follows.
Definition 6 Given two services X and Y , there exists a transaction T (X,Y ) if a suc-
cessful communication to exchange information is carried out either between X and Y
or vice-versa.
Definition 7 A service graph G = (S,L) is defined by a set of services represented as
nodes S = {s1, s2, ...sn} and a set of links as edges L = {l1, l2, ..ln}, where given two
services x and y, li(x, y) ∈ L ⇐⇒ ∃ T (x, y).
The service graph is created by analysing the network traffic of the interactions between
services. For the cases where no network traffic is provided the graph is generated by
looking at the projected transactions between services. A projected transaction is a
possible interaction between two services that was planned during the design phase of
the system.
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Figure 4.2 illustrates the difference between service graph and network topology. Fig-
ure 4.2 (a) shows a regular system network topology, with routers, switches, hosts and
services. Figure 4.2 (b) shows the service network graph. Only services and links
between them are included. For example, one can notice that service A does not com-
municate with service B because there is no link (edge) between them.
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X - MTU and HMI Server
Y - Historian and RDBMS
A,B,C,D - PLCs
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Figure 4.2: Comparison of real network structure (a) and service network structure
(b). Note how the two structures may be different due to different services in different
hosts communicating with each other at any time
Another type of service graph is called dependency graph. As it is the case with service
graphs, dependency graphs are generated by looking at transactions between services.
The main difference is that dependency graphs look at who initiated the transaction in
order to create their directed edges. As a rule defined by this model, in a transaction
between a service client and a service provider, the service client is dependent of the
service provider. The intuition here is that a service that is dependent on another service
needs this other services in order to provide its functionality. More formally,
Definition 8 Dependency graph is a service graph whose edges are directed. The di-
rection of the edges is based on a explicit dependency between two services. Given two
services X and Y , X is dependent on Y (X ← Y ) if there is a transaction T (X,Y )
initiated by X .
Figure 4.3 (a) show a service graph, there is no direct links between services. Figure 4.3
(b) shows the same services now mapped by their dependencies. We can see that every
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other services is dependent of service X .
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Figure 4.3: Dependency Graph
4.2.2 Services - S
Services are the basic entity for the holistic survivability evaluation of a SCADA system.
To avoid misinterpretations about services and systems we provide two definitions that
are important to a clear understanding of the relationship between them. We also show
this relationship illustratively in Figure 4.4.
Definition 9 A system Sy = {S1, S2, ..., Sm} consists of a set of m services commu-
nicating with each other and providing functionalities to internal and external clients,
where the internal clients are other services within the system.
Definition 10 A service is a software that provides a functionality consumed by other
entities (services or clients) of the system. Services can have a variety of states that
describe different levels of operability (e.g. Normal, Compromised, Acceptable, Unac-
ceptable, and so forth).
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Figure 4.4: Service model
The classification of services in essential and non-essential is vital for holistic surviv-
ability. Even though the model is flexible enough to accept manual services classifi-
cation, most of the time we rely on the algorithm proposed in Chapter 5 for defining
essential and non-essential services. Therefore, we leave this discussion for Chapter 5.
4.2.3 Service state modelling - Sm
The definition of the possible states that a service can hold is necessary for the analy-
sis of dependencies between services and consequently to survivability quantification.
However such states are based on what it is being quantified. For instance, if one is
interested about the performance of the system, the state-space required might be dif-
ferent from the one that is interested about security. A generic state-space definition can
be possible as long as the same number and types of service states is shared between the
types of quantification. For instance, if a state-space definition for performance defines
three states to represent a service (e.g. Normal, Degraded and Unavailable) and if the
state-space for security modelling also defines the same three states, both could use the
same state-definition.
It is important to note that the way the state is computed is dependent of the metric
being used to the state computation. Just because two different service modelling ap-
proaches use the same state-space definition it does not mean their states are computed
in the same way and using the same metrics. In this work, we provide two types of
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quantification, namely performance, and security.
The service state model is represented by a set Sm = {s1, s2, ..., sn}where each item si
defines a possible state of the service and n is the number of states. In Section 4.2.5 we
show how the metrics are used in combination with state models to compute the state
of a service in the system.
Depending on how holistic survivability will be used we rely on two types of techniques
to compute service states:
1. Analytical - for analytical analysis we rely on analytical models that are used to
compute the service distributions and based and consequently the service states.
2. Empirical - for empirical analysis we rely on machine learning techniques such
as anomaly detection [Chandola et al., 2009]. Such techniques are based on the
detection of outliers. An outlier is an observation that deviates from the other
observations for a large margin, therefore raising suspicious about it [Hawkins,
1980]. In general there are three type of techniques to detect outliers: supervised,
semi-supervised and unsupervised. The first two techniques depend on trained
datasets. Sometimes it is not possible to have trained datasets, for such cases
unsupervised techniques can be used. To compute the metrics in the proposed
model the unsupervised type of detection is used. It is assumed there is no training
data available. As it is the case for the the other types of detection, unsupervised
anomaly detection also provides different techniques to detect outliers. To this
proposed model statistical test is used. The statistical-based technique assumes
that the normal data is generated by a known distribution, occur in a region with
high probability and that the outliers deviates largely from this distribution. The
technique works as follows.
• Assume that the data follows a known distribution. Usually it is assumed
that the data fits in a Gaussian distribution [Chandola et al., 2009]. When
it is not the case, transformations to make the data more ‘Guassian’ can be
performed.
• Compute the mean (µ), the standard deviation (σ) and the variance (σ2).
• Find the outliers by looking for data points that deviate more than 3 times
from the standard deviation (σ). Also known as 3σ rule. This rule represents
the small left and right tails region in Figure 4.5.
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Figure 4.5: Gaussian distribution
4.2.4 Metrics - M
Metric is a unit of measurement and can be either qualitative or quantitative. As we are
interested in survivability quantification, our focus is on quantitative metrics. The terms
metrics and quantitative metrics will be used interchangeably throughout this thesis.
Metrics are widely used by the scientific community where it is applied to provide
understanding and meaning to theories and discoveries, and by industry that applies
metrics to their business processes in order to get insights from the acquired data and
help tune their models more accurately.
One of the challenges in defining metrics is to know what and how to measure. The
more accurate and meaningful metrics give us better understanding into the processes
of the system. In this thesis the metrics utilised to quantify the service states and conse-
quently holistic survivability are based on the key attributes of survivability as originally
defined by [Ellison et al., 1997]. However, the metrics will not measure recognition, re-
sistance, recovery and adaptation directly. They will look at aspects of the system that
are linked to these attributes. Performance will measure, as the name suggests, the per-
formance of the services (see Chapter 6). By looking at the performance of services
we can detect degradations that may be related with malicious attacks. Security will
measure the probability of having the service confidentiality, availability and integrity
compromised by looking at possible vulnerabilities affecting services and how easy
they are to be exploited. Services without vulnerabilities are harder to attack as they are
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mode difficult to be break in, consequently they are more resistant to attacks.
Those metrics do not measure the attributes, for instance, malicious attacks that do not
affect the performance of a service will likely not be detected by monitoring perfor-
mance metrics. The same is valid for the security metric that monitors vulnerabilities,
the security of a service may be degraded because the messages exchange between ser-
vices are not encrypted, the proposed security metric (more detailed in Chapter 7) will
not detect such compromise. Other properties were taken into account when devising
metrics to quantify survivability.
4.2.5 Probability distribution - P
A probability distribution is associated with each service in the system. The distribution
represents probabilities for each state of the service during its operational time. The
number of states are defined by the state model as described in Section 4.2.3. For
instance, lets say the state model defined three states {s1, s2, s3} for representing the
possible states of a service, let M defines the metric to be measure and t = 0.15 a
threshold used to define the rules for the service matching. The threshold t can be
defined by a system expert or learnt from the data.

s1 if M < t
s2 if M ≥ t and M < 2× t
s3 if M > 2× t
(4.2.1)
Then, applying the above to the measurements illustrated in Figure 4.6 (top) we have
the states assigned as illustrated in Figure 4.6 (bottom).
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t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t7 t8 t9 t10
M
0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.1 0.27 0.3 0.15 0.21 0.02
t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t7 t8 t9 t10
state
s2 s2 s2 s2 s1
service i
s3s1 s2 s2 s1
Figure 4.6: Metric M measurement (top). Service state based on its metric measure-
ment (bottom)
We have the following rules been applied during a empirical experiment or though ap-
plying analytical models. Chapter 6 describes how to use analytical models and empir-
ical data to compute the probabilities P .
It is also important to note that when services are dependent on other services P be-
comes a Conditional Probability Distribution CPD. The probability P can be assigned
in two ways. If the system is evaluated in design time P is assigned manually, usu-
ally using known distributions as Exponential distribution, Uniform distribution and so
forth. For the cases where an empirical evaluation is being performed, the probabilities
P are learnt from the data acquired.
4.3 Quantifying holistic survivability
In order to provide a quantification tool that allows us to quantify holistic survivability
we need to map its concepts to a mathematical formalism. As mentioned earlier, one
of the features of holistic survivability is to consider all services in the system and their
(inter)dependencies. We already have shown how a computing (SCADA) system is
mapped as a service graph (see Section 4.2.1).
Now we extend this concept by mapping holistic survivability to probability theory.
Services are defined as random variables X , with probability distributions to repre-
sent them P (X). A joint probability distribution is used to represent all services in
the system. Therefore, given a set of services {x1, x2, ..., xn}, the joint distribution is
represented by P (x1, x2, ..., xn), where n is the number of services in the system. This
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full joint probability distribution can answer all possible inference queries to the system.
Essentially we will use this model to ask questions such as: (i) What is the survivability
of the system if service X is on a state that is not defined as normal? (ii) What are the
services that service X depends most?
Those questions are important to evaluate the survivability of the system. However they
are not efficient to execute. Given n services with m discrete states, it would take mn
parameters to answer all queries to this model. Definitely, a not desired performance.
Fortunately, there are more efficient ways of performing these operations. Probabilistic
Graphical Models (PGM) formalism comes to help.
Probabilistic Graphical Models rely on Probability and Graph theory to its formalism.
They offer more efficient mechanisms, which rely on conditional independence (de-
scribed in Definition 1) to represent a joint distribution compactly. We use them as the
base formalism for holistic survivability. We also rely on their formalism to perform
inferences in our model. As mentioned in Chapter 1, among the capabilities of holistic
survivability it is power of doing inference for prediction and diagnosis.
One of the key aspects of holistic survivability is the concept of essential services.
Holistic survivability model allows the definition and use of more than one essential
service. Chapter 5 describes an algorithmic approach to identify essential services.
Once the services are identified they are used to compute the overall survivability of
the system. More specifically, holistic survivability is quantified by computing the joint
probability distribution through the essential services.
Definition 11 Holistic survivability is quantified as the marginalisation of essential
services over all services of the SCADA system, where the essential services are in
an intended state. P (E = s) =
∑
I P (E, I), whereE represents the set of all essential
services, I represents all non-essential services of the system and s is the operational
service state that was designed for.
Figure 4.7 illustrates a generic picture of the model and their main steps, which are
based on services states, service interdependencies, and finally the overall system sur-
vivability inference. As mentioned earlier this thesis presents two different techniques
to model and evaluate system survivability. One technique that relies on simulation
models to define the service probability distributions and an empirical one where distri-
butions are learnt from data.
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Figure 4.7: Holistic survivability model overall structure
The dashed arrows in Figure 4.7 represent the manual process of defining the graphical
model, computing the metrics and then computing the inferences that define holistic
survivability. This process is simple as it only contains three steps: System experts
define the model to be simulated or computed numerically, the metrics used to define
the state of the service are computed, and the service graph that represent the system is
defined. Once the CPDs and the service graph are defined the system expert is ready to
use the model for computing holistic survivability. Even though the process is simple it
is labour intensive to make the system expert compute the metrics, the CPDs and define
the service graph of the system. For systems with a high number of services this process
become infeasible.
4.4 Learning from data
We recognise that is impractical to use a manual process to compute holistic survivabil-
ity. In this section we describe how the learning from data helps on creating the model
to compute holistic survivability. We present an algorithm that can be used to acquire
and parse the data, generate the service graph, compute the metrics being analysed, gen-
erate the CPDs for all services (or potentials) in the system, and finally compute holistic
survivability.
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First, we describe a step-by-step following the steps illustrated in Figure 4.7, and then
we present the algorithm that computes the entire process. Extra inferences and diag-
nosis are supported by the model, but they are not defined in the algorithm, as it would
impossible to known what type of diagnosis and on what services a practitioner was
interested.
4.4.1 Data acquisition (step 1)
The first step in the data acquisition process is to define what data should be recorded.
In other words, it needs to define what information is important enough to describe the
state of the service. As mentioned earlier, the state model (see Section 4.2.3) is defined
in terms of metrics (see Section 4.2.4). Therefore, the data field can be a vector of multi-
ple values, each measuring a metric of interest. This is the data that needs to be acquired
or computed. Every time a transaction occurs its content should be parsed to acquire the
following attributes: source, which represents the service that initiates the transaction,
target, the service provider, and data, which as already mentioned represents the data
of interest. Alternatively, the metrics in question could be acquired separately from the
transactions. This is the case for the security model presented in Chapter 7. The data
will eventually be merged as a single table.
The information stored in this table will also be used to build the service graph (see
Section 4.2.1) of the system and consequently the network structure of the graphical
model that will be used. Also it is important to notice that the data field is not mandatory.
Depending of the analysis being executed the metrics used by the analysis may not
come from this network traffic data. However, the source and target fields are always
necessary, as they are used to build the service graph of the system.
Table 6.4 shows an example of the acquired information at the service side, where the
two rows describe a transaction between two services, in this case services A and B.
Table 4.1: Transaction between two services
Source Target data
A B 000200000006030100000001
B A 00020000000403010100
... ... ...
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In practical terms, there are multiple ways of acquiring this information without the
need to rewrite service’s code. One possibility is to add a machine that sniffs the traffic
at the switch level. The machine acquires the information from one or more switch(es)
to which all SCADA devices running the services are connected to. Techniques like
ARP spoofing could also accomplish this easily. However, this may be considered hos-
tile and network administrators may not allow such techniques. Another way of accom-
plishing data acquisition is to add ‘proxy’ devices between the SCADA services and the
switch, so that the proxy can acquire and process the information being exchanged.
4.4.2 Metrics computation (step 2)
Once the raw data is acquired it needs to be transformed into a dataset so that the
proposed model can use it to build the network structure and to learn the CPDs. The
model is applied to historical data. Therefore, it is assumed that the acquired data is
available on a central database. Information acquired by individual services are sent to
a central repository that holds all the information in this central database. It contains
information similar to Table 6.4. For example, the table contains three fields (Source,
Target and Data), and numerous rows depicting different transactions between services.
The data transformation occurs in two steps. First, the data is transformed into a
database where columns represent the services and rows represent the measurements
at a specific time. Second, based on the metrics used a score representing the metrics
is computed. Then, based on the state model defined a service state is assigned to the
service. Figure 4.8 illustrates how the transformed data looks like after each step in the
transformation.
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Figure 4.8: Computing metrics - 2 steps
In order to define the state behaviour for each service, score bound limits need to be
defined for a service (as mentioned in Section 4.2.3). As discussed the proposed model
uses statistical tests to find the limits for the metrics that define service states.
4.4.3 Generating the service graph (step 3)
The service graph is generated by processing the transactions recorded at the table de-
fined in Table 6.4, the process aims to generate a graph structure similar to the one
illustrated in Figure 4.3. On the top is the system network topology and on the bottom
is the generated network structure.
The process to generate this structure starts by going through Table 6.4 and identify-
ing transactions. Those transactions are then converted into nodes and edges in the
graph. Figure 4.9 illustrates what happens when Algorithm 1 identifies a transaction in
Table 6.4. Depending on the type of the graphical model used, the algorithm will run
slightly different. For instance, for creating undirected graphs, the algorithm does not
check for loops, as it is the case when creating directed acyclic graphs. The algorithm
runs through all rows of Table 6.4, and at the end the service graph is generated.
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Figure 4.9: Example of generating dependency graph or service graph from transac-
tion table
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Algorithm 1: Generate Service (Dependency) Graph
// Represents the Table of data logs
Input: DataLogs
// Type of graph to be generated: 1 - Directed, 2 -
Undirected
Input: T
Output: G
// Represents the generated graph
1 G← ∅
2 foreach row in DataLogs do
3 if row == inverse(next(DataLogs)) then
4 x, y ← extractServices(row)
5 if T == 1 and NotLoop(G,edge(y,x)) then
6 G ∪ edge(y, x)
7 else if T == 2 then
8 G ∪ edge(y, x)
9 end
10 else
11 reverse(DataLogs)
12 end
13 end
14 return G
4.4.4 Computing the CPDs (Step 4)
To learn the CPDs it is assumed that the probability of each service state is independent
of the probability of every other state in the dataset (i.i.d). In addition, a service (or
dependency) graph is already known (Section 4.4.3). Depending if the dataset contains
noisy data or not a different algorithm may be applied. In our model we will use two
algorithms, one for when the dataset contains no missing data, and one for datasets with
missing data.
We use Maximum-Likelihood Estimation (MLE) Θijk =
Nijk∑
k Nijk
for learning CPDs
from datasets with no missing data [Korb and Nicholson, 2004; Spiegelhalter and Lau-
ritzen, 1990]. The process can be formally described as, given a service graph G that
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represents the system’s network structure, where m represents the number of service
(nodes) in the network structure, and D = ({< v11, v12, ..., v1m >, ..., < vn1 , vn2 , ..., vnm >
}), with n samples (rows), represents a dataset. The problem is to find the model M
(CPDs) that maximises Pr(D|M). More formally, the challenge is to find Θijk =
P (Xi = xk|Pa(Xi) = paj), where Xi is a service, Pa(Xi) are the parents of service
Xi, xk is a service state and paj is parent’s service state.
On Markov Networks (Undirected Graphs), the graph has to be decomposable and no
constraints are placed on the form of clique potentials [Barber, 2012]. For the cases
where datasets contain missing data we resort to the Expectation Maximization (EM)
algorithm [Barber, 2012]. This process is different from the previous one as now we
must consider not only the observed data (as before), but also the method by which data
is missing.
4.4.5 Calculating the survivability (step 5)
Once the graphical model is built, the final overall survivability score is computed.
The computation is based on the factorisation derived from the service (dependency)
graph itself, and the computation is based on it, however it uses Definition 11 to proper
compute the holistic survivability. It is important to notice that even though we did not
include the process of identifying essential services, which is the base of our holistic
survivability definition, the process has to occur and it is described in Chapter 5.
4.5 Conclusion
This chapter introduced a new concept of survivability for SCADA systems. Holistic
survivability evaluates the survivability of SCADA systems considering services inter-
dependencies, essential services and it is flexible enough to support different metrics
and models. The five components that defines holistic survivability were also intro-
duced. Holistic survivability uses the formalism of probabilistic graphical models to
compute survivability and it is suitable for design time analysis as well as analysis in
runtime using the data generated by the system. A step-by-step guide was presented
that shows how holistic survivability can be computed through an automatic process
based on data. For the cases of dependency graphs this solution present a shortcoming,
which we hope to fix on future work. Currently, only systems that do not create loops
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on their service transactions are supported. As dependency graphs are DAG (Direct
Acyclic Graphs). A possible solution is to use another type of graphical model, one that
supports temporal aspects and consequently remove cycles by having nodes defined
with temporal tags such as Dynamic Bayesian Networks (DBN) [Koller and Friedman,
2009].
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Finding essential services
This chapter introduces an algorithm to identify the essential services of a SCADA sys-
tem. The algorithm is based on Service Rank, a ranking measurement aimed at sorting
the importance of services in a SCADA system. It uses network traffic and central-
ity techniques [Freeman, 1979; Newman, 2007] to rank the services. The chapter also
provides an evaluation that demonstrates how to use the proposed algorithm to iden-
tify essential services in a SCADA system. The evaluation is created in SCADASim
(see Chapter 3), a tool to create SCADA simulations. Further, we compare the pro-
posed algorithm with other techniques used to find important nodes in a network such
as network centrality metrics [Landherr et al., 2010].
5.1 Introduction
A key aspect of survivability is the importance of services. One of the first accounts of
the concept of essential services was presented by [Ellison et al., 1997] in the definition
of survivability for computer systems. However, most of survivability analysis over the
years did not give importance to essential services. This is may be due to the fact that
in general the analysis of survivability was focused to a specific service and not the
system, which could have multiple services. By analysing one service their implicitly
assumed that the service under analysis was an essential service.
We recognise that essential services are vital to the functioning of a system, and they
Part of this work to appear in IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics
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should have priority over the other services. However we do not assume that essential
services are already identified by system experts in order to perform a survivability
analysis. In addition we believe to the possibility that a system may contain multiple
essential services. If this is the case such essential services should be analysed together
in an holistic approach. In general survivability analysis is applied to a specific service.
The manual approach of identifying essential services is problematic. Even though a
system expert could identify multiple essential services, such subjective approach could
lead to different experts evaluating services differently. Also, the manual process for
complex and large systems, where we could have hundreds of services interconnected
could make the identification process erroneous at best.
There is a need for an algorithmic identification of essential services. The challenge
is to provide a generic approach that does not take into account what system is under
evaluation and what type of data is being exchanged. Looking at other research fields we
found that the idea of identifying important actors on networks it is not novel. In fact,
the domain of Social Network Analysis (SNA) has been studying it for many years.
However, it is a challenging problem and SNA researchers have resorted to different
approaches.
One of the methods to find important nodes in graphs is to remove nodes that will make
the graph become disconnected. Unfortunately, such approach does not work on surviv-
ability and SCADA networks. Depending on who are the essential services, it is possi-
ble that the essential services and the other services needed by the essential ones are on
the same sub-graph and therefore they still can provide their functionality. [Shetty and
Adibi, 2005] recognised this problem and proposed a solution by applying graph en-
tropy [Ko¨rner, 1986], however they did not remove graph cutting technique completely.
Their approach was to look at the transactions between the nodes in the graph (e.g.
email exchanges, phone calls) to compute the graph entropy, and then by applying cuts
to the graph and computing the difference between before and after cuts they found the
important nodes. The nodes that provide higher differences are the important ones.
[Borgatti, 2005] resorted to another approach. He described a typology of network
flows based on two attributes: types of trajectories that traffic could follow in a graph
(e.g. geodesics, walks, paths, or trails) and the method of spread (e.g. broadcast, se-
rial replication, or transfer). His main argument is that in general people make implicit
assumptions about the manner the traffic will flow in the network. This means that
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the degree centrality is not applicable for every type of network, as so as betweenness,
eigenvector or any other type of centrality measurement. Such metrics should be ap-
plicable to the type of network that follows the traffic pattern they were designed for.
[Ghosh and Lerman, 2010] agreed with [Borgatti, 2005] and they have shown empiri-
cally that the influence model has to match the dynamic process of the network. In other
words, many topological properties of networks are defined by assuming that most of
the information flows along shortest paths. Clearly, this is not the case for networked
systems as they are not designed with this ‘feature’ in mind. In addition, data flows
according to specific rules, which usually are not related with the shortest paths of the
network.
With the Finding Essential Services (FES) algorithm we propose a different approach
to identify importance and consequently essential services in a SCADA system. Our
approach is based on the data exchanged between services. The network traffic is used
to find transactions (see Definition 6) between services (nodes) and also to find out the
diversity of such transactions. The FES algorithm has three main steps:
1. Computing Service Rank
2. Clustering the services based on their service ranks
3. Choosing the cluster that represents the essential services as the one that the high-
est ranked service is part of
Over the next sections we introduce Service Rank, a quantitative measurement devised
specifically to rank the importance of services, and we present the FES algorithm, as
well as we present an evaluation of the algorithm. We created a simulation of a SCADA
system to evaluate our FES algorithm.
5.2 Service rank
Service Rank is a quantitative measurement that identifies the importance of a service
within a system. The higher is the service rank the more essential is the service to the
system. Service rank uses some ideas of centrality [Landherr et al., 2010], a metric that
measures the importance/influence/power of a node in a network. It is widely used in
the Social Network Analysis domain [Wasserman and Faust, 1994]. Centrality has been
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proved of great value to analyse and understand the roles of actors in social networks
and measures different aspects of the network. [Freeman, 1979; Newman, 2007] de-
scribes the main metrics used to measure centrality: Degree, Closeness, Betweenness,
and Eigenvector, among others.
An important aspect on the algorithmic process of identifying essential services is the
choice of metrics. The metrics used to compute Service Rank should be generic enough
to be used by any type of SCADA system. SCADA are information systems, their ser-
vices exchange data from and to other services and external entities. It is reasonable to
model the metric in terms of the data being exchanged. Following this approach we de-
fined two primitives (attributes) as the core of the Service Rank algorithm: information
flow (IF ), and information diversity (ID).
To compute the service rank the information diversity and information flow are multi-
plied together as described in Equation 5.2.1.
SR = IF × ID (5.2.1)
5.2.1 Information flow
Information flow measures the number of transactions a service performs during a pe-
riod of time. A definition of transaction is described in Definition 6. The period of time
is defined by who is performing the evaluation. However, we see two main approaches
for this: Batch assessment, all the transactions are stored in a database and after the
evaluation period finishes the batch data is processed. Still part of batch assessment is
to use the data collected during the current assessment in addition to historical data col-
lected by previous assessments. We prefer this option because the more data we have
the better is for the algorithm computing the rankings. The other approach is real-time
assessment; data is collected and computed as the system runs. Here, the best approach
is to combine the historical data with the one being acquired. At first, because not much
data is collected the initial rankings can be misleading. Therefore, it is recommended to
use the algorithm when the system is on steady-state mode in terms of data exchange.
Equation 5.2.2 shows how the IF score is computed. For each service the weights of its
links (edges) is summed up and then it is normalised by the total sum of all services of
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the system.
IF (s) =
∑
i tsi∑
i
∑
j tij
, if i 6= j 6= s (5.2.2)
We use a weight undirected graph to represent the system. Each pair of services (i, j)
that communicates with each other is represented by a graph edge between them, the
edge weight t represents the number of transactions between the two services. Inter-
nally, each service has a data structure to store this information. The data structure
contains two fields: destination and number of transactions. Table 5.1 shows the data
structure of service X based on the example illustrated in Figure 5.1.
Algorithm 2 describes the process of computing the information flow of each service,
and then normalise them based on the total information flow of the system. The Lo-
calInformationFlow defined in Algorithm 2 sums up all the transactions processed by
a service. For instance, taking as example the transactions for service X described in
Table 5.1, the operation will return the value 28.
Algorithm 2: Information Flow
Input: ServicesList
Output: InformationFlowList
1 InformationFlowList← ∅
2 totalInformationFlow← 0
3 foreach service in ServicesList do
4 localIF← LocalInformationF low(service)
5 totalInformationFlow← totalInformationFlow + localIF
6 put < service, localIF > in InformationFlowList
7 end
8 foreach tuple in InformationFlowList do
9 inflow← tuple < localIF > /totalInformationF low
10 put inflow to tuple < localIF >
11 end
12 return InformationFlowList
To provide a better understanding of the Information flow attribute we show an example
of a system with 8 services and the service graph illustrated in Figure 5.1.
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Figure 5.1: Service graph with transactions as weights - An example of applying IF
In this example graph, service X communicates quite often with service W (12 trans-
actions), services C and D do not communicate (they are not linked), there are few
interactions from services C and D to service B (2 and 3 respectively).
Table 5.1: Data structure for service X
Destination Number of transactions
W 12
B 3
A 5
Z 8
The table in Figure 5.1 shows the IF score for all services in this example. Service
X has the highest Information flow score in this system as it concentrates most of the
transactions in the network. For the sack of completeness we compare IF with known
centrality metrics such as: Closeness, Degree and Betweenness.
Closeness measures how rapidly information spreads in the network from one node
to another. A central node can reach other nodes quicker (using fewer intermediaries
nodes) than other nodes. Figure 5.2 illustrates the closeness of the nodes in the network.
The closer to black they are the higher closeness they have. As we can see there are
three services B,X, Y with highest closeness, they are in black in Figure 5.2. Using
IF , service B is not even between the three highest ranked services. Clearly, closeness
does not capture a key aspect we are interested, the dynamism of the network regarding
transactions.
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Figure 5.2: Closeness centrality
Degree centrality measures the nodes degrees in the graph. The intuition of using degree
centrality is that higher degree nodes may be ‘well’ connected in the graph (system).
With degree centrality we have the same behaviour as presented by closeness centrality.
We have services defined as high rankings that are not even part of the top three ranked
services in IF , as illustrated in Figure 5.3.
B
C
D
X
Y
A
W
Z
Figure 5.3: Degree centrality
And finally Betweenness, a centrality measure that bridges the communication between
nodes in the graph. The intuition is that high ranked betweenness nodes may be impor-
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tant as they may ‘know’ what it is happening in terms of data in the network. Figure 5.4
illustrates the betweenness of all services in the graph. As we can see the results are
even worse. Service B is the highest ranked service in the graph. Clearly, results are
completely different from the ones provided by IF .
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Z
Figure 5.4: Betweenness centrality
5.2.2 Information diversity
Information diversity measures the diversity of information exchanged by a service. The
intuition is that the more diverse is a set of messages the more information it contains.
It works by tokenising data message in terms of content.
Essentially Information Diversity is the normalisation of Token Diversity score. Equa-
tion 5.2.3 shows how ID is computed. The attribute is measured by computing the
Token Diversity (TD) of the messages exchanged by a service and then normalising it
in order to compute the final ID.
ID(s) =
TD(s)∑
i TD(i)
(5.2.3)
Figure 5.5 illustrates the overall process of computing Token Diversity and consequently,
Information Diversity. The first step is to define a rule that will be used to tokenise the
message. In other words, the rule will define what from a message is considered a to-
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ken. Any rule is supported, as long as it can be computed. Once the rule is defined,
the process will tokenise the messages and send the tokens to be processed by the main
algorithm that will then compute the Token Diversity score.
Tokenizer
Token
Diversity
computation
tokensmessage TD
Rules
score
1
2 3 4
Figure 5.5: Overall process to compute individual (service) Token Diversity
The rule used in the algorithm to tokenise messages is defined as a function, therefore
new function scan be defined to provide the desired functionality. Consider the message
illustrated in Figure 5.6. The message is a generic message with two fields, header and
payload. Usually it is how any protocol message looks like, the difference may be on
having sub-fields in the header. A simple rule would be to use the entire message as
a token, for the case of the generic message, it would mean to use header + payload.
However, it may not be the best approach. Some protocols add counters to their message
headers, if one adopted this simple approach of using header + payload as a token, it
could end up having one message per token type. Another approach is to use only the
payload of the message. It seems reasonable for us, as it is where the important content
is located.
Header Payload
Figure 5.6: Generic message
The token diversity calculation is illustrated by Equation 5.2.4, where n is the number
of token types handled by a service. The equation is a variation of Simpson’s diversity
index [Simpson, 1949]. In our case, rather than measuring diversity on nature, we are
measuring information diversity on messages.
Algorithm 3 shows how token diversity TD is computed. It counts the number of tokens
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per token type and then applies part of Equation 5.2.4 to get a temporary token diversity.
And after it gets a summation of all temporary token diversity (one per token type) it
applies Equation 5.2.4 to get the final token diversity score.
TD =
1∑n
i=1 pi
2
× n (5.2.4)
Algorithm 3: Token Diversity
Input: TokenMap, totalTokensCounter
Output: Token Diversity score TD
1 td, ttd← 0
2 tokenTypes← keys(TokenMap)
3 numberTokenTypes← length(tokenTypes)
4 foreach type in tokenTypes do
5 counter← value(TokenMap,type)
6 ttd← ttd+ ( countertotalTokensCounter )2
7 end
8 td← 1ttd × numberTokenTypes
9 return td
Once the token diversity is computed per service they need to be aggregated in a final
step to compute a normalised version of the token score, which is the final ID score.
Equation 5.2.3 illustrates this approach. Each individual TD(i), where i is i-th service
in the list, has its score divided by the sum of all TD scores.
Figure 5.7 illustrates an example of an arbitrary networked system. Each service keeps
track of the tokens they are exchanged with other services in a HashMap data structure
as shown in Figure 5.7. The token type represents the key of the HashMap and the #
tokens represents the value.
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Figure 5.7: Information diversity example
In the example illustrated in Figure 5.7 tokens are represented as numbers. A local ser-
vice data structure that keeps track of the messages exchanged between service W and
the other services would look like as Table 5.2, where each row represents a transaction.
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Table 5.2: Information Diversity Data Structure for service W
Destination token
X 9
X 9
Y 0
X 9
X 9
X 9
X 9
X 9
X 9
X 9
Y 0
X 9
X 9
X 9
Y 0
Y 0
Y 0
Y 0
Y 0
Y 0
Y 0
Y 0
5.3 Finding essential services algorithm
Algorithm 4 describes the entire FES computation process. As mentioned earlier, the
FES algorithm has three main steps: Computing service rank, which is described in
Algorithm 4, lines 2 to 9. After the service rank is computed the algorithm groups the
services in two groups of services by applying the k-means clustering algorithm [Ander-
berg, 1973]. There is no special reason to use k-means apart of being an unsupervised
machine learning technique and being widely used by practitioners, this process is rep-
resented in line 25 of Algorithm 4. Once the groups are created the algorithm labels the
groups between essential and non-essential, which represent essential and non-essential
services respectively. This process is represented by lines 27 to 33 of Algorithm 4.
For the case when a service rank value is sharing by all services of the system, some
special check has to be made to avoid the clustering algorithm erroneously to group the
services in two groups, even though it is not the case, as they clearly belong to the same
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group. The FES algorithm considers that by doing a check on the rank values of the
services as it is described in lines 10 to 24 of Algorithm 4.
By applying the FES algorithm on examples illustrated by Figure 5.7 we provide an
illustrative view of service rank results and how the clustering algorithm will group the
services.
Figure 5.8 (a) illustrates a histogram with all services in the example. Service X has
the highest service rank. Figure 5.8 (b) illustrates the two groups of services after the
k-means algorithm is applied to the example described earlier. We can see that there are
three services separated aside from the others and they are on the top right corner of the
graph. Definitely, they are the three essential services of this system.
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Figure 5.8: (a) histogram with all service ranks. (b) clustering of essential and non-
essential services
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Algorithm 4: Finding Essential Services
Input: ServicesList
Output: EssentialServicesList
// list of tuples < service, rank > sorted by rank in descending order
1 ServiceRankList← ∅
2 InformationFlow← ComputeInformationF low(ServicesList)
3 InformationDiversity← ComputeInformationDiv(ServicesList)
4 foreach service in ServicesList do
5 inflow← InformationF low(service)
6 infdiv← InformationDiversity(service)
7 sr← inflow × infdiv
8 put < service, sr > in ServiceRankList
9 end
// tally the number of times each service rank has occurred.
10 TallyList← ∅
11 foreach tuple in ServiceRankList do
12 sr← get(tuple,sr)
13 tallyTuple← lookup(TallyList,sr)
14 if tallyTuple !=NULL then
15 tallyTuple < sr, v + 1 >
16 else
17 tallyTuple< sr, 1 >
18 put tallyTuple in TallyList
19 end
20 end
// check for repetition on service ranks between services. get any tuple
21 tallyTuple← lookup(TallyList)
22 if get(tallyTuple,v) == Size(ServicesList) then
23 return ServicesList
24 end
// FindClusters always returns two clusters
25 Clusters← FindClusters(ServiceRankList)
26 EssentialServicesList← ∅
// first element is ranked highest. list is sorted in descending order
27 highranked← first tuple in ServiceRankList
28 foreach cluster in Clusters do
29 if cluster contains highranked then
30 EssentialServicesList← cluster
31 break
32 end
33 end
34 return EssentialServicesList
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The complexity of the FES algorithm depends on three others, algorithms 2, 3 and the
k-means. Algorithm 2 complexity is defined in terms of the number of services in the
system. It has two loops that iterate through each of the services. Let n be the number
of services, by iterating two loops of size n, the algorithm complexity in the worst case
scenario is defined as O(n). Algorithm 3 complexity is defined in terms of the number
of types of tokens exchanged in the system. It has a main loop that iterates through
types of tokens.
The complexity of FES algorithm itself is defined by three loops in terms of number of
services, in addition to the other three algorithms complexity. Therefore, let n be the
number of services, then FES complexity can be defined as O(n3 × logn).
5.4 Evaluation
To evaluate the essential services algorithm we devised a case study of a SCADA system
very close to systems deployed in the real world. The SCADA system, as illustrated in
Figure 5.9, consists of five networks: one corporate, three field and one remote network,
comprising of 43 nodes. The corporate network is used by the corporation employees
to monitor and control the field networks. The remote network is used by remote em-
ployees, so that they can access and manage the system remotely. The field networks
are the ones that acquire monitoring data from the critical infrastructure system.
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Figure 5.9: SCADA System network topology
In this SCADA system, the corporate network contains three MTUs (cssXX), one his-
torian (ch01), one relational database (cdb01), one HMI server (chsXX), four work-
stations used by the employees (cXX) and two remote servers (crsXX) that provide
access for remote users. The remote network consists of four clients using PC work-
stations (rcXX), and finally the field networks contain RTUs (fXXr0X), sensors
(fXXsrXX) and PLCs (fXXpXX). Each network is connected to the internet
through a router (brXX), and the networks also have internal switches (fXXsXX).
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Figure 5.10: SCADA System service graph
The simulation is built in OMNET++ [Varga, 2001] and we use SCADASim (see Chap-
ter 3) to build the simulation. From simulation network topology presented in Figure 5.9
we generate the service graph illustrated in Figure 5.10.
5.4.1 End system
The end system is the system being under control by the SCADA system. For this
simulation we assume that this SCADA system is controlling a power grid plant. A
power grid consists of four components: generation, transmission, distribution and load.
The generation is responsible for generating electricity from sources such as: coal,
hydro, nuclear, and so forth. Transmission is responsible for transmitting the generated
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power to the distribution site. And then distribution is responsible for providing the
electricity we use everyday. The load is responsible for defining how much load each
part of the grid will receive. For instance, Industrial areas usually have higher demand,
and consequently higher load, than some other regular areas in the city.
A common analysis tool for this type of system is the power flow analysis. Its goal is
to provide accurate information for each bus in the system due to specified load and
generator real power. There are numerous tools that providing such analysis. We are
interested on simulation tools that could be plugged into the SCADASim simulator. We
decided to use Power Systems Analysis Toolkit (PSAT) [Milano, 2005], a tool used to
design and analyse electrical power systems.
The end-system will be represented by power grid networks, each network being con-
trolled by one SCADA field network. The goal of the SCADA system is to monitor
the power grid networks, as we are interested on the network traffic generated by the
services used to control and monitor the power grids. Field network F01XX is respon-
sible for controlling power grid 1. Field network F02XX is responsible for controlling
power grid 2 and field network F00XX is responsible for controlling power grid 3. Fig-
ure 5.11 illustrates the case for field network F01XX. The dashed lines represent the
power grid network. For the nodes that are not attached to buses, same random data
(uniform distribution) would be produced.
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Figure 5.11: Field network monitoring power grid buses
5.4.2 Experiments
In this experiment we use the system described in Section 5.4, applying a network traffic
with only one type of protocol (MODBUS). It means all services will exchange mes-
sages on the same protocol, with the only different being the content of the messages.
We run the experiment for the equivalent to one day of runtime (86400s). The services
in the system exchange data about the power grids they are monitoring and controlling.
Therefore, a typical information exchanged is about the load produced, transmitted and
distributed to final users. Figure 5.12 illustrates a colour-coded graph that shows the es-
sential services of the system based on the data acquired from the simulation. Closer to
black is the node colour the most essential it is. From Figure 5.12, we can see that nodes
css01, css02, css03, f01p03, f01p07, f01p08, f01p09, f01p10, f01p11 have the high-
est service ranks. Comparing with Figure 5.13 that illustrates the betweenness of the
same service graph, the nodes chs01 included in the betweenness score is not part of
the FES algorithm result. This is due to the traffic generated by the nodes f01XX ,
which cannot be captured by the betweenness algorithm.
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Figure 5.12: Colour-coded service rank results from simulation using MODBUS pro-
tocol to exchange data between services
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Figure 5.13: Colour-coded betweenness results from the simulated network graph
5.5 Conclusion
This chapter introduced an algorithmic approach to find essential services in SCADA
systems. Such technique is relevant because is one of the underpinnings of survivabil-
ity concept. By identifying essential services automatically and in a standard fashion
practitioners will be free of the outdated error-prone approach of manual identification.
The chapter also showed that existing techniques used to identify key actors in networks
are not appropriate for networks where the dynamism is a key aspect of it. Such tech-
niques work appropriately on networks where the information content is not relevant.
The finding essential service algorithm is an essential part of the holistic survivability
model as it is used by the proposed model to identify essential services.
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Holistic survivability using
performance modelling
This chapter introduces a framework for evaluating the holistic survivability of SCADA
systems based on performance modelling. The model uses analytical and simulation
analysis to evaluate the status of services performance and the survivability of the over-
all system. The performance model is a model where services are evaluated individually
and then they are put together in order to performance a joint evaluation. The model
uses queuing theory to perform the individual analysis and a Bayesian network to per-
form the overall evaluation, and consequently compute the holistic survivability of the
SCADA system.
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter we use holistic survivability combined with a performance model to
quantify the survivability of a SCADA system. Performance is extensively applied to
quantify the survivability of networked systems. [Liu et al., 2004] proposed a frame-
work that combines performance and availability to quantify performability and sur-
vivability. The performance model is a homogeneous CTMC model based on the
M/M/m/m queuing model. It assumes memoryless inter-arrival and service times
with m servers or processors and m jobs (requests). While the performance model
Part of this work appeared in IEEE 10th International Computer and Information Technology, 2010
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handles performance measurements the availability model uses the notion of failures
replacing arrival-time and service rates with failure and repair rates, respectively. The
composite model evaluates the entire system as if the service model worked uniformly
across all its services. Sadly, this assumption does not hold for most systems (SCADA
and otherwise). Since services may behave differently based on their characteristics
and roles in the system. Evaluating the system in terms of performance and availabil-
ity without considering the systems heterogeneity gives an inaccurate system picture.
Therefore, it is not flexible enough for use on different types of SCADA systems where
there are diverse services. Our proposed model overcomes this limitation by consider-
ing both a service based model and service interrelationships. Furthermore, since the
proposed work is focused on the implication of attacks on SCADA systems, it is as-
sumed to be a fault-free system (i.e. does not consider hardware and software faults for
performance degradation).
As presented in Chapter 2, the proposed performance based model is not the first attempt
on quantifying the survivability of networked systems looking at performance aspects.
However, we identified the following issues during the analysis of previous tools and
frameworks.
• Existing models [Heegaard and Trivedi, 2009; Jha and Wing, 2001; Liu and
Trivedi, 2006; Moitra and Konda, 2000] used to quantify survivability are not
sufficiently flexible to be applied to SCADA systems since they do not consider
the heterogeneity of such systems.
• Existing survivability measurement techniques [Jha and Wing, 2001; Liu and
Trivedi, 2006; Moitra and Konda, 2000] do not take into account the interde-
pendencies between services.
In addition to these issues, and perhaps more importantly, existing models do not focus
on holistic approaches for survivability. Consequently, in addition to show how holistic
survivability can be implemented we also address the issues mentioned above. We
tackle them by:
• measuring the performance of each service according to metrics one is interested
to investigate
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• combining the services into a probabilistic graphic model that takes into account
the aspects of holistic survivability
• computing the holistic survivability of the system by computing the dependencies
and service states
It also is important to note that the proposed model does not attempt to produce new
intrusion and attack detection systems. We aim to measure holistic survivability that is
the ability of a system to cope with undesired events that may affect the performance
of the system. In other words, the objective of the model is to respond questions such
as (i) what is the overall system survivability in case Service X is unavailable? (ii) how
important is service Y to the overall functioning of the system? We address the security
aspects of measuring survivability in Chapter 7.
The proposed model defines an analytical and a simulation-based model that quanti-
fies and predicts the survivability of SCADA systems based on specific attributes (e.g.
service processing time and network traffic). The model combines queuing theory and
Bayesian networks. First, it calculates survivability for each individual service and then
aggregates the results into a final score. Over the next sections we will present the
model and how it is built on top of holistic survivability concepts.
The first step on applying the proposed performance model is to map it to the context
of holistic survivability. It means to describe each of the six-tuple elements that define
holistic survivability.
6.2 A performance model based on holistic survivability
As introduced in Chapter 4, the service graph (G) represents the services as nodes and
the communication between services as edges. Therefore, there is no change from what
was introduced in Chapter 4. The state service model (Sm) is grouped into three states
(Normal, Degraded and Unavailable). As mentioned in Chapter 4 the states and the
numbers of states utilised in a model are not constrained. The modeller should define
the number of states and their behaviour. In this proposed model we use three states
that defines normal, degraded and unavailable behaviours. We believe that these three
states cover the possible behaviours when looking at performance of services. Often
we expect a service behaving on a normal manner. It means its performance is accord-
ing to the limits defined to it. Degraded behaviour may happen when a service is hit
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with a Denial of Service (DoS) attack on any other undesired event that affects the ex-
pected performance of the service. Unavailable services are the ones that do not respond
requests. Many factors may be responsible for such a behaviour, including malicious at-
tacks (e.g DDoS, DoS). Even though one may argues that more states and consequently
behaviours should be possible, we believe that these three states are enough to quantify
survivability in terms of performance. And as discussed earlier in this thesis, the state
model is flexible enough to accept the inclusion of other states if necessary.
Even though we introduced an algorithmic approach to find the essential (E) and non-
essential (I) services of a SCADA system in Chapter 5, in this chapter we use the
manual approach for defining such services, as the initial goal of introducing the per-
formance model and show how it is computed. Then, we show how the model can be
learnt from data acquired from network traffic.
6.2.1 Performance metrics - M
In this section we introduce our performance metrics used to measure the behaviour
of SCADA systems regarding its performance. The metric goals are to evaluating the
performance of a SCADA system by looking at its services.
The basis for computer system performance can be derived from the ISO 9126 stan-
dard. It measures the quality of computer systems. According to them performance
is characterised by efficiency, and it is further divided into two categories: time be-
haviour and resource utilisation. Time behaviour metrics reflect the speed efficiency of
the system/service being measured. Usually lower times mean better performance and
higher speed (of processing). On the other hand, resource utilisation measures the use
of resources within a period of time. CPU utilisation, memory usage, I/O usage are ex-
amples where can apply resource utilisation metrics for evaluation. Resource utilisation
is defined by the ratio of busy time of the resource versus the total elapsed time of the
time period.
Even though resource utilisation metrics are important to evaluate system performance
we are more interested on the time behaviour category because it is related with time
that is a quite important aspect of real-time systems and systems with real-time and
non real-time aspects such as SCADA. The time behaviour category provides various
metrics for performance measurement.
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Metrics related to time are very important to capture the performance of a service or
system regarding speed and time to service. Some services such as real-time ones have
pre-assigned times to service. They have deadlines to delivery a service and if it cannot
delivery by the deadline the request has to be dropped. It means the client will not be
serviced and drastic consequences may affect the users of the system. For instance, a
water plant may have to open a valve at a specific time of day, a failure on that may
compromise people lives that depend on that water supply. We see four metrics as the
most important ones for the type of systems we are dealing with:
• Response time the time a service takes to respond a request. It includes the
waiting time and the actual processing time.
• Network latency the time it takes to either a request travel from the origin to the
destination or vice-versa.
• Waiting time the time a request has to wait in the queue to be processed.
• Processing time the actual time taken by the service to process the request.
We believe that the evaluation of the services is the best approach to have an accurate
picture of the system and consequently to detect possible failure states. The proposed
performance model uses time behaviour metrics as attributes: waiting time, processing
time and response time.
In addition to these three attributes we also use a network traffic attribute that measures
the traffic of the systems network. However we did not include network latency as
part of the metric attributes. It is manly because we are more interested on the service
behaviour. Any delay on the network will affect the service performance, and conse-
quently will be captured by the metrics.
Performance metrics are widely used to evaluate the performance of servers, networks,
and services. Latency, throughput, response time, service processing time, completion
time, and speed up are examples of widely known metrics utilised in performance mea-
surement [Menasce et al., 2004]. All metrics aimed to evaluate the performance of a
service are under the Performance category. Those metrics are used to evaluate the sys-
tem in terms of availability, reliability, and performability. Performance metrics are the
favourite metrics to analyse survivability, and dependability. In this thesis we do not
define any new performance metric, we show how the already used metrics could be
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used in our model. Although the ones described here should be relevant for SCADA
systems.
A SCADA system is a chain of services where a degraded service may compromise the
entire system. A regular SCADA deployment may contain from dozens to hundreds of
field devices located on remote sites and servers that are responsible for managing these
remote devices and to provide monitoring and controlling tools to system operators.
These servers are COTS machines widely used in all type of industries and business.
Therefore, they should be evaluated as such.
The field devices are extremely vital to the functioning of the system. Because they
provide the field information needed to system operators take decisions. Such decisions
affect the quality of the service provided, nevertheless to say any wrong decision may
have disastrous consequences. More specifically attacks on such devices may lead to
disastrous consequences.
SCADA are, in essence, systems based on the client and server architecture. There
are clients requesting functionalities from services, which can be considered servers.
Service time, response time, are common metrics used to evaluate the performance of
servers in systems based on the client/server model [Menasce et al., 2004].
Service time is used to evaluate the time a service takes to process a request from a
client. Response time evaluates the time a request waits to be processed plus the actual
processing time. Here we define Service Processing Time (SPT) as the response time,
and it also includes the time to response arrive at the client. Different from the individual
metrics SPT explicitly trace all steps taken by a request. It measures the request round
trip to and from the service plus the time the request took to be processed. For the
service client, the measurement includes the effects of network latency, request waiting
time and the actual processing time by the service. Figure 6.1 illustrates a typical user
request using a service time-line. Service client requests a service at time t0, the request
arrives at the service provider at time t1 and goes into its waiting queue, at t2 the request
is removed from the waiting queue for processing. The request is processed at time t3
and at time t4 the response arrives at the user. From the point of view of the client,
processing time represents the time that takes to the request being delivered, processed,
responded and delivered back to it.
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Service timeline
t0 t1 t2 t3
Network time Waiting
time
Processing
time
t4
Figure 6.1: Service time-line
Figure 6.1 illustrates these two perceived service processing times. For the service
provider, processing time is represented by st = (t2 − t1) + (t3 − t2), and for the
service client is defined as (spt = t1 − t0) + (t2 − t1) + (t3 − t2) + t4, where t4 is
the time to the response being delivered to the client. To refer to service time we use
the notation SPT and for service processing time from client’s point of view SPTc.
Therefore, Equation 6.2.1 shows the metrics (M ) applied to the proposed performance
model.
M = {SPT, SPTc} (6.2.1)
6.2.2 Probability distributions - P
Queueing theory is commonly used to analyse the behaviour of computer systems via
their performance [Bolch et al., 1998]. The analysis is made through a queueing model
that represent appropriately the system. It takes into consideration some aspects of the
system such as inter-arrival rates, service times, number of servers and the size of the
queues in those servers. Such approach is widely used in the survivability literature, as
described in Chapter 2. Queuing theory models such as /M/M/n and /M/M/n/k are
usually applied to analyse survivability. Those models provide closed formulas making
easier to analyse systems analytically. For instance, [Liu, 2010] has shown diverse
case studies applying different metrics and using queueing theory models to analyse the
survivability of computer and networked systems.
The holistic survivability model proposed here deviates from such models by making
it flexible to be used with multiple metrics, using analytical tools, supporting data-
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centric approaches, where simulated and real data could be fed into the model, and
also supporting the input of system experts, as the model uses Bayesian networks and
therefore is flexible to accepts external inputs (priors) (see Chapter 2).
We also understand that sometimes one metric could be more important than other, or
even not be relevant at all, therefore making the use of different metrics and giving the
flexibility of using them accordingly makes the model more powerful and consequently
more useful. In this section we show how holistic survivability can be used with perfor-
mance metrics to measure and analyse the survivability of a SCADA system.
To execute the analytical analysis with system experts inputs and the simulation-based
analysis we rely on queuing theory, as mentioned before. However we apply different
queuing theory models. SCADA services have different requirements and run on differ-
ent types of hardware. To represent such differences on the model we use two different
queueing models. We defined two type of services: Enterprise and Field to represent
services in SCADA systems.
Field services are services that run on field devices with very limited resources (e.g.
RTU, PLC). Enterprise services run the ones that run on more powerful hardware,
usually server machines, which are designed to be scalable (e.g. MTU, HMI Server).
Therefore, enterprise services are represented by M/M/n model and field services by
M/M/1/K model.
6.3 Quantifying holistic survivability using a performance model
As introduced in Chapter 4, holistic survivability is quantified by the joint distribution
that marginalises over all services of the system where the essential services are on
an intended state. In this performance model the intended state is the normal state.
Therefore, Equation 6.3.1 describes the quantification of holistic survivability using a
performance model. E represents the essential services and I the non-essential ones.
P (E = normal) =
∑
I
P (E, I) (6.3.1)
The proposed model combines queuing theory and Bayesian networks to quantify the
holistic survivability. Bayesian networks is not the only probabilistic graphical model
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available, as described in Chapter 2, in addition to Bayesian networks there is Markov
Random Fields (MRF), also known as Markov networks. Bayesian networks are based
on directionality, they are Direct Acyclic Graphs (DAG), where the nodes correspond
intuitively to direct influence of one to another. This is exactly what we want to show
with performance metrics in holistic survivability. A service that needs someone’s else
functionality is dependent of that service in order to provide its own service. A client
that needs a service provider is dependent of that service or set of services. This depen-
dency is represented by a direct edge between the two nodes.
To compute holistic survivability first at service level the state of each service is mea-
sured. Then, they are aggregated into a Bayesian network that is used to compute the
final score. In other words, the Bayesian network is used to compute Equation 6.3.1,
which represents holistic survivability.
The methodology to compute holistic survivability based on a performance model is
divided into three parts:
1. Individual service performance analysis - Computes survivability for each ser-
vice.
2. Bayesian network construction - Builds the Bayesian network. It can be created
either manually, by a system expert, or automatically through the learning from
data process. This process is introduced in Section 7.6.
3. Computing survivability - Perform queries to quantify the overall survivability of
the SCADA system.
Service
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Computing
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Diagnosis 
reasoning
Metrics
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Figure 6.2: Three steps to compute holistic survivability
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Figure 6.2 illustrates the three steps needed to compute holistic survivability. It is an
adaptation from Figure 4.7 that provides a generic view of the steps to quantify holistic
survivability.
6.3.1 Individual service performance analysis
As mentioned earlier, holistic survivability is represented by a probabilistic graphical
model, where the nodes are represented by probability distributions. This makes the
states of a service be necessarily defined in terms of a probability distribution, where
the distribution represents the probability of a service being in each of possible states,
in this case three possible states (Sm = {Normal,Degraded, Unavailable}). In
the next sections we show how we apply queuing theory to generate the service state
distributions for both Field and Enterprise services.
6.3.1.1 Computing SPT for field services
Field services are modelled as Continuous Time Markov Chains (CTMC). The num-
ber of requests in the service represents a state of the Markov chain. Field services
have limited capacity for handling requests. This characteristic can be represented an-
alytically by the M/M/1/K queuing model [Bolch et al., 1998; Pardoux, 2008]. It is
assumed that request arrival rates are Poisson processes with λ rates, service times are
exponentially distributed with rate µ and buffer size K (including one being processed)
and runs on a FCFS (First Come First Serve) basis.
queue
size
arrivals
λ
CPU
μ
service
time
K
M/M/1/K queuing model
Figure 6.3: M/M/1/K Queuing model
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The M/M/1/K model has been chosen because it has limited buffer K and it is used
to model servers with one CPU only. It is reasonable to assume that field devices have
only one CPU and limited capacity to handle requests.
Analytically, the probability of a request being rejected is proportional to the time the
queue is full [Pardoux, 2008]. The probability PK defines the unavailable status of
the service. Equation 6.3.2 calculates the probability of a service being in state n. The
Equation is derived by solving the balance equations that show the limiting probabilities
of each state in a CTMC [Bolch et al., 1998; Hillier et al., 1990; Pardoux, 2008].
(
λ
µ)
K 1−(λ/µ)
1−(λ/µ)K+1 , if λ 6= µ,
1
K+1 , if λ = µ.
(6.3.2)
Given λ, µ and K, P{Unavailable} is calculated by Equation 6.3.4, P{Degraded}
by Equation 6.3.3 and P{Normal} that represents the probability of normal status by
Equation 6.3.5.
A service is considered as degraded when its service time is over a threshold value t.
The threshold is defined by a system expert. Wq is the mean service waiting time in
the queue, the degraded status probability is defined by the summation of probability
states for cases where n×Wq is greater than t for 1 < n < K. More formally,
P{Degraded} =
{∑n−1
i=2 Pi, if i×Wq > t (6.3.3)
P{Unavailable} = Pn, where n = K (6.3.4)
P{Normal} = 1− P{Unavailable} − P{Degraded} (6.3.5)
It is important to notice that even though the survivability of a service could be com-
puted analytically, the numerical analysis grows in complexity as the number of services
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and their interconnections are added to the system. For such cases it is more appropriate
to use simulations to compute the states of services.
In a simulation the service states are computed differently. If a field service is dropping
connections it is considered unavailable, if the service time is over a threshold t it is
degraded, otherwise it is normal. Equation 6.3.6 illustrates such cases.

Unavailable, if Dropped connections > 0
Degraded, if SPT > t
Normal, otherwise
(6.3.6)
6.3.1.2 Computing SPT for enterprise services
Enterprise services are modelled as CTMCs where the state of the Markov chain is
defined by the number of requests being processed. The model assumes a Poisson
arrival rate λ, an exponential service time µ and requests are handled in a FCFS (First
Come First Serve) basis. The M/M/s assumes an infinite buffer and can process s
requests at once [Chan, 2000]. Figure 6.4 illustrates the model.
Enterprise services represent common application servers such as HTTP and database
servers. It is reasonable to assume that such services can either be deployed in cluster
environments with s servers or in multiprocessor machines with s CPUs, consequently
making them able to process s requests at once. The equations described here assume
that λ < s× µ, so that λs×µ < 1. Otherwise, the summations will not converge [Hillier
et al., 1990].
Analytically, Equation 6.3.8 is used to compute the status probabilities. It computes
the probability of the service being in state n, which represents the number of requests
in the service.
P0 = (
s−1∑
n=0
(λµ)
n
n!
+
(λµ)
s
s!
1
1− λs×µ
)−1 (6.3.7)
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Figure 6.4: M/M/n Queuing model
Pn =

(λ
µ
)n
n! P0, if 0 ≤ n ≤ s,
(λ
µ
)n
s!sn−sP0, if n ≥ s
(6.3.8)
We define a service as being normal when there is no delay to process requests, i.e. no
waiting time (Wq = 0). The probability of being normal is defined by Equation 6.3.9.
The probability of being degraded is defined by Equation 6.3.10. Because the model
assumes every request will be processed (sooner or later) the unavailable status proba-
bility is calculated by Equation 6.3.11. The threshold t can either be defined by a system
expert or learnt from data.
P{Normal} =
s−1∑
n=0
Pn (6.3.9)
P{Degraded} =
∞∑
n=s
Pn, if Wq × n ≤ t (6.3.10)
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P{Unavailable} = 1− P{Degraded} − P{Normal} (6.3.11)
For simulations, the states of enterprise services are computed differently. If the service
time is over a threshold e the service we consider the service as unavailable, if there is
latency time (LT) and the latency time plus the service time (ST) is not over threshold e
we consider the service as degraded and if there is no latency time and the service time
is not over threshold e we consider the service as normal. Equation 6.3.12 illustrates
the cases.

Unavailable, if ST > e
Degraded, if LT > 0 and LT + ST ≤ e
Normal, otherwise
(6.3.12)
6.3.2 Bayesian network construction
As introduced earlier, holistic survivability is quantified by computing the joint proba-
bility distribution of the services in the system, where the marginalisation over essential
services is of interest. To compute this joint distribution we will use a Bayesian network,
whose computation is represented by the chain rule introduced in Chapter 2.
There are two ways of building the Bayesian network. One way is to leave for the ex-
perts to build it manually. The other way is building the network automatically. We de-
scribe the automatic process (also called learning) in Section 7.6. To build the Bayesian
network and consequently to use the holistic survivability model we need three things:
• Bayesian network structure - Because we are using a manual approach the struc-
ture is defined by system experts based on how the system as designed to com-
municate when functional. This network structure uses the dependency graph
devised from the system. Nodes as services and links between the nodes as edges.
• Conditional Probability Distributions - They represent the probabilities of service
states. The most used forms of CPDs are the Conditional Probability Tables
(CPT), which are widely used when networks are built by system experts. In
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theory a system expert could define the probabilities they wish to represent the
states of the service. However, this is not a clever approach as the system should
be modelled as close as the one deployed (or to be deployed). To have behaviour
that approximates to the reality we model the system using Queueing theory, as
already discussed in Section 6.3.1.
• Essential services - One important aspect of survivability and consequently of
holistic survivability is the essential services. In order to quantify the survivabil-
ity of a system essential services needed to be defined. In this section essential
services will be defined manually. However, in Section 7.6 we apply the algo-
rithm devised in Chapter 5 to find essential services automatically.
To facilitate the understanding we provide a small and simple client server system that
is use to demonstrate the feature of this performance model on quantifying holistic
survivability. A more detailed and thoroughly evaluation of the model is presented in
Section 7.7.
Figure 6.5 illustrates a simple system with two variables (nodes) V ar = {A,B}, where
A is a service client and B a service provider. There is also a client but it is not part
of the evaluation. Figure 6.5 also shows that A performs requests and B responses to
such requests. By applying Definition 8, we have the dependency graph illustrated in
Figure 6.5 (right). And consequently, by applying Definition 11, the holistic surviv-
ability for this system is defined as P (A = normal) =
∑
B(A,B), where A is the
essential service and B the non-essential one. The fact that A is an essential service is
not based on the algorithmic approach introduced in Chapter 5, but to the system expert
choice. Chapter 5 shows how essential services can be identified through an algorithmic
approach.
The dependency graph is the network structure that is used to build the Bayesian net-
work. Then by using Definition 3 the factorisation that represents the joint probability
distribution is defined as P (A,B) = P (A|B)× P (B).
Once that the network structure is built the next step is to define the CPDs that repre-
sent the probabilities of the services (A,B) being in one of the three states Normal,
Degraded and Unavailable. There are two type of CPDs on a Bayesian network: con-
ditional CPDs, and non-conditional CPDs. The conditional CPDs are the ones whose
its values are dependent of its parents, whose parents are other services in the system.
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Figure 6.5: Simple system example
In this example. B is a parent of A, consequently, the CPDs assigned to A is con-
ditional on B, and B has a non-conditional CPD. For each node Xi there is a CPD
P (Xi|ParG(Xi)).
For this small case one could have a system expert setting up the CPDs for the two
services. This is a reasonable approach when the system is relatively small and more
importantly, when the expert has knowledge about the system. As first step the expert
should define the CPD for service B. As we can see from the dependency graph (Fig-
ure 6.5), serviceB is a parent node, it means it does not have any dependency, therefore
the process of creating its CPD is straightforward. The expert can just define three per-
centage scores, one for each possible state (Sm = {Normal,Degraded, Unavailable})
or by using the equations defined in Section 6.3.1 and defining inter-arrival rates λ and
service rates µ the expert could come up with the CPD for service B. Lets say the expert
computed the following values for the states: N = 0.88, D = 0.106, U = 0.014. It
means, the expert expects that service B keeps most part of its time on a normal state,
(88%) of that time, and it is also expected a very low probability for the service being
under degraded or unavailable states. For service A the process of defining the CPD
is the same, however more information is necessary as there is a conditional depen-
dence between service A and B, P (A|B). Therefore, the CPD that represent service
A is defined by Table 6.1. The state names in Table 6.1 are abbreviated due to space
restrictions.
Here, the expert could resort for some simulations to help on creating the CPD for
service A. Applying analytical equations defined in Section 6.3.1 will not work properly
because the conditional dependence could not be modelled. To make easier to create
the CPDs a simulation using field services (see Section 6.3.1) was performed. The
simulation provides information about number of dropped connections and the SPT
for each service. Figure 6.7 shows the number of jobs processed and dropped by the
services. For instance, service A processed 10000 but 2732 of them were dropped,
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around 27% of the jobs. Service B performed better, only 104 of 7268 jobs were
dropped, around 1.4% of the jobs. The dropped jobs represent the unavailable state
in the performance model (see Equation 6.3.6). Figure 6.6 illustrates the SPT for both
services in the system. From this information the CPDs for each service can be derived.
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Figure 6.6: Services A and B - Service Processing Time
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Figure 6.7: Dropped jobs by services A and B
Table 6.1: Service A conditional states
P (A = N |B = N) = 0.95 P (A = N |B = D) = 0.50 P (A = N |B = U) = 0.0
P (A = D|B = N) = 0.04 P (A = D|B = D) = 0.30 P (A = D|B = U) = 0.0
P (A = U |B = N) = 0.01 P (A = U |B = D) = 0.20 P (A = U |B = U) = 1.0
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Once that the CPDs are defined the joint probability distribution based on the factori-
sation that represents the network structure can be computed. Table 6.2 shows how the
joint distribution is computed. By using this table a system expert can many different
type of questions regarding the system.
Table 6.2: Joint distribution - P (A,B) = P (A|B)× P (B)
0.95× 0.88 = 0.8360 0.50× 0.106 = 0.053 0.0× 0.014 = 0.0
0.04× 0.88 = 0.0352 0.30× 0.106 = 0.0318 0.0× 0.014 = 0.0
0.01× 0.88 = 0.0088 0.20× 0.106 = 0.0212 1.0× 0.014 = 0.014
As introduced earlier, the holistic probability of this system is the probability of ser-
vice A being normal, P (A = normal) =
∑
B(A,B). Therefore, we are interested
on the first line of Table 6.2, which represents the marginal of service A = normal.
More specifically, by summing up all values of line 1 in Table 6.2 we compute the
holistic survivability of the system, as the summation represents P (A = normal) =∑
B(A,B). Therefore, the holistic survivability for the system illustrated in Figure 6.5
(a) is: 0.8360 + 0.053 + 0.0 = 0.889.
In the next section we provide a more thoroughly evaluation by demonstrating holistic
survivability using performance metrics a close to reality SCADA system.
6.4 Learning from data
Even though, analytical models used to assess survivability are demonstrated useful
they are not suitable for survivability evaluation of functional deployed systems. A
typical SCADA system may contain hundreds of services, which makes the process
of manually building the network and the CPTs impractical even by system experts.
Holistic survivability provides ways of evaluating the survivability of systems currently
deployed. The data-driven survivability evaluation uses data acquired in the field.
There are existing bodies of research [Cooper and Herskovits, 1992; Jensen, 1996; Mur-
phy, 2002] to generate Bayesian networks from empirical observations. Usually their
problem is to find the best network structure between all possible ones. Where the
‘best’ means the one the fits to what they want to achieve. The proposed model uses a
different approach. We use the interaction between the services to create the network
140
CHAPTER 6. HOLISTIC SURVIVABILITY USING PERFORMANCE MODELLING
structure. So that, we only have one network structure. Usually, the network structure
dictates the conditional independence of the variables of the Bayesian network. Other-
wise, we would have a highly connected graph representing the entire joint distribution
between all variables of the network. Clearly, this is not ideal, as the number of possible
network structures grows more than exponentially in the number of services. In the pro-
posed model, the network structure represents the dependencies among the services of
a SCADA system. However, there are three important issues to consider before we can
apply the proposed technique to build the network structure that represents the services
of a SCADA system.
1. The nodes in the Bayesian network must correspond to the services in the SCADA
system.
2. There is no straightforward way to use the network logs to learn the Bayesian net-
work values since a log entry is just a description of the connections between any
two nodes (services) at any point in time and does not describe the performance
issues needed to analyse the dependencies among services.
3. Once the network structure has been created, the CPTs must be generated. To
generate the CPTs we need a dataset that shows the variables, in this case services,
and its relationships, which can be used to build the CPTs.
Much of the process of learning from data was already described in Section 7.6. The
only difference here is that the performance model is interested on the SPT metric,
therefore the values recorded utilising the data structure introduced in Section 4.4.1, are
the SPT measured at running time (simulations or otherwise). It is important to notice
that the SPTs will be converted based on the state model defined in Section 4.2.3.
6.5 Evaluation
To evaluate the Holistic survivability model we use the simulation scenario described
in Section 5.4. Services are mapped as nodes and the interconnection between the
nodes is based on the dependency graph illustrated in Figure 6.8. SCADASim supports
multiple network traffic simulation, as used it to generate traffic from different protocols
to provide a more realistic view of the SCADA system. Table6.3 presents the mapping
between the three type of traffic profiles and the services used by the simulation
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Table 6.3: Traffic profiles
Connection traffic profile
css01 - field devices (fXX) 1
css02 - field devices (fXX) 1
css03 - field devices (fXX) 1
crsXX - chs01 2
crsXX - cdb01 2
crsXX - ch01 2
crsXX - cssXX 2
chs01 - ch01 2
chs01 - cdb01 2
chs01 - cssXX 2
css01 - ch01 3
css02 - ch01 3
css03 - ch01 3
The first step to run the performance model is define the dependency graph that will be
used by the model. As described in Chapter 4, the dependency graph is generated with
information from the network traffic. Figure 6.8 shows the graph that is used in this
simulation.
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Figure 6.8: SCADA System dependency graph
Once the dependency graph is generated the next step is to execute the finding essential
services algorithm (see Chapter 5), to then create the factorisation equation that de-
scribes holistic survivability. As one can see in Figure 6.9, four essential services were
identified. The ones on black. Based on this information the holistic survivability will
be quantified by computing the equation 6.5.1, where S is the set of all services in the
system.
P (css03 = n, css02 = n, css01 = n, ch01 = n) =
∑
{css03,css02,css01,ch01}c∩S
P (S)
(6.5.1)
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Table 6.4: Dataset D
Source Target SPT SPTc
css03 f00p01 0.35 0.53
f00p01 css03 0.48 0.76
... ... ... ...
f00p01
css03
f00p02
f00p03
f00p04
f00p05
f00r01
f00r02
f00r03
f00r04
f00r05
f00sr01
f00sr02
f00sr03
f00sr04
f00sr05 crs01
crs02
chs01
ch01
f02p01
css02
f02p02 f02p03
f02r01
f02r02
f02r03
f02sr01
f02sr02
f02sr03
f01p11
css01
f01p06
f01p10
f01p09
f01p08
f01p07
f01p01
f01p05
f01p04
f01p03
f01p02
cdb01
Figure 6.9: Essential services. Colour-coded from white to black (essential services)
At this phase the data is acquired from the deployed services. The first step is to ac-
quire the information being generated by the service. As discussed earlier, every time
a transaction occurs the service should parse the content of the transaction to acquire
the following attributes; the source, which represents the initiator of the transaction, the
target, the receiver, and SPT for both components (service client and service provider).
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The factors values were omitted in this part due to space constraints, however their
generation is similar to the information provided in Table 1. In this evaluation we
compute the overall survivability of the system, which is defined as follows:
P (css03 = n, css02 = n, css01 = n, ch01 = n) ≈ 0.78
6.6 Conclusion
This chapter proposed a performance modelling applied to holistic survivability. The
performance model proposed was mapped to use the holistic survivability components
and consequently to infer measurements about the overall survivability of a simulated
SCADA system. Two techniques (analytical model and learning model) were demon-
strated. The learning aspect is the most interesting one as it shows that such models can
be used to evaluate systems deployed in the field. Even though only one performance
metric was introduced (SPT). Because holistic survivability is flexible enough other
metrics could be added to the proposed performance model easily. It only requires an
adaptation on the service state modelling and on the metrics component.
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Holistic survivability using a security
model
This chapter introduces a security model for holistic survivability and also a security
metric tailored for survivability. The security model follows the requirements defined
by the holistic survivability definition (see Chapter 4), however it uses another graphi-
cal model to representation. The proposed security model uses Markov networks (see
Chapter 2 for an overview) for its representation and formalism. The Contextual Vul-
nerability Index (CVI), a security metric aimed at computer systems, and more specifi-
cally, at SCADA systems. CVI extends current CVSS score system by adding attributes
pertinent to the concepts of survivability. We conclude the chapter by providing an
evaluation of the model using a SCADA system simulated with SCADASim.
7.1 Introduction
When survivability was introduced to computer systems security was one key motiva-
tion. [Ellison et al., 1997] clearly mentioned it on his seminal paper that presents surviv-
ability to the world of computer systems. Unfortunately, most of work on analysing the
survivability of computer systems is based on performance aspects. Chapter 2 provides
a more detailed discussion about the current survivability models. We believe that per-
formance models are important as such analysis provide meaningful information about
the behaviour of the system, and this is one of the reasons we presented a performance
model using the holistic survivability formalism in Chapter 6.
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However, in more recent years, there is a tendency on associating survivability with se-
curity. [Nicol et al., 2004] presented a survey on model-based evaluation techniques to
quantify dependability and security; [Al-Kuwaiti et al., 2009] have shown that security
is related to survivability; and [Trivedi et al., 2008] described techniques that makes
a clear relationship between survivability and security. Such direction comes with no
surprise, as it seems clear that absolute security is impossible to achieve. From the
few models addressing security and survivability on computer systems, nearly every-
one follows the pattern of attack graphs (trees) and the models are not really aimed at
survivability. For instance, there is not much about essential services on such models.
On the other hand, recent attacks targeting SCADA systems (see Chapter 1) demon-
strate the fact that such systems are no longer immune to attacks [Falliere et al., 2011;
Igure et al., 2006; Munro, 2008; Patel and Sanyal, 2008; Slay and Miller, 2007]. And the
current state of affairs in security systems that provide mechanisms based on preven-
tion and interdiction [Coutinho et al., 2008; Goseva-Popstojanova et al., 2001; Gula,
2007; Kolesnikov and Lee, 2006; Krugel and Toth, 2001; Long et al., 2005] are not
working. The inability to stop every attack and the complex interactions in SCADA
systems demands a different solution. One that focuses on providing critical services in
the presence of undesired events, either malicious attacks or not.
In this chapter we introduce a model to evaluate survivability in terms of security. As
part of the modelling process we present a new metric, which is focused on the secu-
rity aspects of SCADA systems. The Contextual Vulnerability Index (CVI) extends the
Common Vulnerability System Score (CVSS) [Mell et al., 2007] by adding contextual
aspects. Two new attributes that capture the context of the system in terms of survivabil-
ity are added. The first attribute is Reachability, which measures how close a service
is to another service in the network. The second one is Essentiality, which is based on
the service ranking function introduced in Chapter 4. Essential services should be more
relevant to the security aspects of the system.
The proposed security model aims to tackle the following issues:
• Lack of survivability models considering a holistic approach on security and sur-
vivability. Current models are aimed at vulnerability aspects, how a vulnerability
can lead to another, and so forth. The models do not focus on the service aspect.
How the vulnerability of a service can degrade other services and consequently
the entire system, for instance.
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• The security metrics utilised are not tailored or devised with survivability in mind.
Usually, they adopt known security metrics to survivability modelling [Wang
et al., 2008].
• The models are not flexible enough to support the addition of new metrics or the
composition of multiple metrics.
The main goal of this chapter is to introduce a security model applied to holistic surviv-
ability. Therefore, over the next sections we map the components of holistic survivabil-
ity < G,Sm, S,M,P > to the proposed security model.
7.2 Service graph - G
The construction of the service graph follows the rules defined in Section 4.2.1, if there
is a transaction between two services in the system, a edge (link) between such services
is created. Manual and automatic approaches are supported for the graph construction.
A system expert can generate its service graph based on previous experience about the
system. However, a better approach is to generate the graph automatically. Such process
was introduced in Section 4.4.3. Nevertheless to say, each service represents a node in
the service graph. The mapping process is the same already defined in Section 4.2.2.
7.3 State model - Sm
As introduced in Section 4.2.3, the state model describes the possible states a service
may have in a system. In this model we defined two services to represent all possible
states of a service. Acceptable is a state in which the service either has no known
vulnerability or the vulnerability has a very low risk. Unacceptable refers to a state
where the service has a higher probability of being attacked, usually because there are
known vulnerabilities in the wind with a high change of being exploited. More formally,
Acceptable = 1− CV IUnacceptable = CV I (7.3.1)
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7.4 Security metrics - M
Security is an important aspect of survivability, however it has not been recognised as
such. We introduce a new security metric aimed specifically at survivability aspects.
The Contextual Vulnerability Index (CVI) extends current CVSS score system [Mell
et al., 2007] by adding attributes pertinent to the concepts of survivability.
This security metric may draw some similarity with attack graphs. In fact, there is some
work in the literature on attack graphs that propose probabilistic metrics to analyse the
security of systems [Wang et al., 2008]. The vulnerability score metric differentiates
from previous work on attack graphs, as probabilistic metrics in many ways. In attack
graphs, the security is related to system state. An exploit is a walk through services vul-
nerabilities, and consequently, system states. In our case, we map services to nodes, and
not vulnerabilities to nodes. An attack graph is a graph with nodes representing vulnera-
bilities, and the edges representing the probabilities of a vulnerability being exploited in
order to chain an exploitation of vulnerabilities. There are some work on attack graphs
using probabilistic graphical models. [Liu and Man, 2005] proposed a model that uses
a Bayesian network that maps nodes as services (vulnerabilities) and edges as paths
to attacks. We think this approach is limited because it based on Bayesian networks
that uses directional dependencies. By using such approach we are limiting the number
of possibilities on chaining attacks based on the vulnerabilities. In our model we use
Markov networks to avoid such a limitation.
We have defined one solely metric to quantify the resistance of systems upon attacks.
The metric is defined by a combination of graphs, vulnerabilities scoring system and ser-
vices interdependency trees. The novelty is on using these three techniques together. At-
tack graphs, tree and scenarios [Mauw and Oostdijk, 2006; Schneier, 1999] are widely
used to describe the potential of attacks and attackers targeting a system. The use of at-
tack trees to assessing vulnerabilities in SCADA systems is not new [Byres et al., 2004],
however as far as we know there is no work focusing on these three aspects together.
We have adopted the CVSS system as the base for our security metric because it gives
more flexibility for scoring the vulnerabilities. The context-scoring feature gives the
flexibility of scoring vulnerabilities based on the context. For instance, vulnerability can
be highly scored for Internet based systems and it can be irrelevant for SCADA systems
as it affects resources not utilised by them. By adopting the CVSS scoring system we
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may have different vulnerability scoring based on the context of the vulnerability.
As CVI extends CVSS before we introduce it we give a brief overview on CVSS, and
then we introduce CVI and show how it can be incorporated in terms of holistic sur-
vivability. For a more detailed description about CVSS we recommend its specification
[Mell et al., 2007], which introduces CVSS in further details. CVSS gives scores based
on three groups of metrics: base, temporal and environmental. Figure 7.1 illustrates
how the three metrics are related. Temporal and Environmental groups are optional and
if used they can not provide a score higher than one produced by the base metric group.
As shown in Figure 7.1, the temporal metric group can only be used if the Temporal
group is also used. CVSS is computed per vulnerability and produces a score ranging
from 0.0 to 10.0.
EnvironmentalTemporalBase CVSS
Optional
Figure 7.1: CVSS computation flow
Base metric The base metric describes the characteristics of the vulnerabilities. Usu-
ally, they are constant with time and across different environments. Table 7.1 describes
all the attributes that are part of the base metric.
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Table 7.1: Base metric attributes
Abbr. Name Description
AV Access Vector The attribute describes how the vulnerability could
be exploited. If remotely, locally, and so forth.
Three possible values: Local(L), Adjacent Net-
work(A) and Network (N).
AC Access Complexity Describes the complexity of the attack. If an attacker
needs to gain further privileges, how much technical
skills are needed, and so on. Also has three possible
values: High (H), Medium (M) and Low (L).
Au Authentication Measures the number of authentications an attacker
needs to exploit a vulnerability. Three possible val-
ues: Multiple (M), Single (S) and None (N).
C Confidentiality Impact Measures how the vulnerability exploitation impacts
the confidentiality of the system. The idea of sys-
tem is related to the machine in which the vulnerable
software is running. For instance, once exploited the
vulnerability gives the attacker access to the file sys-
tem, memory, and so on. It applies for Integrity and
Availability as well. Three possible values: None
(N), Partial (P) and Complete (C).
I Integrity Impact Measures how the vulnerability exploitation impacts
the integrity of the system. Three possible values:
None (N), Partial (P) and Complete (C).
A Availability Impact Measures how the system is affected in terms of
availability if the vulnerability is exploited. Three
possible values: None (N), Partial (P) and Complete
(C).
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The base metric is computed as follows:
Ba = RoundToOneDecimal[(((0.6× Impact) + (0.4× Exploitability)− 1.5)
× f(Impact)]
Impact = 10.41× (1− (1− C) ∗ (1− I) ∗ (1−A))
Exploitability = 20×AV ×AC ×Au
f(Impact) =
1.176 when Impact > 00 when Impact = 0
AV =

0.395 when Local
0.646 when Adjacent Network
1.0 when Network
AC =

0.35 when High
0.61 when Medium
0.71 when Low
Au =

0.45 when Multiple
0.56 when Single
0.704 when No Authentication
C, I,A =

0.0 when None
0.275 when Partial
0.660 when Complete
The CVSS metrics are usually distributed as a vector, in addition to the overall numeric
score. Below is the base score metric as a vector.
Base AV:[L,N,A]/AC:[H,M,L]/Au:[M,S,N]/C:[N,P,C]/I:[N,P,C]/A:[N,P,C]
Each attribute is defined in its abbreviate form follow by a colon and then the attribute
value. For instance, the following vector AV:L/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:C is inter-
preted as: Access Vector requires local access (AV:L), Access Complexity is Medium
(AC:M), There is no Authentication (Au:N), Confidentiality Impact is partial (C:P),
Integrity Impact is none (I:N) and Availability Impact is complete (A:C).
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Temporal metric The temporal metric represents vulnerabilities properties that are
mutable over time, it modifies the base score lowering it as much as 13 .
Table 7.2: Temporal metric attributes
Abbr. Name Description
E Exploitability Measures the current status of exploit techniques
and code availability. For instance, if there is some
code available that exploits the vulnerability the ex-
ploitability score should be higher if compared when
there is no code available. Five possible values:
Unproven (U), Proof-of-Concept (POC), Functional
(F), High (H) and Not Defined (ND).
RL Remediation Level Describes if there are fixes around. Users could use
to prioritise updates. Five possible values: Official
Fix (OF), Temporary Fix (TF), Workaround (W),
Unavailable (U) and Not Defined (ND).
RC Report Confidence Measures the credibility of known details about the
vulnerability and the existence of it. For instance,
the vulnerability may be just a rumour. Four pos-
sible values: Unconfirmed (UC), Uncorroborated
(UR), Confirmed (C) and Not Defined (ND).
The temporal metric is computed as follows:
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Te = RoundToOneDecimal[Ba× E ×RL×RC]
E =

0.85 when Unproven
0.90 when Proof-of-Concept
0.95 when Functional
1.00 when High
1.00 when Not Defined
RL =

0.87 when Official Fix
0.90 when Temporal Fix
0.95 when Workaround
1.00 when Unavailable
1.00 when Not Defined
RC =

0.90 when Unconfirmed
0.95 when Uncorroborated
1.00 when Confirmed
1.00 when Not Defined
The temporal metric represented as a vector.
Temporal E:[U,POC,F,H,ND]/RL:[OF,TF,W,U,ND]/RC:[UC,UR,C,ND]
Environmental metric The environmental metric provides the context of the vulner-
ability inside the organisation the system is located.
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Table 7.3: Environmental metric attributes
Abbr. Name Description
CDP Collateral Damage
Potential
Measures the potential for loss of life and physical
assets damage. It can also measure productivity loss
or revenue loss. It has six possible values: None (N),
Low (L), Low-Medium (LM), Medium-High (MH),
High (H) and Not Defined (ND).
TD Target Distribution Measures how much of the environment could be
target by the vulnerability. It has five possible val-
ues: None (N), Low (L), Medium (M), High (H),
and Not Defined (ND).
CR, IR,
and AR
Security Require-
ments
Provides the analyst with the option to weight the
importance of the affected assets, measured in terms
of Confidentiality (CR), Integrity (IR) and Availabil-
ity (AR). Four possible values: Low (L), Medium
(M), High (H) and Not Defined (ND).
The environmental metrics is computed as follows:
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En = RoundToOneDecimal[(ATe+ (10−ATe)× CDP )× TD]
ATe = Te recomputed with Ba’s Impact replaced by AI
AI = min (10, 10.41× (1− C × CR)× (1− I × IR)× (1−A×AR))
CDP =

0.0 when None
0.1 when Low
0.3 when Low-Medium
0.4 when Medium-High
0.5 when High
0.0 when Not Defined
TD =

0.00 when None
0.25 when Low
0.75 when Medium
1.00 when High
1.00 when Not Defined
CR, IR,AR =

0.50 when Low
1.00 when Medium
1.51 when High
1.00 when Not Defined
The environmental metric represented as a vector.
Environmental CDP:[N,L,LM,MH,H,ND]/TD:[N,L,M,H,ND]/CR:[L,M,H,ND]
/IR[L,M,H,ND]/AR:[L,M,H,ND]
7.4.1 Contextual vulnerability index - CVI
The Contextual Vulnerability Index extends CVSS [Mell et al., 2007] by adding two
attributes that provides a context in terms of survivability for SCADA systems. The
changes are on the Base and Environmental metrics. CVI does not change the overall
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computation process as shown in Figure 7.1. The contextual base score can still be used
alone, temporal score depends on contextual score, the environmental score depends on
the temporal score and temporal and environmental scores are kept optional.
The way the base metric is computed has been changed, and it is now renamed to
Contextual Base Score. Another change is that the overall CV I score ranges from 0.0
to 1.0, rather than 0.0 to 10.0 as before. The environmental metric has been changed as
well, however the changes are minor. All changes are described below.
Contextual base score The Contextual Base Score introduces two new attributes
(reachability and essentiality) and a constant (ρ), which defines how much of the con-
textual score should be used by the reachability attribute.
Table 7.4: Contextual Base metric attributes
Abbr. Name Description
R Reachability It is a variation of the closeness centrality network
metric [Newman, 2007], which measures the mean
geodesic distance to the other nodes of the network.
The metric attribute measures how close the other
services of the system are from the original service
in terms of link connections. It aims to measure how
central the service is to the system when compared
to the other services. The intuition behind reachabil-
ity is that services with good reachability are more
central to the system, and consequently any mali-
cious attack to those services may have catastrophic
consequences. In other words, reachability ampli-
fies the vulnerability attribute in the sense that a high
vulnerable service with a high reachability is pro-
vides a higher risk to the system. Services that are
able to reach other services at shorter path lengths
have better reachability.
Es Essentiality Measures the type of the service in which the vul-
nerability has been found. Two possible values: Es-
sential (E) and Non-Essential (NE). The concept of
essential and non-essential services are described in
Chapters 4 and 5.
The Contextual base score computation is described in Equation 7.4.1 with the essen-
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tiality computation described in Chapter 5. In the reachability (R) equation, s is the
current service, j another service in the graph, and dsj the distance between them.
CBa = max (((0.6× Impact) + (0.4× Exploitability)− ρ), 0) + (R× ρ)
Impact = Es× (1− (C) ∗ (1− I) ∗ (1−A))
Es =
1.041 when Essential0.520 when Non-Essential
Exploitability = 2×AV ×AC ×Au
R =
1∑
j dsj
(7.4.1)
The constant ρ is used to define how much of the metric should be allowed to the reach-
ability attribute. The f(Impact) function, which was previously used as a constant to
cases when Impact > 0, has been removed. Instead the reachability attribute is added.
The Impact and Exploitability attributes are compared to zero, and are only used if
they are greater than zero.
Environmental score The changes to the environmental metric are in the Adjusted
Impact (AI) equation. Before, the analyst could decide which weight to choose for
CR, IR and AR, now AR is prefixed to the value High = 0.151. The idea is to
reflect one characteristic of SCADA systems that prioritises Availability in detriment to
Integrity and Confidentiality (see Chapter 2). Equation 7.4.2 shows the changes.
AI = min (1, 1.041× (1− C × CR)× (1− I × IR)× (1−A× 0.151)) (7.4.2)
Another change is related to the scaling of values defined by the CVSS score. The CVI
score is scaled down to between 0.0 and 1.0. Scaling down the values is necessary
to have the same range of values between Reachability, Essentiality and the other
attributes.
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7.4.2 Computing the contextual vulnerability index
Algorithms 5, and 6 describe how individual CVI scores (per vulnerability) and for
all services of the system are computed. Algorithms 5 goes through all services of
the system. For each service CV I scores are computed and then summed up (see
Algorithm 5), line 9. As CVI is based on CVSS scores, Algorithm 6 is responsible for
parsing a vector that represents a vulnerability and computes the CVI score for it. As
mentioned earlier CVSS score are expressed as a vector. Once all CVI service scores are
computed Algorithm 5 normalises the scores. This process is defined in Equation 7.4.3
and it is described in line 17 of Algorithm 5. The function computeReach described
in line 5 of Algorithm 5. The findVul function (line 6) searches for all vulnerabilities
found for a particular service. The search is on the OSVDB database [OSV, 2012], an
open source database of vulnerabilities. Function findEssential executes Algorithm 4
that finds essential services. And function computeCVI represents Algorithm 6.
CV I(s) =
CV I(s)∑m
i=1CV I(i)
If i 6= s (7.4.3)
To the context of security, CVI measures the probability of potential risk a service brings
to the system. It is also important to highlight that vulnerability is inversely proportional
with the resistance of the system, Resistance = 1CV I . Systems with services having
low ranked CVI scores are more resistant than the ones with services with having high
ranked CVI scores.
7.5 Quantifying holistic survivability using a security model
As introduced in Chapter 4, holistic survivability evaluates the capacity of systems to
provide their functionalities in cases of undesired events compromising parts of the sys-
tem. It is quantified by the joint distribution that marginalises over all services of the
system where the essential services are on an intended state. In the proposed security
model two possible service states are defined: (Acceptable) and Unacceptable. The in-
tended state is the acceptable state. Therefore, Equation 7.5.1 describes the quantifica-
tion of holistic survivability using this security model, where E represents the essential
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Algorithm 5: Computing CVI for services
Input: G, ρ, θ
Output: servicesMap
1 CV I ← 0
2 services← extractNodes(G)
3 totalCV I ← 0
4 foreach s in services do
5 R← computeReach(s,G)
6 slist← findV ul(s)
7 isEssential← findEssential(s)
8 foreach v of slist do
9 CV I ← CV I + computeCV I(v, isEssential, R, ρ)
10 end
11 if CV I == 0 then
12 CV I ← θ
13 end
14 put(servicesMap, s, CV I)
15 totalCV I ← totalCV I + CV I
16 end
// Normalise all CVI scores. See Equation 7.4.3]
17 foreach s in services do
18 CV I ← get(servicesMap, s)
19 newCV I ← CV ItotalCV I
20 put(servicesMap, s, newCV I)
21 end
22 return servicesMap
services and I the non-essential ones.
P (E = acceptable) =
∑
I
P (E, I) (7.5.1)
As in the other models, service states are computed at the service level, and then they
are aggregated into a graphical model, which provides a compact representation of the
system, to then compute holistic survivability. Markov networks is the graphical model
used for representation of the proposed model. A Markov network [Koller and Fried-
man, 2009] is an undirected graph, where nodes are random variables and edges de-
fine the dependencies and relationships between the nodes. Chapter 2 provides a brief
overview on Markov networks, for a more complete introduction on Markov networks
see [Koller and Friedman, 2009] and [Barber, 2012].
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To use Markov networks, services are mapped as nodes, and the relationship between
the nodes is defined by transactions carried out between services. As one can notice, the
proposed model is not based on Bayesian networks as the model formalism. The reason
for that is that services are not directly dependent of their neighbours. The vulnerabil-
ity of a service is not dependent of the vulnerability of other service, even though by
exploiting the vulnerability of a service one may exploit other services vulnerabilities.
There is some relationship but not a direct dependency as presented in the performance
model introduced in Chapter 6.
As discussed in Chapter 2, a Markov network is defined in terms of potentials. In
this thesis a potential is a function from V al(X) to R+. This model does not consider
negative potentials. Potentials are used to parametrise the distribution that is represented
by the network. The overall joint distribution considers all potentials defined in the
network graph. By adapting the definition of Markov networks and factors to our model,
we have the following.
A Markov network is defined by Equation 7.5.2, where X is a set of variables, and Z
is a normalisation constant, also called partition function [Koller and Friedman, 2009].
Then holistic survivability is represented by Equation 7.5.3.
P (X) =
1
Z
×
∏
i
φi(xi) (7.5.2)
Z =
∑
s∈S
∏
i
φi(si)
P (E = acceptable) =
∑
I
P (E, I) =
1
Z
×
m∏
i
φ(xi) (7.5.3)
The methodology to quantify holistic survivability using a security model is divided
into three parts:
1. Individual service CVI score computation and service state assignments. It is
achieved by executing Algorithms 5 and 6.
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2. Markov network construction. The network is based on the service graph dis-
cussed in Chapter 4. It is generated by looking at the transactions between ser-
vices in the system. In addition the factors are also generated by looking for
maximal cliques in the graph.
3. Computing holistic survivability. Once the model is built one can perform queries
to find out the overall survivability (marginal over the essential services), and can
also perform some types of diagnosis such as what service is responsible for the
degradation on the overall holistic survivability, for instance.
The process of computing CVI scores for services in a system is already described in
Section 7.4.2, therefore it will not be described here. Instead the construction of the
Markov network and the services CPDs is described. To facilitate that understanding a
small exampled is provided.
7.5.1 Markov network construction
To build the Markov network three things are necessary. First, the network structure.
The structure is based on the service graph presented in Chapter 4. A system expert
has the option to build the service graph manually, without any help from data. This
option is reasonable when the system has not been deployed, therefore there is no data
or simulation to help. However, in most cases the service graph is built automatically
from the data acquired from the system. The network traffic can be processed to build
the graph. Section 4.4.3 and Algorithm 1 describe how a service graph can be built from
data. Second, the essential services of the system need to be identified. As they will be
used to compute individual CVI scores and also to compute the overall system holistic
survivability. And third, each potential needs a CPD associated with it that describes its
probability of the services being under states Acceptable and Unacceptable.
Figure 7.2 illustrates a service graph with four nodes (services). This service graph
contains two maximal cliques (potentials), which will be used to compute the holis-
tic survivability of this simple system. Based on the service graph the potentials are
φ1(A,B,C) and φ2(B,C,X), and the problem is to compute φ1(A,B,C)×φ2(B,C,X),
therefore assuming the C is the essential service, holistic survivability is defined as:
P (C = a) = 1Z × φ1(A,B,C)× φ2(B,C,X), where Z =
∑
A,B,C,X φ1(A,B,C)×
φ2(B,C,X).
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Service graph Maximal clique Maximal clique
Figure 7.2: Service graph - Two maximal cliques
Lets say that each service has the following CVI as described in Table 7.5. Once that
the services CVI are provided the next step is to transform these values into the possible
service states and then generate the CPDs for each potential. Based on the service state
model presented in Section 7.3, and the marginal for service C illustrated in Table 7.6,
the holistic survivability is defined as: 0.011738 + 0.066515 + 0.063906 + 0.362136 +
0.010835 + 0.061398 + 0.058991 + 0.334280 = 0.9698.
Table 7.5: Services CVI
A = 0.85 B = 0.70
C = 0.15 X = 0.48
Table 7.6: Marginal for service C = a
A = a B = a x=x = a 0.011738
A = u B = a x=x = a 0.066515
A = a B = u x=x = a 0.063906
A = u B = u x=x = a 0.362136
A = a B = a x=x = u 0.010835
A = u B = a x=x = u 0.061398
A = a B = u x=x = u 0.058991
A = u B = u x=x = u 0.334280
Figure 7.3 illustrates the holistic survivability of the system when there is evidences that
A, B or X are unacceptable. As one can see from Figure 7.3, the holistic survivability
for this example can vary substantially, and even though X is not an essential service
its degradation affects the holistic survivability immensely. As illustrated in Figure 7.3,
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the overall survivability goes from 0.97 to 0.56, if it is revealed that service X is an
unacceptable state.
0.8243 0.8193
0.5625
A B X
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
Figure 7.3: Holistic survivability for different evidences
7.6 Learning from data
The process of learning from data in this model only applies for the service graph. In
other words, the only element learnt from data is the network structure of the graphical
model. This is due to the fact the the values for the CVI metric are obtained by searching
for vulnerabilities on public domain vulnerability databases. Once those values are
gathered they are processed and converted into probability distributions following the
rules defined in Sections 7.3 and 7.5.1. This process is much simpler than the one
described in Chapter 6, for instance. Therefore the steps provided by Chapter 4 will not
be provided here.
7.7 Evaluation
The evaluation consists of using the SCADA system simulation introduced in Chapter 5
to show how the proposed model applies for close to real live systems. Because the
system being used is not a real system, there is no much information about vendors, and
vulnerabilities associated with products. The experiments demonstrated here are based
on three scenarios:
Unfortunately, there is no known distributions describing vulnerabilities on deployed
SCADA systems. Figure 1.1 illustrates vulnerabilities per category affecting SCADA
systems, however it is not a distribution for particular systems. Therefore, this eval-
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uation will use the scenarios described in Table 7.7, where Es represents the number
of essential services, CV I represents the number of CVI simulated and Default CVI
represents the number of services using the default CVI score. The default score is
θ = 0.15. The simulated system utilised here was introduced in Chapter 5.
Table 7.7: Scenarios
Scenario # Es # CVI Essential services
1 1 1 css02
2 3 3 css01, css02, css03
3 5 5 css02, ch01, css03, chs01, crs01
4 10 2 f00p01, f01p02, f00p02, f01p03,
css01, crs01, crs02, ch01, chs01,
f02p01
For each of the scenarios described below a holistic survivability quantification was
computed. Figure 7.4 shows the results for these four simulations. The goal of this
simulation is to show the the model works and how it can be generated automatically.
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Figure 7.4: Holistic survivability based on scenarios
7.8 Conclusion
The security model presented here confirms that holistic survivability is flexible enough
to be used as a framework for models based on different metrics and computational as-
pects. The presented model follows the requirements of holistic survivability, however
it introduces a new security metric and also uses another graphical model for representa-
tion and quantification. The security metric (CVI) extends CVSS by adding contextual
information pertinent to survivability such as essential services and availability impor-
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tance. Even though the graphical model used is different from Bayesian networks it is
based on the same foundations such as potentials and conditional dependences. And
finally, as the restrictions with holistic survivability the presented model assume that
service graphs are connected. To a further analyse of the model more discussion on
the CVI scores computation is necessary. And if they were generated for the essential
services or not, is required.
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Algorithm 6: CVI algorithm
Input: V ,isEssential,R,ρ
Output: CV I
1 values← stringSplit(stringSplit(V, ”/”), ” : ”)
2 C, I,A,AV,AC,Au,E,RL,RC ← computeAttributes(values)
3 if isEssential then
4 Es← 1.041
5 else
6 Es← 0.5205
7 end
8 Impact← Es× (1− (1− C)× (1− I)× (1−A))
9 Exploitability ← 2×AV ×AC ×Au
// CBa is the contextual base, Te is the temporal and
En the environment score.
10 CBa← round(max(((.6×Impact)+(0.4×Exploitability)−ρ)+(R×ρ), 0)
11 if E > 0, RL > 0, RC > 0 then
12 Te← CBa× E ×RC ×RL
13 else
14 Te← CBa
15 end
16 if Te <> CBa then
17 CR, IR,AR,CDP, TD ← computeAttributes(values)
18 if CR < 0, IR < 0, AR < 0, CDP < 0, TD < 0 then
19 En← −1
20 else
21 AI ← min(1, Es× (1− (1−C ∗CR)× (1−I×IR)× (1−A×1.51)))
22 Exploitability ← 2×AV ×AC ×Au
23 CBa← max(((.6×AI) + (0.4×Exploitability)−ρ) + (R× rho), 0)
24 Te← CBa× E ×Rc×RL
25 En← Te+ (1− Te)× CDP )× TD
26 CV I ← En
27 end
28 else
29 CV I ← CBa
30 end
31 return CV I
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Conclusion
This thesis has introduced a new concept of survivability. Holistic survivability provides
a different approach on evaluating the survivability of SCADA systems. It differenti-
ates from current survivability models in four ways: First, when evaluating systems all
services are considered. Second, because essential services are a integral part of the
system, holistic survivability supports automatic recognition of essential services and
the concept of multiple essential services, for systems that have multiple. Third, data is
an important part of holistic survivability. It recognises that due to increasing amount
of data being produced, and acquired, it is important to have a model that supports data
in order to provide quantifications. In other words, analytical models are important, but
they should not be the only way of quantifying survivability. Data support is on holistic
survivability core. Both models presented in this thesis have shown how data can help
on the process on model generation and evaluation.
And Fourth, security. Security is a core component of holistic survivability. Since
its conceptual definitions to its implementation. There are security models targeting the
survivability of systems, however they are not tailored for survivability, they use metrics
that not consider survivability unique characteristics such as essential services.
In the other hand, holistic survivability supports and promotes security as a key aspect
since its inception. After all the main motivation for holistic survivability is to provide
a mechanism that can cope with malicious attacks. More specifically, rather than trying
to stop and detect every attack such effort could be better used on assessing the impact
of attacks and therefore trying to minimise them.
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Another key contribution of this thesis is the simulator of SCADA systems. As security
issues affecting SCADA systems become mainstream the need to have systems where
one can try and test different scenarios in order to provide better solutions for current
systems is immense. In addition to that, the lack of network traffic datasets on SCADA
systems make security research on such systems harder. Therefore, a simulator that
can provide a close to real simulations where data can be generated and consequently
studied is very much appreciated.
Even though, throughout the thesis SCADA systems were used as examples and main
targets of holistic survivability we believe that the model can be easily adapted to other
information systems. Holistic survivability is a step on the direction of having informa-
tion systems under automatic assessment providing predictions to systems users. How-
ever, holistic survivability is not without its shortcomings. The model contains some
limitations that should be fixed on future work. Holistic survivability was demonstrated
to work with two types of models, one based on performance, and another one based
one security. As one may known, survivability is underpinning by four key attributes:
Recognition, Resistance, Recovery and Adaptation. We believe that recovery and adap-
tation could be merged into one attribute, however adaptation should be supported. In
Chapter 4, a brief discussion about adaptation was introduced, but no concrete models
that consider adaptation were presented. Evaluation of adaptation is not an easy task.
For instance, how one can measure adaptation, Is measuring a change on a metric a
valid reasonable of adaptation? How good is this in terms of adaptation? Lets say a
particular metric moved from state one to two, Is this a good adaptation? Or lets say
there is a hypothetical system that has its services working under normal conditions all
the time, nothing changes and the system seems to be perfect. Is this system performing
bad on adaptation? What is the ground zero for adaptation? From where one can start-
ing measuring it in order to have something that really represents improvements and
downgrades? All of these are legitimate questions that this thesis does not provide an
answer, and we see them as part of our future work.
A aspect related to data acquisition that was not addressed in this thesis is real-time
data acquisition, also known as stream computing. Such technology allows systems to
acquire and process data on demand. Data is only stored after it has been processed
and only if it is relevant for future analysis. During the investigations on processing ac-
quired data in this thesis was assumed that the data was already stored on some type of
database, and then the models only has to read and process it. With stream processing
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the model would be built in real-time and on demand. In principle holistic survivability
would support such mechanism, but only if all nodes that are part of the system were
known before hand, and if the inference process only started after connected graphs
were created. This is due to the fact that holistic survivability does not support discon-
nected graphs. It is a limitation of the model that we aim to solve on future work.
We believe that holistic survivability is perfect for the current scenario. Increasing
amount of data being produced and acquired, new and improved algorithms to mining
data, large sensors adoption, and a problem that has not an easy fix - security. All these
conditions make holistic survivability ideal for taking on current challenges to provide
a better answer when comparing with the state of the art in the field.
It is really hard to compare holistic survivability with other models, as it uses unique
techniques that were not implemented in this domain. For example, there is fair amount
of work in the literature on algorithms, systems, and applications using machine learn-
ing techniques to try to fix issues such as security, and so forth. Definitely, holistic
survivability is not the first. However, holistic survivability is the first to bring these
techniques to the domain of survivability on networked systems. By providing a frame-
work in which other models can be built on top of it makes holistic survivability rele-
vant.
Another aspect that should be investigated is the composition of different holistic sur-
vivability analyses. For instance, how the composite of security and performance could
be created to analyse survivability? It is not a trivial problem as service state model may
be different and the service dependencies also could have different characteristics. For
instance, as presented in this thesis the performance model defines three service states
and a directional dependence between services. The security model defines two service
states and not directional dependencies. How to merge them? A possible solution is to
merge the states to therefore create an unique service state shared across the models.
And for the service graph, a hybrid model has to be used. There is some work in the
literature of hybrid graphical models that contain direct and non-direct edges. This is
definitely a good point of investigation for future work.
And finally, a scenario that was not investigated because it was not part of the main
goal of this thesis is to incorporate holistic survivability as an architectural component
of SCADA and other computer systems. The idea was to create a holistic survivability
layer responsible for monitoring and inferring scenarios and possible issues with the
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system in real-time. In addition, combined with an orchestration layer, it would be
possible to have really adaptive computing systems.
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